Nandini Ramanujam and Vishakha Wijenayake
Russia is clamoring to reclaim its influence over its near abroad by using its military might. As of May 2022, tensions between the West and Russia have reached a tipping point following Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.[1] The unabashed use of force by Russia against one of its neighbors has shifted the international legal and security order, pushing countries such as Finland and Sweden to seek NATO membership.[2] At the domestic level, the increasing crackdown on the opposition, and civil society organizations such as Memorial International, as well as the press and media outlets, leaves no doubt that the Russian regime is blatantly undermining human rights within its borders.[3] This chapter underlines the importance of holding Russia accountable for its egregious human rights violations domestically and abroad. But at the same time, the chapter argues that strategies of isolation may do more harm than good in the long term. To this end we explore avenues to prevent powerful yet authoritarian actors such as Russia from further eroding the post–World War II international order founded on liberal values and principles. The global community will need to explore strategies to ward off the emergence of parallel international orders based on anti-liberal values and principles.
The chapter provides an overview of the checkered history of post-Soviet Russia’s relationship with human rights. Russia’s chaotic transition to a semi-institutionalized democracy and market economy in the 1990s was marked by a brief period in which it attempted to align itself to the international liberal order and, with it, the human rights normative and institutional order.[4] However, for the past two decades, Russia’s aggressive military strategy in its near abroad, allegations of cyberattacks, poisoning of political opponents and critics, and election meddling in foreign jurisdictions have strained relations with the United States and Europe.
During the presidency of Donald Trump, whose relationship with President Vladimir Putin was the subject of spirited debate and speculation, Russia’s actions leading to breaches of the international order went largely unchallenged by the United States, its main geopolitical rival. But the tide has shifted since the election of Joe Biden as president. He has stated that the United States will not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which was a violation of international law.[5] He has further refused to accept the results of the March 2021 referendum in which 95 percent of voters in Crimea expressed support for a union with Russia.[6] The United States imposed sanctions over Russia’s treatment of Alexei Navalny, a leading political opponent of Putin and an anticorruption activist, and is reviewing its position toward Russia over cyberattacks against U.S. elections and agencies as well as bounties being offered to Taliban-linked groups to target U.S. forces.[7] Following the February 2022 Russian aggression against Ukraine, the United States, along with other G7 countries, have imposed unprecedented sanctions at the individual, sectoral, and financial levels.[8] With over 14 million people displaced and thousands of civilian casualties to date,[9] there is a real danger that the situation in Ukraine could become a protracted armed conflict, leaving Russia a pariah state in total isolation.
The U.S. shift has highlighted potentially volatile and rapidly evolving geopolitical competition and Russia’s conflictual relationship with the United States and Europe over the liberal international system. There is little consensus among scholars and policy advocates on whether and how to engage Russia constructively in the multilateral global order and what consideration should be given to its failure to comply with human rights norms in such endeavors.[10] For his part, Putin has been defiant, as indicated in his April 2021 State of the Union address: “I hope that no one will think about crossing the ‘redline’ regarding Russia. We ourselves will determine in each specific case where it will be drawn.”[11] Recently emboldened by constitutional amendments that would potentially extend his term as president, he continues to challenge standards of collective global governance and accountability, including international human rights law. Russia under Putin no longer feels the need to justify its actions to stay in line with international law; it is prepared instead to draw its own redlines boldly regarding its own domestic political and foreign policy agendas. Can the multipolar global world accommodate Russia’s blatant attempt to undermine the international legal order to assert its relevance? Or can that order be reformed through Russia’s inclusion in ways that strengthen and update its component elements?
The Cold War era’s human rights discourse reflected the reality of a bipolar world: the USSR’s narrative that privileged socioeconomic rights was engaged in an ideological battle with the liberal, individualist notion of rights focused on civil and political freedoms. Today, however, the world stage has an increasing number of diverse actors, with states such as China and India bringing their own counternarratives to human rights and development. These new actors form nuanced geopolitical relationships that do not subscribe to a bipolar world order. For example, India’s abstention in the UN General Assembly vote against Russian aggression partly stems from its reliance on Russia for arms and to counterbalance “Chinese hegemony in their shared neighborhood.”[12] At the same time, India is a member of the Quad, along with Australia, Japan, and the United States, showing its strategy to make allies with Western and liberal countries.[13] Amid these complex global power structures, Russia’s superpower status has waned to expose a vulnerable nation with a highly undiversified, oil-dependent economy and a declining population.[14] The era of democratization following the demise of the Soviet Union is regarded by those nostalgic about the Soviet past as “the lost decades” when Russia faced embarrassment on the international stage.[15] Wild West capitalism empowered oligarchs to take over state assets, leaving Russians with a desire for stability and economic recovery.
