In the case of migration, we need to introduce a further distinction between the European political economies. Immigration shocks can be primarily a consequence of labour migration (i.e. involving those migrating in search of work) or forced migration (i.e. involving asylum seekers fleeing conflict or persecution). These two different types of shock affect political economies in different ways, and as such generate protest among different labour market groups. In general, immigration is perceived as less of a problem in countries lacking a generous welfare state (as in central and eastern Europe) or in which the welfare state is largely inaccessible to immigrants (as in southern Europe). Yet because labour markets are flexible in liberal/Anglo-Saxon political economies, migrants to these countries are seen primarily as a threat in terms of jobs by those in the low wage-segments of the labour market – hence the strong opposition to freedom of movement in the UK that contributed to Brexit.
Southern Europe
In southern Europe, although the formal labour market is relatively inaccessible to migrants, the informal labour market is by definition flexible and ‘liberalized’ – the market is unregulated and makes up a comparatively large share of the economy. Here, migrants find relatively easy access to employment, though at very low wages and without substantial social protection. The formal sector is sheltered from these developments – and this is exactly what insiders defend with all the means available to them. It is the dualism between the formal and informal sectors that is the object of contention. Put another way, formal sector workers in southern political economies defend their labour market privileges, not their welfare privileges as in northern Europe, and populist protest therefore tends to turn left, not right. Migration in southern Europe stabilizes rather than undermines the strong dualism between the formal and informal sectors.
Yet in recent years, far-right parties such as Vox in Spain or the Lega in Italy have been quite successful in elections in southern Europe. Indeed, it was only in 2018 that the Lega turned from being a former regionalist party into a right-wing populist party (with a strong emphasis on migration). Thus the earlier, clear-cut picture in which strong left-wing populism was prevalent in Europe’s south, and strong right-wing populism dominated in the north, has become more nuanced in the last three years. The recent rise of the far right in southern Europe mainly reflects the fact that ‘secondary’ migration from that region to northern Europe has become less of an option since the refugee crisis of 2015–16, with the result that any substantial increase in immigration now strains local public resources much more than before. Again, only an explanation combining different political economies’ specific vulnerabilities to globalization with specific types of shock can explain these shifts, which longue durée approaches or limited hypotheses about citizens’ cultural attitudes cannot grasp.
Northern Europe
In the open economies of northern Europe, the context is very different from this southern pattern. High productivity in the Scandinavian and northern continental markets allows for high wages both in export-oriented and more sheltered domestic sectors. This translates into high domestic prices, which in turn requires providing – besides status protection for labour market ‘insiders’ – a generous level of social assistance for ‘outsiders’. However, large-scale immigration puts this arrangement under stress. Scholars have found that welfare states tend to be less developed in countries with higher levels of immigration, and that objections against immigration are also stronger where the welfare state is generous.
In northern European countries, immigration has had another consequence. Over the last few decades, countries have introduced welfare state reforms, for example under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in Germany in the 2000s, which were supposed to stimulate employment in the service sector and reduce the increasing dualization between those with jobs and those without. But the consequence of this was to reduce the protection that labour market ‘insiders’ had previously enjoyed. The loss of status protection due to these reforms became more politically contentious among working-class voters as immigration increased, and as more immigrants got access to generous minimum-income protection schemes in the countries concerned.
The political economy model of each country also has consequences for the kind of immigration shock it tends to experience. In Anglo-Saxon economies, a combination of deregulated labour markets and high demand for unskilled workers tends to attract labour migrants. In northern European economies, on the other hand, generous minimum-income protection schemes combined with weak demand for low-productivity workers mean that forced migrants tend to outnumber economic migrants. Thus during the refugee crisis in 2015–16, for example, asylum seekers tended to want to go to Germany or Sweden, which is of course still true but less of an option today.
What this all means is that the effects of immigration should not be thought of as an independent ‘external shock’, but rather as being to some extent conditional on the type of political economy in the country to which people migrate. This leads to distinct types of conflict, which in turn translate into distinct forms of political protest: ‘outsider’ protest against wage competition in the liberal context; ‘insider’ protest against welfare competition in the northern context.
Therefore, outside the UK, it is not migration as such that triggers right-wing populist protest. Rather, the interaction of migration with welfare state generosity and universalism is a driving factor, and is affecting the political economies of continental Europe and Scandinavia in particular. Where welfare provision is meagre and/or inaccessible, we should generally not expect a surge in support for far-right parties. It is this distinction that explains the differences in the manifestations of populism observed in northern and southern Europe respectively.
Central and eastern Europe
An immediate potential question mark about such a comparative framework is where the central and eastern European countries should fit in. The region has largely experienced economic shocks rather than immigration shocks, which might lead to the expectation of a strong populist left. Instead, right-wing populists have been particularly successful. Does this not squarely contradict the proposed explanation?
Yet when seeking to understand cases of populism in central and eastern Europe, it is important to recognize that the political space in the region has been inverted as a legacy of the communist period: parties that are left-liberal on culture are also neoliberal (i.e. right-leaning) on economic matters. At the same time, parties espousing conservative cultural values are often on the left in terms of their economic thinking. Voters seeking refuge from economic shocks therefore tend to vote for parties, such as Fidesz and PiS, that offer left-wing economic policies together with right-wing cultural policies. The strong anti-immigration stance articulated by these parties plays a distinct role in voter scepticism towards a deepening of European integration, but it has no immediate economic rationale: immigration is neither an actual problem for Hungary and Poland, nor is it likely to become one. In a region in which the loss of national sovereignty was the dominant historical experience in the second half of the 20th century, and its recovery after 1990 the most celebrated event, the question of migration may of course also touch other than economic considerations, namely concerns about sovereignty in the form of control over national borders.
