Professor of International Relations and Contemporary History, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
Kristin
Ven Bruusgaard
Postdoctoral fellow/Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo
Margarete
Klein
Head of Research Division – Eastern Europe, Eurasia, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)
This Chatham House research aims to address some of the longer-term conceptual challenges in understanding Russian hard power, which are not directly linked to current operations in Ukraine.
It challenges some ideas about Russian military power and doctrine which have become entrenched among non-specialists but are based on false premises or a misreading of Russia’s own aims, objectives and methods. Some of these misconceptions may have major implications for any future confrontation between Russia and one or more adversaries, potentially including NATO members.
This is a live product to which new subsections will be added as they become available.
Myth 3: ‘Russia wouldn’t attack a NATO member state’
Kalev
Stoicescu
Research Fellow, International Centre for Defence and Security
The assumption that NATO’s collective-defence principle can deter Russia misinterprets Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, while underplaying Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions.
What is the myth?
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has reminded NATO that President Vladimir Putin sees military aggression as a rational means to achieve his foreign policy aims. It has also triggered widespread discussion of the implications if Russia were to follow this with an attack on a NATO member state. The prevailing view is that this is highly unlikely, because Russia must realize the devastating implications of the entirety of the Western alliance joining the conflict and inflicting intolerable damage on Russia. However, this view is based on a number of questionable premises, and in fact a Russian attack on a NATO member state should not be ruled out.
Who advocates or subscribes to it?
A wide range of political figures, analysts and commentators have discounted the likelihood of a Russian attack on a NATO member state. This is primarily because, in their view, NATO’s deterrent message of unity is strong, and Russia is fully cognizant of the fact that an attack on one NATO member state would inevitably bring the rest of the alliance into the conflict. Other Western commentary suggests that there is no evident benefit to Russia in an attack on the Baltic states or Poland.
Russia, too, has added its assurances that it has no hostile intent against NATO – although these assurances are now recognized as valueless, since the same promises were made regarding Ukraine in the lead-up to the 2022 invasion. Indeed in March 2022 Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, stated once again that Russia had no plans to attack other countries, but in the same interview also claimed that Russia had not attacked Ukraine.
Why is it wrong?
There are several reasons why it is incorrect to assume that Russia would not attack NATO members.
The first lies in the term ‘attack’. Ordinarily, this is understood as the ‘armed attack’ specified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – implying an overt use of force which would clearly and unambiguously breach the definitional threshold for armed conflict. However, this narrow definition overlooks both the fact that many other forms of coercion have already been practised by Russia against NATO member states in the sphere of warfare commonly referred to as ‘hybrid’, ‘sub-threshold’ or ‘grey zone’, and that Russia has already used military assets to carry out actions against NATO member states that are indistinguishable from those conducted during wartime. In 2014 Russia sent military intelligence officers to the Czech Republic and Bulgaria to sabotage munitions depots. More recently, Russia has persistently used its military electronic warfare assets to trigger disruption in the Nordic and Baltic areas. In fact, the narrower sense of ‘armed attack’ is one of the few ways in which Russia has not already attacked NATO members.
Russia has already used military assets to carry out actions against NATO member states that are indistinguishable from those conducted during wartime
Second, the entire principle of NATO deterrence rests on an interpretation of Article 5 which does not stand up to close scrutiny. Senior NATO figures and politicians from member states focus on the part of Article 5 which states that an attack on one NATO member state is to be considered an attack against all of them. But this is ordinarily coupled with the assertion, or assumption, that all other member states are obliged immediately to join the conflict by contributing forces to aid the victim of aggression.
Yet this is not what Article 5 actually stipulates, and it is highly probable that, unlike many Western politicians, Russia’s military planners have in fact read it.
The actual text of Article 5 provides plenty of leeway for any member state that might wish to avoid entering a conflict with an aggressor. The requirement only to take the action that each member state ‘deems necessary… to restore and maintain’ security is far more vague than the clear and direct requirement to support the victim of aggression that is ordinarily assumed.
The implication is that Russia might be unlikely to attack a NATO member state if it were indeed convinced that this would trigger retaliation from the rest of the alliance. But there are many circumstances in which Moscow could make a calculated assessment that it could target an individual country while ensuring through other means – political, diplomatic or subversive – that one or more major NATO allies could be effectively deterred from responding, or induced or persuaded not to respond.
