Reforming Venezuela’s electricity sector

Options and priorities for rebuilding a collapsed system

Research paper Updated 19 August 2022 ISBN: 978 1 7413 506 5

A woman in a dark room where a generator is providing power and dim light

Dr Christopher Sabatini

Senior Research Fellow for Latin America, US and the Americas Programme

Walt Patterson

Associate Fellow, Environment and Society Centre

Email Walt

In Venezuela, as around the world, the provision of reliable and affordable electric power is essential for the availability of vital humanitarian services such as healthcare and water supply, as well as enabling public transport, education services and the smooth functioning of the economy.

Decisions dating back two decades have brought about a dramatic decline in the generating capacity and reliability of the Venezuelan electricity system. Progressively worse blackouts since 2010 culminated in a week-long outage in early 2019. Load-shedding has been used to ration power supplies, further damaging infrastructure.

This research paper examines the root causes of the power crisis in Venezuela in the context of the steady collapse of the state in the country, to provide a series of recommendations concerning rebuilding versus replacing existing infrastructure and priorities in Venezuela’s critical energy transition. It urges the engagement of principal stakeholders in a broad, transparent dialogue to launch the reform of the electricity sector in distinct, coordinated phases. Given political will, primacy should be given to meeting the country’s acute humanitarian needs, with an ongoing focus on sustainable, locally based generation solutions.

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03 Making sense of multiple demands and limited time

Recreating a functioning, accessible electricity sector will require a focus on priorities and ‘quick wins’. Addressing the humanitarian crisis, and determining which assets can be rebuilt quickly and economically and which will require new, modern technology, have to be at the top of the list.

As discussed earlier, the needs and priorities for the restoration of electricity in Venezuela are multiple, and not all of them can be tackled at the same time. Given the complexity of these demands, it will be essential to establish sets of tasks within specific timeframes. Some of the more immediate priorities will need to address humanitarian crises, while others will be longer-term, such as reforming and rebuilding the institutional, legal and regulatory framework for managing the electricity sector. All of this will need to occur as the Venezuelan government seeks international technical and financial assistance and investment from the private sector; many of them will overlap. Table 1 endeavours to group these priorities and tasks. The intent is not to convey a timeline or strict chronology where one set of work needs to be completed before another can begin. In many cases these tasks will need to be conducted in parallel.

Table 1. Priorities and options for action

Options by priority area	Enabling actions
Priority: Humanitarian needs – hospitals, schools and potable water
Identify immediate humanitarian priorities Integrate mobile units (rented or permanent) when appropriate Prioritize repair/rebuilding vs new-build options Identify focus areas (e.g. Zulia and Nueva Esparta states, the Andean region and the Central control region)	Establish technical review and procurement unit in advance, before political conditions are conducive to allowing the emergency recovery phase to begin Start an early dialogue with international donors on funding availability
Priority: Institutional reform – overcoming structural and professional decay
Establish independent regulatory office/advisory unit Map generation and transmission requirements Identify new energy sources, including renewables and captured gas Conduct an analysis of the ways in which electricity requirements and reform are to be integrated into broader energy reforms	Create a legal framework for multi-, bilateral and private sector investment in the power sector Identify funding possibilities, including blended and green finance Establish the conditions for the return of Venezuelan sector professionals
Priority: Subsidy reform – making the system sustainable
Take early action to ensure that large businesses pay the full cost of their supply The oil sector should pay the cost of its supply, but in return should be paid for supplying gas Carefully roll back subsidies for small businesses, essential public services and retail consumers	Calculate the realistic cost of generation and transmission – this should be high enough to remunerate new investments Integrate plans for subsidy reform with broader social reforms, such as in wages and transport costs

Source: Authors’ compilation.