Putin’s domestic political rhetoric has capitalized on this wounded national pride and nursed it with a romanticized narrative of the Soviet legacy and an unhealthy dose of nativism. He has repressed domestic opposition instead of purging corruption, while at the same time rewarding political and economic allies with lucrative deals and himself amassing a personal fortune. Russia has turned into a kleptocracy within which an anticorruption activist such as Navalny was able to capture the imagination of Russians and become an international figure challenging Putin’s regime.[16] Russia has also moved on from being regarded as a country in democratic transition to being labeled by Freedom House as “a consolidated authoritarian regime.”[17] In the exercise of its authoritarian powers, Moscow mimics and taunts certain aspects of democratic governance, as and when it suits its interests.[18]
As noted earlier, it is important to hold Russia accountable for the human and economic costs of its human rights violations and international interventions. However, treating it solely as a rogue state or isolating it can lead to further deterioration in a rapidly evolving and disintegrating multipolar global order. Russia’s role among the Permanent Five (P-5) in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as well as its nuclear arsenal and arms supply to other nations, make it imperative that the West strive to find pathways for constructive engagement that could also be extended to a post-Putin Russia. Three decades after the emergence of the Russian Federation, its political and judicial institutions retain many characteristics of the old regime. Identifying the sociopolitical and historical dimensions of Russia’s reluctance to adopt the current human rights paradigm needs to be a precondition for any such engagement. To build a more sustainable and inclusive international order, and foster a democratic and rule of law-abiding institutional culture within Russia, measures to ensure the accountability of the Russian state will need to be complemented by a constructive engagement with the Russian state, civil society, and its people.
Human Rights at Home
In January 2021, over 200,000 protesters gathered across 125 cities in Russia, including in rural, agricultural regions and conservative strongholds, to demand the release of arrested opposition politician Navalny.[19] This event refocused global attention on Russia’s suppression of internal dissent. Distressingly, these tactics have been used by Putin before, and often. Boris Nemtsov, a fierce critic of the Kremlin, was assassinated in 2015.[20] The relentless persecution of Navalny is similar to the 2003 arrest, subsequent trials, and prolonged incarceration of Mikhail Khodorkovsky.[21] In these cases, an already centralized, personalized power structure demonstrated its willingness to use its iron fist to secure Putin’s will.[22]
Borrowing from the Soviet era, Russia has also instrumentalized laws to restrict opposing voices and democratic participation in politics. A law of July 2012 requires nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to register as “foreign agents” if they receive donations from abroad. Later legislation adopted in May 2015 gives prosecutors the power to sanction both foreign and international organizations working in Russia that are labeled “undesirable,” as well as Russian organizations and nationals involved with such “undesirable organizations.”[23] Dmitry Dubrovsky states that by cutting Western funding of Russian NGOs, such laws allow the authorities to reinforce their control over civil society and fuel paranoia among Russians that the United States is interfering in Russia’s internal affairs.[24] Media and academic freedoms have also been severely curtailed during Putin’s regime, and strict regulations have been imposed on internet service providers and social media platforms.[25] This domestic stifling of freedom of expression casts an ominous cloud over civil society efforts to rally support against violations of human rights perpetrated by the Russian regime. The importance of local civil society activism must not be undermined if an organic culture of human rights is to take root in Russia.
