Vote-selling behaviour and democratic dissatisfaction in Nigeria

What is the level of participation in local elections?

Over 80 per cent of households surveyed in Benue and Sokoto states and the FCT, and over 70 per cent of those in Adamawa, Enugu and Rivers, reported that at least one household member had voted in the previous local election, in 2015.33 Lagos state was the outlier, with just over 60 per cent of households reporting that at least one member had voted. This is consistent with the low turnout in Lagos in the 2015 vote and in the 2019 election which followed the survey. However, overall voter turnout in elections has waned steadily across Nigeria.

Figure 1. Household-level participation in previous local election in 2015, by state

Question: Did you or a household member vote in the last local election?

— Source: Local Understandings, Expectations and Experiences Survey 2018.

What do people think of the practice of vote-selling?

To measure whether people approved of vote-selling, respondents were asked the following questions: ‘Do you think that people should collect money or a gift for their vote?’ and ‘Do you think it is acceptable for people to collect money or a gift for a vote?’. A substantial majority of respondents – 78.4 per cent of all surveyed households – thought that constituents should not receive money for their votes, against 18.3 per cent who felt constituents should receive money for their votes. (In other words, most people disapprove of vote-selling, even though – as the survey data also shows – they believe that people in their community frequently engage in the practice.)

Figure 2. Personal normative beliefs, by state: should people sell their votes?

Question: Do you think that people should collect money or a gift for their vote?

The one exception to this broad picture was found in Sokoto, Nigeria’s poorest state, where more than 45 per cent of the respondents thought that people should collect money in exchange for their vote – possibly reflecting the relatively severe economic realities of most constituents in Sokoto.

With respect to socio-economic status, respondents who disapproved of vote-selling behaviour cut across all income levels, with a majority of more than two-thirds expressing this view in each of the five income quintiles, from lowest to highest. Meanwhile, the approval rate was lowest (14.7 per cent) among the high-income quintile, and highest (27.2 per cent) among those in the lowest income quintile. Overall, this indicates that the poorest households made up the highest number of respondents who think that people should sell their votes.

Figure 3. Personal normative beliefs, by income quintile: should people sell their votes?

Question: Do you think that people should collect money or a gift for their vote?

What drives beliefs about vote-selling behaviour?

After posing each question, we then asked respondents why they held these beliefs,34 differentiating between those who thought people should sell their votes and those who thought they should not. Specifically, respondents were asked whether their views on vote-selling were driven by moral or practical considerations (see Box 1).

Why do people disapprove of vote-selling?

Among those who held negative views (negative personal normative beliefs) on vote-selling, respondents were quite evenly divided on the reasons why they held these views, with almost 44 per cent of all respondents who disapproved of vote-selling holding this belief on moral grounds – for example, because of its negative effect on the democratic process, or out of a sense of civic duty – and 48 per cent disapproving for practical reasons, such as the rewards on offer being too small, or the risks – for instance, of violent reprisal by other political actors – being too high. These findings were largely constant across all income percentiles.

Figure 4. Reasons why people disapprove of vote-selling, by income quintile

Question: Why do you think that people should not collect money or a gift for their vote?

There were, however, significant differences across states. Adamawa, for example, was the only state where most respondents who thought selling votes was wrong were morally opposed to the practice (77.9 per cent), with a small minority considering it unacceptable to sell votes because it was not practical (13.9 per cent). In Enugu, however, a sizeable majority (72.6 per cent) thought that voters should not sell their votes because of practical concerns, with only a minority considering it morally unacceptable (26.1 per cent).

Figure 5. Reasons why people disapprove of vote-selling, by state

Question: Why do you think that people should not collect money or a gift for their vote?

Why do people approve of vote-selling?

