China’s 22 provinces, four municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin), two special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau) and five autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Tibet, Ningxia and Xinjiang) each have their own distinctive geographical, economic and cultural outlook. To effectively maintain unity and cohesion, Beijing seeks to perform a difficult balancing act: ensuring compliance with the party line, while leaving provincial-level governments space to be flexible and autonomous in policy implementation.As a result, power has historically oscillated across the various levels of government. An effective analysis of Chinese foreign policy decision-making requires an understanding of the push–pull power dynamic that has long existed between the central and local governments.
While plenty of literature recognizes the role that provincial-level governments play in the formulation and implementation of relevant policies, this dynamic is often overlooked in the public discourse in favour of a perception that power is unilateral and centralized, flowing from the top of the CPC down to the townships. It is essential that foreign policymakers outside of China understand how provincial-level governments contribute to, and sometimes complicate, foreign policy decision-making.
Gerald Segal argues that decentralization and internationalization have disrupted the flow of power in China’s political hierarchy. By empowering provinces to become important political actors, these joint forces have effectively ‘deconstructed’ China’s foreign relations. China’s 1982 Constitution redefined the prerogatives of central and local governments, and increased the agency of provinces in the Chinese political economy. One example of this is the central government’s decision to allow local governments to commit to large-scale investment projects without first acquiring approval. While centralization has increased under President Xi, there are still areas where provincial-level governments have leeway to exert influence over Beijing’s foreign policy directives.
This paper presents Shanghai, Yunnan and Shaanxi as case studies to illustrate how local governments influence the country’s evolving foreign policy agenda. As the highest contributor to China’s GDP, Shanghai’s economic prowess gives its municipal government significant bargaining leverage and a strong platform from which to challenge central authority and shape policy. Yunnan is less economically developed; however, its geographical position, bordering Southeast Asia, has elevated its political capital. It has a unique role in managing border relations and associated security threats. Meanwhile, the Shaanxi provincial government has used its soft power to position itself as a manufacturing centre for the BRI and a magnet for foreign direct investment.
Audrye Wong has identified three mechanisms that local governments use to shape policy: ‘carpetbagging’ (modifying the implementation of central policy); ‘resisting’ (refusing to adopt Beijing’s policies); and ‘trailblazing’ (creating new policy ideas that benefit local interests and proactively persuading the central government to adopt them). This paper applies Wong’s concepts to Shanghai, Yunnan and Shaanxi to demonstrate how local governments shape foreign policy through the economy, security and soft power, respectively.
Due to limited space, this paper does not reflect all aspects of provincial influence on the central government. Instead, through these three case studies, the paper seeks to facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the central–local dynamic, and to show how provincial-level governments are not only important subnational actors, but also, increasingly, global players.