Russia’s relationship with the modern human rights framework, as enshrined in UN and regional treaties and implemented through UN Charter mechanisms and regional courts, is distinct and complex. Historically, the USSR played a significant role in shaping international human rights law, particularly through the promotion of socioeconomic rights. It argued that political rights become illusory when the right to work and to a decent livelihood and the right of children to an adequate education are not guaranteed.[26] Not only did the Soviet Union ensure that socioeconomic and cultural rights were enshrined in international treaties, but it also constitutionally guaranteed these rights domestically to its citizens, including the provision of free health care, education, and cultural resources.[27] Following Marxist concepts of history and economic justice, this guarantee of civil and political rights was contingent on conformity with the socialist system.[28] Accordingly, the Soviet understanding of human rights was one where the state was central in both conferring rights and imposing duties on citizens. In addition to supporting socioeconomic rights, as a matter of state principle, the USSR’s rhetoric placed a high value internationally on state sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs as cornerstones of international law.[29]
The collapse of the USSR and the ensuing transition to democracy was coupled with accepting human rights obligations under both the European and the UN frameworks, which meant Russia’s de jure endorsement of the liberal human rights paradigm.[30] This precipitated a deviation from the dominance of the collective over the individual that is often noted as a key element of Russian culture.[31] The departure from the socialist form of government was manifested in the more liberal articulation of human rights, for example, through enshrining guarantees in the 1993 Constitution to protect private property rights and, along with these, a modern market economy.[32] This was mirrored in the economic reforms (shock therapy) and privatization, which in turn engendered social consequences including a drop in the standard of living for some during the “lost decades.”[33] This transformation revealed how shifts in economic policies and social welfare structures can have severe impacts on human lives and security; life expectancy within Russia fell following the end of the Cold War.[34] The financial crisis of 1998 and the devaluation of the rouble only added to increasing disillusionment within the country with the promise of an open economy and liberal domestic policies.
The belief that transplanting Western laws would contribute to Russian development assumes that imitation of Western liberal democracies leads to economic and political progress. According to Brian Z. Tamanaha, the template of capitalism, democracy, the rule of law, and universal human rights that works in a given society may not work the same way in another society with different arrangements and underpinnings.[35] Transplanting foreign principles and institutions, including liberal iterations of human rights principles, cannot be expected to show immediate results in a country unless it is accompanied by appropriate shifts in legal culture and mentality.[36] Likewise, while imitation of Western norms was prevalent in post–Cold War Russia, this experience did not lead to a complete conversion of values.[37] The historical inclination toward a powerful centralized state still permeates the Russian worldview. Moreover, the failures of transplanted models led to popular distrust and even rejection of the liberal frameworks of human rights and rule of law, especially as promoted by outside powers—a sentiment Putin has used to his benefit. Therefore, the critique of Russia’s performance in relation to human rights would benefit from looking beyond Putin’s dominant, singular narrative and paying closer attention instead to Russia’s institutional culture.[38]
The Russian Constitution and its recent amendments highlight the friction within Russia between the legacy of historical privileging of socioeconomic rights and the struggle to stop the country from sliding into authoritarianism by asserting more civil and political freedoms. In April 2021 Putin gave the final approval to legislation that would amend the Constitution. The constitutional amendments reinforce a subset of socioeconomic rights. Although surveys in general, and especially in political climates such as Russia’s, have to be taken with more than just a grain of salt, a January 2020 survey of Russians noted that more than 80 percent of respondents supported the changes, consistent with the population’s strong support for socioeconomic rights and the involvement of the state in the economy and society.[39] The amendments established that the minimum wage cannot be less than the poverty threshold and required that pensions and cash payments be indexed to inflation.[40] In a clever political move, the amendments were linked to the president’s political ambitions to consolidate power, such as a change that would allow Putin to remain in power for twelve more years after his fourth presidency ends in 2024 and would grant the president the authority to dismiss Constitutional Court judges and other senior judges for misconduct. This does not bode well for a Russia that is already suffering from a serious erosion of the rule of law and lack of protection of human rights in a situation where the executive has unchecked power and the separation of powers is weak.
The constitutional amendments further allude to Russia’s thousand-year history and its purported traditional ideals and beliefs. Moscow seems to be taking a page out of Beijing’s playbook, which has also capitalized on emotionally popular, nationalist rhetoric to portray China as a victim of bullying Western powers.[41] This nativist rhetoric advocates for an exceptional position for Russia within human rights. It has also been a point of leverage, enabling popular support for 2013 “anti-LGBTQ [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer] laws” to be whipped up by exalting the traditional Russian family and portraying voices that advocate for civil rights and progressive values as reflecting foreign, decadent, liberal sociopolitical ideologies.[42] This regressive attitude toward the rights of the LGBTQ community has become a geopolitical symbol against Western liberalism, allying Russia with other conservative European states such as Poland.
