As he tries to assert an even bigger ambition on the European continent, Vladimir Putin appears to be losing patience with Ukraine. The proxy-war in Donbas has inflicted much suffering on its citizens but has not subverted Kyiv’s determination to pursue the Euro-Atlantic integration and reforms which destroy the Soviet legacy Putin cherishes so much.
Ukraine is progressing along the bumpy road of aligning its political and economic system to countries in the European Union (EU), while also successfully building a decentralized nation of strong communities at home. Its economy now survives without Russian energy, and most exports go to China and the EU instead of Russia.
But it pays a heavy price for such determination, with United Nations (UN) estimates of more than 13,000 killed and 33,000 heavily wounded since the start of the military aggression in 2014. And Russia keeps the pressure on by continuing with low-intensity conflict – the six ceasefires negotiated as part of the Minsk Accords have lowered the numbers of victims but never ended hostilities.
Russia views the Minsk Accords merely as a tool to impose limited sovereignty on Ukraine by legitimizing Russian proxy groups and providing them with overarching autonomy, including the right to veto Ukraine’s foreign policy direction.
But such a ‘settlement’ is unacceptable to Kyiv and Putin so far has failed to impose his reading of the agreement on Paris and Berlin, leaving Russia sidelined and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken openly calling on Russia to implement its parts of Minsk during the recent Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) meeting in Stockholm.
Russia wants a two-tier Europe
Russia refuses to shift its position and, in fact, is trying to enlarge its entitlement with a buffer zone which expands beyond the former Soviet republics to the countries of Eastern Europe, the former Warsaw pact region. Russia’s proposed two draft treaties on 17 December outline the establishment of a two-tier Europe – one with the right to defend itself from Russian encroachment while the other must accept Russian supremacy as a new geopolitical reality.
Put simply, this would mean former republics of the USSR such as Ukraine are denied the right to exist as fully independent states, and shows Putin’s quasi-historical essay on Ukraine is effectively an ideological proclamation towards the whole of post-Soviet region.
Claiming that ‘true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia’, Putin will happily foster the region’s dependency on Russia. His obsession with great power status means he must ‘gather Russian lands’ and reconstitute what he recently called a ‘historical Russia’ which disintegrated with the collapse of the USSR.
Moscow wants Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and even the Central Asian states to be ‘reunited’ with Mother Russia – an ambition perfectly understood by Ukraine which therefore sees the current conflict as more than simply a war for independence, but to prevent re-colonization following 30 years since the collapse of the USSR, and to stop a new Imperial Russia project.
As that project entails control over the states of the former Soviet Union and a restoration of the sphere of influence in the periphery, the demand to NATO is to de-militarize in Eastern Europe to the level of 1997 when Romania became the first former Warsaw Pact country to be invited to join NATO.
Ukraine knows it is a prime target in Putin’s masterplan. Current Russian leadership does not respect its right to statehood and Moscow will continue with its full spectrum of warfare using information, energy, history, and kinetic tools. Ukraine now sees its own struggle as containing Russia’s expansion more widely, with the outcome deciding if the rule-based international order can be upheld or if powerful nations such as Russia and China get to shape the world by coercion and military force.
Russia also fails to accept that NATO’s enlargement eastwards was not driven by Washington, but instead by insecurity among former Warsaw Pact countries towards Russia. This same logic pushes a majority of Ukrainians to desire collective security through NATO, with survey data showing if a referendum about NATO membership were to take place, up to 70 per cent would vote for it.
But collective security also needs the capacity of individual countries to defend themselves. And Ukrainians take self-defence seriously – the resolve to defend Ukraine with a weapon in hands has been declared by 60 per cent of its citizens. In addition to combat-tested armed forces, Ukraine does have around 400,000 combat veterans to lead a civilian resistance so, although taking territory may be feasible for Putin, keeping it will not be easy.
International resolve to deter Russia is vital
High-level talks between Moscow and Washington have yet to lead to de-escalation and therefore much depends on a unified international resolve to deter Russia – which is why splitting transatlantic solidary on Ukraine is one of Putin’s top priorities. New leadership in Germany offers him an opportunity to do this, as does the desire of the Biden administration to focus on China, which may make it expedient to appease Putin.
Any such temptation must be avoided as a unified transatlantic coalition can deter Russia from its revisionist plans. It is key to remember that discouraging Russia from addressing a perceived security problem by military intervention in a neighbouring state matters not just for Ukraine but for European security and the future of international order.