Third, the assessment that Russia would not attack a NATO member state rests on the assumption that decision-makers in Moscow are assessing their options using the same framework of reality and rationality as the Euro-Atlantic community. However, both the shifting rationales for the invasion of Ukraine and the counterproductive nature of the invasion itself show that this should not be relied on. Many of Russia’s recent actions have achieved the exact opposite of what they were intended to do because of Moscow’s faulty understanding of events and processes in the outside world. For example, Russia makes military threats and launches military action in order to dissuade neighbours from joining NATO – with the only result being to demonstrate to those neighbours precisely why they need to join. The most recent examples are Finland and Sweden: the former a long-time exponent of stable relations with Russia, and the latter a country that enjoyed military neutrality for more than two centuries. Similarly, the possibility of misguided actions by the Russian leadership in the future should not be ruled out solely on the basis of what appears rational based on Western assumptions and the Western understanding of recent history.
Fourth, President Putin has clearly laid out the extent of his ambition to roll back history and the borders of the West. He has set out his task as correcting the ‘catastrophic mistakes’ of the end of the Russian empire, and redrawing the international borders that he says came about as a result of those errors. But restoring Russia’s former imperial boundaries can only come at the expense of those nations and peoples that were formerly dominated by Russia and now live in independent sovereign states. That list includes NATO member states, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and – soon – Finland. Given both Russia’s and Putin’s track record of strategic patience and nurturing grievances, and widespread support within the country for wars of reconquest, even military defeat in Ukraine would only postpone, rather than deter, Russia’s next attempt to achieve Putin’s vision.
What is its impact on policy?
The results of a misguided default assumption that there will be no Russian attack on a NATO member state are inimical to timely and appropriate preparation for that eventuality.
Paradoxically, throughout most of NATO’s recent history, failure to prepare adequately for conflict with Russia has resulted not solely from the assumption that Russia did not intend to attack, but also from the self-deterring idea that Russia could be ‘provoked’ into attacking through defensive preparations by NATO. Major European NATO allies therefore self-deterred from doing anything which Russia described as provocative. NATO’s limited contribution to the security of the Baltic states and Poland, the so-called ‘enhanced forward presence’ (eFP), came about only after extensive wrangling over whether this might trigger a Russian attack – a striking indication of the dominant position of Russian narratives about the nature of the security threat in the region.
Today, this same pattern of assumptions has deterred a wide range of meaningful and timely assistance to Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. Germany in particular has shown extreme reluctance to provide weapons to Ukraine, or even to allow third countries to do so, using the argument that this – rather than Russian intent – could be the trigger for war with NATO.
In addition, despite widespread recognition of the key role played by tactical nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine, nuclear deterrence policy, capabilities and decision-making processes have been allowed to atrophy within NATO because of a preference to treat nuclear use as ‘unthinkable’. This is a highly dangerous assumption when Russia devotes a great deal of thought and resources to the possibility of nuclear use, in addition to extensively employing nuclear rhetoric for intimidating the West.
What would good policy look like?
Preparations by NATO nations for potential conflict with Russia cannot be premised on the assumption that it will not happen.
The defence of NATO nations need not be hostage to interpretations of Article 5. The Joint Expeditionary Force – a coalition of 10 like-minded northern European states that share a similar viewpoint on the threat from Russia – provides a template for cooperative organizations that can respond to aggression by Moscow without relying on support from every member of the alliance. And the existence of NATO does not preclude regional defensive alliances of this kind, tailored to the specific nature of the threat, which varies across Europe.
The forward presence of troops and assets from major NATO allies in the front-line states is an essential element for the conventional deterrence of Moscow
The forward presence of troops and assets from major NATO allies in the front-line states is an essential element for the conventional deterrence of Moscow. Until now, initiatives such as eFP in the Baltic states and Poland have been sufficient to deter an attack, by eliminating the element of doubt as to whether other allies would respond. But the new situation following the invasion of Ukraine demands forward-deployed forces that are militarily as well as politically significant, in order to offer deterrence of Moscow by denial in addition to the promise of deterrence by punishment. Overall, defensive preparations by NATO must reflect the reality of a belligerent Russia whose hostile intent is no longer in doubt, and NATO’s forward presence in the eastern flank must become a robust forward defence posture.