In contrast, respondents who held positive views toward vote-selling (i.e. who thought that voters should sell their votes) overwhelmingly felt that way due to practical considerations (85.5 per cent) in comparison to on moral grounds (6.5 per cent). The only notable variations to this pattern were found in Adamawa and Benue states, where a significant number – more than 24 per cent in both cases – felt that it was morally acceptable to sell votes. This probably reflects some pockets of voter disillusionment in these states, as well as a lack of confidence in the impact of elections on people’s material circumstances beyond the price paid by politicians to gain votes. Across the five income quintiles, the same broad pattern applied, with more than 80 per cent of respondents in each quintile citing practical reasons for approving vote-selling in principle.

Figure 6. Reasons why people approve of vote-selling, by state

Question: Why do you think that people should collect money or a gift for their vote?

Figure 7. Reasons why people approve of vote-selling, by income quintile

Question: Why do you think that people should collect money or a gift for their vote?

Vote-selling as a practical, not a moral, behaviour

Taken together, these survey findings indicate that views on vote-selling among the Nigerian population are more commonly driven by considerations of practicality – or, put differently, the practical norms of politics in Nigeria, not morality. This is the case across the whole sample of households that expressed a view (i.e. excluding those responding with ‘other’ and ‘don’t know’). Almost 60 per cent based their view on practical considerations, while just over 40 per cent were driven by moral criteria. This includes both those that approved and those that disapproved of vote-selling.

Thus, though a large majority of those surveyed disapproved of vote-selling, this seems to have been a conditional view for most. The survey data would indicate that the view of these respondents, and therefore their behaviour, could change if the material conditions around vote-selling – an individual’s personal socio-economic circumstances or perceptions of safety, for instance – or the level of reward offered were to change.

Measuring social expectations and conditionality of vote-selling behaviour

A further vital element in understanding how these individual perspectives translate into behaviours is to set them in the context of expectations of how others in the community think and act. We measured whether vote-selling behaviour was conditional on social expectations using four vignettes related to vote-selling behaviour (see Table 1).

Table 1. Vignettes of vote-selling behaviour

	Community disapproves of vote-selling	Community approves of vote-selling
Vote-selling is rare	Scenario 1	Scenario 2
Vote-selling is common	Scenario 3	Scenario 4

Source: Authors’ elaboration.

Respondents were provided with one of four possible scenarios: (1) where vote-selling was uncommon and widely disapproved of; (2) where vote-selling was uncommon but widely approved of; (3) where vote-selling was common but widely disapproved of; and (4) where vote-selling was both common and widely approved of. The four vignettes were randomized such that respondents had an equal chance of receiving each one of the four during survey administration. Respondents were then asked to assess the likelihood that an individual going to the polling booth in such conditions would sell their vote.

Figure 8. Predictive probability of vote-selling under different scenarios, by state

— Source: Local Understandings, Expectations and Experiences Survey 2018. Note: Probability is expressed as a number between 0 and 1, where 0 = impossible and 1 = certain.

One central finding from this section of the survey is that vote-selling behaviour need not depend on the actions or judgments of others in the community. Across all states, respondents who were given Scenario 1 – in which very few people sell their vote, and very few people approve of selling votes – thought that the chances of vote-selling behaviour were over 50 per cent (i.e. probability was greater than 0.5); in Enugu, Lagos, Rivers, Sokoto and FCT-Abuja the perceived chances rose to 65–70 per cent. This suggests that vote-selling is often motivated by individual circumstances, such as economic hardship, poverty or fear of intimidation or violence, and not by the wider social context and community expectations; in theoretical terms, it tends towards being an independent behaviour, rather than an interdependent one. This means that the biggest costs of a refusal to sell one’s vote involve economic or security-related sanctions rather than social ones such as a loss of community status or a sense of belonging, public ridicule or becoming the subject of negative talk.

Nonetheless, we found that social expectations do play some general role in influencing vote-selling behaviour, though there was some variation in the degree of influence observed. In both Adamawa and Benue, for example, the likelihood of vote-selling increased by 22 percentage points when moving from Scenario 1, the least permissive of vote-selling, to Scenario 4, where it was most accepted. The likelihood of vote-selling increased in Lagos, Sokoto and the FCT by a relatively more modest 15–16 percentage points when moving from Scenario 1 to Scenario 4.