Options for rebuilding/restoring service

Balancing the use of remote renewables with a degree of grid dependency

Certain types of renewable generation assets are – and will necessarily continue to be – located away from centres of demand. In the case of Venezuela, the most obvious examples are hydroelectric dams which are located on remote rivers. (In contrast, thermal assets tend to be located near to centres of demand, many of which are clustered in the eastern parts of the country.) In future, the optimal location for wind generation is likely to be the northwest coast of the country, for example on the peninsulas of the Paraguaná, in Falcón state, or in La Guajira, in Zulia state30 – both of which are distant from the centres of highest demand. Greater flexibility can be exercised in locating solar installations, depending on land availability. This means that the present and future configuration and status of the high-voltage grid will play a critical role in balancing the system. Figure 2 illustrates the view represented in one report of the status of the electricity network and the key regional control centres and centres of demand in 2018, highlighting the surpluses and deficits across the grids.31 In that year, the Guayana region was constrained in its ability to supply the overall system because of grid damage: the situation is thought to have worsened due to the damage which resulted from the 2019 blackouts (as described above). Apart from in Guayana, available generation capacity was below maximum demand, but – apart from in Occidente, Sur Occidente and Insular – there was sufficient grid capacity to bridge the supply gap, if the overall system were adequately supplied. This indicates that repairs to the grid from Guayana and to Occidente should be given priority, as well as repairs to generation assets in the control regions of Occidente, Sur Occidente and Insular.

Figure 2. Key control regions and centres of demand in Venezuela’s electricity supply network, 2018, by surplus/deficit

— Source: Study conducted by Venezuelan experts, 2019. Note: Deficits and surpluses are calculated taking available grid capacity into account.

Supplementing existing infrastructure

One report identifies a number of key areas in which the placement of rapid-response generation (generación de respuesta rápida) should be a priority.32 The analysis bases its recommendations for the placement of such generators on a series of factors, including: the greatest need for electricity; the possibility for fuel to be delivered; access to transmission and distribution networks, and the capacity to repair them when necessary; and the possibility for installing large generation units to achieve economies of scale. Based on the report’s criteria, the states with the greatest needs and offering the most favourable opportunities for rapid-response generation are Mérida, Nueva Esparta, Táchira, Trujillo and Zulia.

It should be noted that the recommendations contained in this research paper are based on a different set of priority factors, including the existence of significant humanitarian needs and of opportunities for co-produced gas in oil-producing areas. In some cases, this may involve renting units, although this should only be done within the framework of an analysis of long-term options and cost-effectiveness. As the following argument demonstrates, there are viable attractive options that draw on renewables.

Options for small, ready-to-use units for local needs

One option that is now both technically and economically attractive in the Venezuelan context is the complete local electricity system, or microgrid. A microgrid uses small generators sited close to where the electricity is used, with a distribution network sometimes under local control. The system may use diesel or gas-engine generation, often in cogeneration mode – i.e. generating not only electricity but also steam or hot water – or even trigeneration, adding an absorption chiller for refrigeration and air-conditioning purposes.

Using technologies that can be small, modular and portable, and that can be installed quickly, microgrids are rapidly assuming a significant role in humanitarian relief measures across the wider region.

Renewable self-generation or microgrid generation may include solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, small-scale wind turbines or even, in suitable locations, microhydropower systems, coupled with batteries to extend operating hours. A microgrid may have a back-up connection to a larger high-voltage system, but the microgrid will usually be capable of operating in ‘island’ mode, with no such connection. Microgrids can be set up rapidly and operate independently. They are therefore especially valuable for emergency circumstances and critical loads such as hospitals and water-supply plants.33 Other suitable locations include universities, hotels, airports, ports, military bases, shopping centres, and indeed entire neighbourhoods and villages. Microgrids have also demonstrated impressive resilience in difficult conditions, keeping a locality’s lights on during storms and hurricanes.34

Using technologies that can be small, modular and portable, and that can be installed quickly, microgrids are rapidly assuming a significant role in humanitarian relief measures across the wider region. They have been deployed with particular success, for example, in Puerto Rico, after the destruction caused in September 2017 by Hurricane Maria. Their deployment not only helped to provide an emergency response, but also served to decentralize the electricity grid, making it more sustainable.

Box 2. Restoring a damaged system: the example of Romania in the 1990s

Before the collapse of the Ceauşescu regime in 1989, Romania resorted to the central planning of its energy system, with disastrous results – much as the government of Venezuela has done in recent years. In the 1980s President Nicolae Ceauşescu decreed that Romania was to achieve ‘energy independence’; but the country’s decisions increased its dependence on fuel imports, and fuel had to be imported in exchange for hard currency, which was already scarce in the country. A vast bureaucracy was assigned to establish quotas, and to allocate fuels and electricity to producing exports and to various industries, with punishments being imposed when quotas were missed or exceeded. Decisions were made centrally, often by those without the necessary competence to make them. The population, which was left out of the quota system, suffered. Power generation plants were old and inadequately maintained, with no spares. The country’s functional generation capacity was far below the nominal capacity, and the thermal plants created severe pollution – much like their present-day Venezuelan counterparts. Official information about the system was either falsified or simply not available. Skilled engineers existed (as they do today in Venezuela): while they knew what work should be carried out, they were not permitted to do it, and were effectively forced to lie.