The Kremlin’s rejection of certain elements of the liberal democratic model stems from its political objective of consolidating power free from external challenges. But it is not a coherent alternative to Western liberalism.[43] The notion of “sovereign democracy” advanced by Putin’s regime reverts to a Soviet narrative built around the relationship between the people and the government, united to accomplish a “national idea,” thereby upholding “collective concern for national sovereignty in the guise of ‘sovereign democracy.’ ”[44] It lacks the participatory or deliberative nature of democracy, which can truly accommodate a plural polity conducive to the respect and fulfillment of human rights.[45] The idea of sovereign democracy also comes with Slavophile undertones and endorses the view that Russians must represent themselves and seek organic change rather than having liberal values, which include civil and political rights, imposed on them by external forces.[46] In this manner, Putin has framed the universal human rights framework as Western particularism, which is portrayed as having been designed to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs while imposing double standards.[47] What is needed is a robust civil society within Russia that challenges these narratives of nativism and promotes a language of multilateralism and human rights. However, with the Russian state’s intensifying crackdown on the internet, media, and civil society following its aggression on Ukraine, the already constrained democratic space has further closed down.[48] While global attention stays focused on Ukraine, it is critical to finds ways to offer assistance, and lend solidarity to independent media and civil society actors in Russia to empower citizens to hold the Russian state accountable for its gross violations of international law human rights.
Europe: A Contested Relationship
Russia’s entry into the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1996 ushered in an era of hope for legislative, judicial, and other institutional reforms.[49] Russia ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1998. In the five years after it joined the CoE, Russia passed more than 2,300 federal laws and carried out reforms to implement human rights guarantees and ensure conformity with international law.[50] However, the speech Putin delivered at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, which North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations found surprising and disappointing at the time, has proved to be prophetic of Moscow’s approach to international relations and signaled that Russia no longer wanted to be seen as a student of more “advanced” democracies.[51] Following its brief flirtation with liberal democratic transformation, Russia has reverted to its tradition of a strong state with no appetite for liberal human rights influences from Europe.[52] The ideological clashes that underpin its reluctant engagement with the European human rights framework can be traced back to its discontent at being subsumed into a European system while striving to reclaim its legacy as an empire in its own right.
On March 16, 2022, the CoE decided that Russia can no longer be one of its member states. On the preceding day, the Russian government had formally notified its wish to withdraw from the CoE and communicated its intention to denounce the ECHR.[53] This is not Russia’s first battle with the CoE. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE suspended the country’s voting rights. These were restored in June 2019, but not before Russia had retaliated by withholding funding and threatening to leave the CoE. These tensions are emblematic of the tangible impacts of Russia’s consolidation of power in its near abroad have on its relationship with regional multilateral forums, including the European human rights framework. They also reveal Europe’s powerlessness to hold Russia truly accountable for its military aggression and human rights violations.[54] Domestic support for its exploits in its near abroad has fortified Russia’s confrontational practices with the European human rights framework in the past. This support is facilitated by a narrative that reinforces the need to take aggressive measures to prevent perceived threats to the “projected identity of a ‘Russian world’ (Russkii Mir)” encompassing the Russian language and culture, and a common, Russia-centric past.[55] This further highlights Russians’ discontent that the end of the Communist period went hand in hand with the disintegration of the Soviet Union—a geographical and cultural space—and the legacy of a heroic Soviet identity to which the people had a sentimental attachment. However, even while recognizing the misinformation and suppression of facts about the war within Russia, it remains doubtful whether the domestic support for nativist rhetoric will be able to withstand the impact of Western sanctions that are constantly being intensified.[56] The economic costs of sanctions and the isolation of Russians from the global space is expected to weaken support for Russia’s empire-building agenda.