Importantly, respondents predicted the highest chances for vote-selling behaviour under the two scenarios (3 and 4) where vote-selling was commonplace. The implication here is that the behaviour of others in the community is more influential than a respondent’s and their community’s judgment in shaping vote-selling behaviour.35

Normative beliefs and expectations surrounding vote-selling behaviour

This relative disconnect between individual vote-selling and respondents’ views of/judgment of the community’s beliefs was further evidenced by questions designed to measure people’s expectations of the behaviour of others (normative expectations). Respondents were asked: ‘Think about the people in your community, such as your family, friends, neighbours, and colleagues. Out of 10 in your community, how many of them do you think said people should collect money or a gift for their vote?’

On average, respondents in Lagos expected six out of 10 people in their community to approve of vote-selling, while respondents in Adamawa, Enugu, Rivers and Sokoto felt that closer to half of people in their community would do so. Respondents in Benue state held the lowest normative expectations, believing that an average of just three out of 10 people in their community approved of vote-selling.

Figure 9. Consistency of normative beliefs, by state

The predominant picture was therefore one of a wide disparity between people’s personal views on vote-selling, which as noted above were overwhelmingly negative, and the average expectation that 47.8 per cent of other community members would approve of vote-selling.

However, in Sokoto, the survey found mutual consistency between what respondents felt is the right way to behave and what they believe others in their community approve of. Where 45.8 per cent of Sokoto respondents thought that it was acceptable for voters to sell their votes, they also, on average, thought that 53.9 per cent of their community would approve of selling their vote. However, despite this mutual consistency, we found that respondents in Sokoto were amongst the least likely to be influenced by social expectations. In the scenario exercise, respondents in Sokoto predicted that a typical voter would sell their vote 70 per cent of the time, even under Scenario 1, where the least permissive conditions exist.

As these are household, not individual, voting figures, they cannot be directly compared to other results – but are indicative of a significantly higher turnout than at previous general elections.

That is, why they thought people should/should not collect money in exchange for the gift of a vote, and why they thought it was acceptable/not acceptable to collect money in exchange for such a gift.

This is also consistent with the laboratory finding that, in cases of incongruence between empirical and normative expectations (i.e. under condition/Scenario 3), empirical expectations (driven by beliefs about what others do) dominate normative expectations (driven by beliefs about what others think). See Bicchieri, C. and Xiao, E. (2009), ‘Do the right thing: but only if others do so’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22(2), pp. 191–208.

Vote-selling behaviour and democratic dissatisfaction in Nigeria

Raj Navanit Patel

Research findings

What is the level of participation in local elections?

Figure 1. Household-level participation in previous local election in 2015, by state

What do people think of the practice of vote-selling?

Figure 2. Personal normative beliefs, by state: should people sell their votes?

Figure 3. Personal normative beliefs, by income quintile: should people sell their votes?

What drives beliefs about vote-selling behaviour?

Box 1. Moral vs practical motivations

Why do people disapprove of vote-selling?

Figure 4. Reasons why people disapprove of vote-selling, by income quintile

Figure 5. Reasons why people disapprove of vote-selling, by state

Why do people approve of vote-selling?

Figure 6. Reasons why people approve of vote-selling, by state

Figure 7. Reasons why people approve of vote-selling, by income quintile

Vote-selling as a practical, not a moral, behaviour

Measuring social expectations and conditionality of vote-selling behaviour

Table 1. Vignettes of vote-selling behaviour

Figure 8. Predictive probability of vote-selling under different scenarios, by state

Figure 8. Predictive probability of vote-selling under different scenarios, by state

Normative beliefs and expectations surrounding vote-selling behaviour

Figure 9. Consistency of normative beliefs, by state

Figure 9. Consistency of normative beliefs, by state