After the fall of Ceauşescu in December 1989, the new government, with the help of the EU and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, reorganized the energy sector into an array of government departments with separate responsibilities, appropriate competence and a degree of independence: a model that could potentially be adopted by Venezuela. In the case of Romania, however, the various departments failed to communicate effectively with each other, well into the 1990s: the habit of secrecy proved hard to break. On the other hand, individual engineers had the freedom at last to express their opinions and to disagree openly with each other. Active debate on energy policy became lively, even heated.

An important step was to clean and clarify official statistics on the energy and electricity sector, and to make these statistics public. During the reconstruction, efficiency was a central theme for the government and for reformers, with the message being that improving supply made little sense if users were still wasting it. To this end, the government created the Romanian Agency for Energy Conservation, which published data and identified opportunities for improvement across supply and use, working with multilateral banks, international corporations and private investors on individual projects. The lesson for Venezuela is that a high degree of efficiency can be achieved at low or no cost, simply by inculcating a culture of switching off appliances and general ‘good housekeeping’: however, such a culture of efficiency is hard to promote if electricity is free at the point of use. The establishment of fair and equitable tariffs was a sensitive and difficult political challenge in Romania, and needed to be pursued slowly. Much the same will apply in Venezuela.

Funding: a critical issue

Before considering recommendations for policy priorities, it is essential to identify potential sources of funding to support the multiplicity of requirements faced by Venezuela in planning the rebuilding and recreation of its electricity sector. In the early emergency and repair phases (see Introduction) the electricity sector will need to compete with other humanitarian priorities for limited multilateral development bank (MDB) funds. In the longer term, in preparation for reform and new-build phases, it will be necessary to attract commercial investment into the sector, probably in a blended model that incorporates MDB political risk cover. However, this will only be possible if legislation is developed that enables key governance and regulatory reforms to be enacted: these reforms should include the establishment of an independent TSO that enables generation companies to access customers and bankable offtake agreements, as well as a plan to phase out subsidies. In mid-2021 the International Energy Agency (IEA) set out key steps to supporting the financing of the energy transition in emerging and developing economies: these included examples from the Latin American region.35 Coordination with oil and gas sector plans will be important to secure fuel supply and to ensure the sector either pays the full economic cost of power supply or reduces the load on the system by installing on-site generation. At the same time, the aggressive incorporation of plans for the restoration of existing renewable energy sources and the integration of new ones may open up the possibility of the involvement of international financial institutions and private sector ‘green finance’ sources.

Box 3. Energy access and displacement in Venezuela

Over 5.4 million Venezuelans live outside their country of origin: the current wave of displacement is the largest in the recent history of Latin America and the Caribbean.36 While there are relatively few internally displaced people in the country at present, more than 32 per cent of Venezuela’s population is estimated to be moderately or severely food-insecure. Malnutrition and hunger are rife.37

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 7 (Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all) commits the world to achieving universal access to modern energy services by 2030. However, refugees and displaced people are among those most likely to be left behind.38 Many of the Venezuelans who have crossed borders to seek refuge in informal settlements in Colombia, Brazil and elsewhere are likely to encounter issues finding fuel to cook food, as well as electricity to facilitate a wide range of tasks from lighting their homes to charging their mobile phones and powering their businesses.39 Current surveys suggest that those who are internally displaced within Venezuela – as well as those remaining at risk of displacement – are struggling with many similar challenges, particularly with obtaining power and fuel for cooking.

In the past, energy requirements have rarely been factored into humanitarian response.40 But this is beginning to change at global level, as humanitarian agencies begin to ramp up efforts to implement sustainable energy provision in their operations, especially where there is government support and available financing linked to national SDGs and climate resilience.41 This paves the way for collaboration with national and local governments. Host country policy measures and donor interventions can create favourable conditions for energy projects, for example by providing clarity about whether settlements and camps can – or will – be connected to a national grid. Another way is by encouraging the creation of large-scale renewable energy assets which can power humanitarian operations and eventually be transferred to the ownership of national and state governments, and local communities, as has occurred in Jordan, Kenya and elsewhere.

Note: Thanks go to Owen Grafham, assistant director of Chatham House’s Environment and Society Programme, for this analysis.

Establishing priorities

It is no exaggeration to state that Venezuela’s electricity crisis is multifaceted and complex, and its resolution will require several issues to be addressed simultaneously. Key areas of focus will include rebuilding the basic functions of an operating state, such as a professional public administration; depoliticizing the security forces; and establishing the independence of key institutions such as the judiciary, the central bank, and the public accounting and statistics offices. Nevertheless, there is a general set of semi-phased priorities, given the urgency of humanitarian requirements, the demands of ramping up energy production to restore the economy and to generate hard-currency export earnings for the government, and general public needs – such as transport and education services, and regular access to electricity for citizens, not least to renew their faith in government. The capacity of the national government to provide accessible electricity to key business sectors and to citizens will be one of the key criteria by which Venezuelan citizens will evaluate that government’s legitimacy and decide whether to give it their political support.

Figure 3 presents an illustration of the key phases into which the reform process could be organized. The text which follows provides additional detail on each phase.

Figure 3. The electricity sector reform process: an indicative timeline

— Sources: Plan País; IDB (2020), A Look to the Future for Venezuela; and authors’ estimates.

Recovery phases: Simultaneous recovery phases (labelled in Figure 3 as Emergency, Repair and Reform/New build) will run in parallel; within these broad strands, shorter phases dedicated to planning and surveying, contracting and execution will overlap, or will have flexible boundaries. They should not be seen as sequential. Nonetheless, it is useful to describe tasks as belonging to such phases, because they have different time horizons, and actions are likely to be allocated to different groups: for example, the project manager tasked with emergency and repair work will not be the same one who is tasked with considering and drafting proposals for legislation to facilitate long-term reform.
Emergency phase (to be initiated immediately upon transition, in the first year):
- In order that ‘emergency’ actions can be initiated immediately upon transition, it would be helpful if high-level planning and survey work is completed in advance of transition, as indicated in Figure 3. As well as identifying priority locations for temporary power generation, this work should include a finance plan and draft contract structures. Providers of temporary power units have indicated that those units could be deployable within months, if there is a clearly articulated requirement backed up with available finance. The IDB has recommended the establishment of a project management team to oversee this process. One possibility would be to explore the use of public–private partnerships to accelerate investments and developments in these areas.
- An independent study conducted in Venezuela identified priority states and regions for the deployment of rapid-response generation: specifically, in Nueva Esparta and Zulia states, the Andean region and the Central control regions.42 These broadly correspond to the deficit regions denoted in Figure 2, with the addition of Centro Occidente, where there is very limited availability in generation capacity. There is likely to be a tension in terms of affordability between rapid response generation to supply the grid and an approach where temporary power is targeted for specific critical installations such as hospitals and water-pumping facilities. The scale of the generating units is different in each case: the output of a typical standby generator supplying a large hospital is 2–3 MW, while a unit with an output of 15 MW upwards would be required for a typical grid installation. Because of the high cost per megawatt hour (MWh) of rented temporary power, any deployment should be linked to a clear plan to refurbish assets and phase out temporary power provision. If a generating asset is needed for long-term use, it is better value to purchase rather than rent.
- Faults on the grid between the Guayana and Centro/Oriente control regions are preventing the supply of 1.45 GW, or around 12 per cent of current peak supply, of low-cost hydroelectric power to the wider grid (Figure 2). Investigating possibilities for quick-win repair options should be a priority, as should restoring the capability of the national dispatch centre to manage the grid.
Repair phase: medium-term (first three years):
- The repair phase should begin with a thorough stocktake of the operational status of the current system and the identification of areas where capacity-building, providing spare parts, carrying out repairs and supplying fuel could make an immediate difference. As mentioned earlier, some of these steps could be initiated if there is sufficient political will within the government, as well as agreement within the international community to support such efforts. Consideration should be given to retaining the IDB-proposed project management team for this work to facilitate coordination with the emergency phase.
- Plans should be executed to repair and refurbish the current system, including the completion of any viable assets that are part-built (e.g. Tocoma). Termozulia is a key CCGT asset but its maintenance status is unclear. Contractual disputes may complicate these processes. If assets cannot be economically repaired, this should be recognized and longer-term replacement options evaluated, including solar and wind. Hydroelectric assets may take longer to repair than thermal assets. Although safety reviews are needed at some dams, grid connections could be restored relatively quickly.
- Coordination with oil and gas plans is a key part of this phase, as some assets are inoperable because of fuel shortages. Where possible, gas should displace diesel/fuel oil on both environmental and economic grounds. This may involve selective investment in gas infrastructure. The justification for this investment is strengthened if it can be linked to reductions in flaring – here, the World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership could be supportive. The expectation should be set that the oil and gas sector should invest in on-site generation, particularly where co-produced gas is available.
- Although subsidy reform is a long-term project, immediate steps can be taken towards reducing subsidies for industrial and commercial users. Reducing non-technical losses would also be helpful in laying the groundwork for subsidy reform, even if many formal accounts pay only nominal charges. In 2017 the independent study cited above estimated that 35 per cent of supply went to residential customers and 28 per cent to industrial or commercial users, with losses accounting for the remaining 37 per cent.43 Progressive increases to a wholesale tariff of $25–$35 per MWh should recover current operating costs without encouraging grid disconnection, although higher tariffs may be needed to remunerate new investment in generation and grid-strengthening.
Reform and new build phase: long-term (five or more years):
- The focus of the reform and new build phase will be the regulatory and governance reform that provides the framework for an electricity sector that is self-financing and provides good value for customers, and where both replacement and new capacity are consistent with the objectives of the global energy transition. As indicated by Plan País, the regulatory and governance changes are likely to need a new Organic Law of the Electricity Sector, although an emergency regulation may suffice during the above, shorter-term, phases. The development of the legal framework regarding electricity provides two important opportunities. The first is to better integrate electricity sector reform with the reform of the legal framework to ensure coherent, productive coordination across those sectors. The second is political: rewriting the fundamental legislation that guides both sectors to improve productivity and delivery for citizens may provide a unique opportunity for political cooperation and consensus-building.
- Best practice in international governance for electricity generation, delivery and management is widely understood as a system that is largely independent of political preferences by the state or by private owners. Key building blocks include a ministry to set high-level policy, an independent regulator for the sector, an independent TSO to run the natural monopoly of the grid, and state or private corporations providing generation and distribution, preferably with competition (especially in generation). Currently all these functions lie within the remit of CORPOELEC, where the minister of electrical energy was also president until May 2020. While the full unbundling of CORPOELEC is likely to be a long-term project, it is suggested that establishing an independent TSO should be an early priority to facilitate progress.
- Long-term subsidy reform is critical for the sustainability of investment in the sector: the example of countries such as Iraq shows that if this issue is not addressed early in the process, investment becomes beholden to government budget pressures and oil price fluctuations. In the medium-term repair phase it is suggested that industrial and commercial customers should be moved progressively to tariffs that recover the cost of supply. However, for retail customers there is a more delicate balance, between ensuring affordability for the poorest while also ensuring that high charges for the middle class and wealthy do not incentivize them to go off-grid – and to not then be concerned about broader access to quality service. The IDB has set out the challenges in arriving at a fair and sustainable tariff structure, as well as how to balance fixed and variable charges.44 Given Venezuela’s chronic historical deficiencies in bill collection in this sector, greater attention will need to be devoted to establishing an effective and fair structure for assessing and collecting fees.
- Venezuela must plan for future investment in generation capacity, particularly in wind and solar power, which could improve system resilience to drought conditions and reduce both oil consumption and carbon emissions. As mentioned above, green finance funding – potentially combined with other sources – is a resource which in the future Venezuela could tap, both for the restoration of its hydropower sector and for upgrading the energy mix to integrate solar and wind power. The IEA, in its 2021 Hydropower Special Market Report,45 highlighted that the share of generation accounted for by hydropower across Latin America is relatively high, at 45 per cent compared to a global share of 16 per cent, but cautioned that any expansion should be selective and should prioritize projects that can store energy, rather than those exposed to drought risk, which particularly affects run-of-river projects. In Venezuela, some initial research has been carried out on the potential for solar installations in the northwest, and there are two non-operational wind assets in Falcón and Zulia states. For both solar and wind renewables, the principle of using auctions to promote competition for supply has been used successfully across the Latin American region in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, but such success is dependent on the ability of these renewable sources of electricity to access the market and bankable offtake.46 Because most wind resources tend to be located on the coast, far away from centres of demand, investment in those facilities will have to be coordinated with investment in grid strengthening. In the long term, as liquid-fuelled thermal assets reach the end of their economic life, their generating capacity should be replaced in the form of renewables. The same may apply to gas-fired assets: however, there is only an environmental gain if any gas displaced is not flared.

A common theme among the analyses discussed in this paper is that historic mismanagement on the part of Venezuela’s regime is the sole source of unreliability in the country’s electricity system. That view, however, may not take into account other factors, such as progressive climate change or the availability of new technology options, and could hinder consideration of how to achieve certain improvements in the future. Examples might include strengthening the grid, better integrating hydropower and intermittent renewables such as wind and solar, establishing smaller units within microgrids, reducing future dependence on thermal assets as they reach the end of their lives, and improving resilience to climate change.

Venezuelanalysis.com (2010), ‘Wind Generation to Represent 10% of Electricity Production in Venezuela by 2025’, 11 April 2010, https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5265.

The cited report was prepared by subject-matter experts with proven professional experience in power generation in Venezuela, and was shared with the authors of this research paper on the condition of anonymity.

Ibid.

Hirschbold, M. and Haun, A. (2019), How new microgrid designs help hospitals increase resilience, cut costs, and improve sustainability, Research Paper, Schneider Electric, https://microgridknowledge.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/998-20588515_GMA-Hospital-microgrids.pdf.

S&C Electric Company (2018), Is a microgrid right for you?, Research Paper, https://microgridknowledge.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Is-a-Microgrid-Right-For-You.pdf; Baier, M., Bhavaraju, V., Murch, W. and Teleke, S. (2017), Making microgrids work: Practical and technical considerations to advance power resiliency, Research Paper, Eaton, https://microgridknowledge.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Making-Microgrids-Work-to-Advance-Power-Resiliency.pdf.

International Energy Agency (2021), Financing clean energy transitions in emerging and developing economies, IEA Flagship Report Extract, https://www.iea.org/reports/financing-clean-energy-transitions-in-emerging-and-developing-economies.

Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (2021), Refugee and Migrant Response Plan 2021, https://rmrp.r4v.info. See also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2021), ‘Venezuela Situation’, https://www.unhcr.org/uk/venezuela-emergency.html.

World Food Programme (2019), Venezuela Food Security Assessment, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Main%20Findings%20WFP%20Food%20Security%20Assessment%20in%20Venezuela_January%202020-2.pdf.

Grafham, O. (ed.) (2019), Energy Access and Forced Migration, Oxford: Routledge.

Lehne, J., Blyth, W., Lahn, G., Bazilian, M. and Grafham, O. (2016), ‘Energy services for refugees and displaced people’, Energy Strategy Reviews, 13–14, pp. 134–46, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2016.08.008; Global Platform for Action (2020), ‘Helping the UN cut down on fossil fuels by de-risking energy service contracts’, 8 September 2021, https://www.humanitarianenergy.org/news/latest/helping-the-un-cut-down-on-fossil-fuels-by-de-risking-energy-service-contracts.

Lahn, G. and Grafham, O. (2015), Heat, Light and Power for Refugees: Saving Lives, Reducing Costs, Chatham House Report for the Moving Energy Initiative, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2015-11-17-heat-light-power-refugees-lahn-grafham-final.pdf.

Global Platform for Action (2021), ‘Leaving (really) no one behind: Energy Access in Fragile and Conflict Affected Areas’, 5 July 2021, https://www.humanitarianenergy.org/what-is-the-gpa/resources-and-tools/leaving-really-no-one-behind-energy-access-in-fragile-and-conflict-affected-areas.

Cavallo, E., Powell, A. and Serebrisky, T. (2020), From Structures to Services: The Path to Better Infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean (Executive Summary), Inter-American Development Bank, https://publications.iadb.org/en/from-structures-to-services-the-path-to-better-infrastructure-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-executive-summary.

IEA (2021), Hydropower Special Market Report: Analysis and forecast to 2030, https://www.iea.org/reports/hydropower-special-market-report.

IEA (2020), Renewables 2020: Analysis and forecast to 2025, https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-2020.

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