Russia’s inclusion in the European framework had meant that its efforts to consolidate power in its near abroad have entailed vital and increasing scrutiny through a human rights lens. On March 1, 2022, prior to Russia’s CoE exit, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) responded positively to a request by Ukraine to issue interim measures against Russian military action by calling on Russia to refrain from targeting civilians and other protected persons and objects.[57] Russia’s human rights violations had previously come under judicial scrutiny at the ECtHR. For example, in July 2004, in Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, the majority of the Grand Chamber of ECtHR found that Russia rendered support to Transdniestria amounting to “effective control.”[58] The Court has also delivered judgments relating to the situation in Chechnya in the North Caucasus.[59] A recent example of the ECtHR’s regulation of Russian human rights obligations in its near abroad is the Georgia v. Russia (II) decision delivered on January 21, 2021, concerning allegations by the Georgian government of administrative practices on the part of the Russian Federation, such as unlawful detention, violating the right to life, freedom from torture, and freedom of movement of displaced persons, and the obligation to carry out effective investigations, among others.[60] Moreover, Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (applications 20958/14 and 38334/18), which were declared partly admissible in January 2021, concern Ukraine’s allegations of Russia’s violations of the ECHR in Crimea through administrative practices that include killing and shooting, unlawful automatic imposition of Russian citizenship, and suppression of non-Russian media.[61] While Europe has attempted to rein in Russia’s military muscle-flexing through these human rights–based legal maneuvers, Russia’s departure from the CoE and its denunciation of the ECHR challenge the enforcement of human rights in Russia through these mechanisms. Judicial accountability of Russian actions in its near abroad has shifted from human rights forums to the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the Prosecutor of the ICC deploying investigators and forensic experts to Ukraine in order to advance its investigations into crimes under the Rome Statute.[62]
Previously, however, the scrutiny by the European human rights framework had extended not only to Russia’s activities in its near abroad but also to its domestic suppression of dissent. The ECtHR has made several interventions regarding violations of Navalny’s human rights by Russian authorities.[63] In February 2021, it ordered Russia to release him from jail, stating that a failure to do so would be a contravention of the ECHR.[64] The Russian Ministry of Justice has rejected what it refers to as “crude interference into the judicial system of Russia.”[65] Russia has increasingly resisted complying with the ECtHR. In 2014 the latter issued its judgment in the Yukos case, which concerned a company managed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky; it ordered a payment of 1,866,104,634 euros, which Russia has not made.[66] In July 2015, the Russian Constitutional Court ruled that in exceptional cases Russia could deviate from its obligation to enforce an ECtHR judgment if this was the only possible way to avoid a violation of the fundamental principles and norms of the Russian Constitution.[67] This principle was also incorporated into national legislation in December 2015.[68] This is despite Article 15(4) of the 1993 Constitution, which states that where an international treaty conflicts with domestic legislation, the international treaty rule prevails. The Venice Commission, in its Final Opinion of June 13, 2016, stressed that the execution of ECtHR judgments “is an unequivocal, imperative legal obligation, whose respect is vital for preserving and fostering the community of principles and values of the European continent.”[69] According to the proposed amendments to the Russian Constitution, the Constitutional Court will be able to rule on whether or not decisions contradicting the Constitution and taken by international bodies to which Russia is party can be applied.[70]
Russia has further attempted to challenge the European human rights framework by creating alternative subregional forums, a point further elaborated in chapter 4 by Alexander Cooley. The Commonwealth of Independent States was created in 1991 following the fall of the Soviet Union and was in theory intended to preserve the economic, political, and military ties of former Soviet republics. In practice, it aimed to extend Russia’s hegemonic shadow within the region.[71] Europe has not reacted to such efforts positively. For example, a report finalized in 2001 by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Assembly of Europe concluded regarding the compatibility of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS Convention) and the ECHR that “no regional human rights mechanism should be allowed to weaken the unique unified system of human rights protection offered by the ECHR and its Court of Human Rights.” This report therefore confirmed the primacy and supremacy of both the ECHR and ECtHR, and it urged CoE member or applicant states that are also members of the CIS not to sign or ratify the CIS Convention.[72] The establishment of the CIS and its human rights framework can be seen as a Russian effort to create a plurality of forums within the European landscape, thereby potentially challenging the universalist framework of human rights presented in the ECHR. Russia has also taken advantage of multilateral institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) group to remain relevant amidst shifting power structures in the global order.[73]
Such efforts to challenge the universal human rights order by creating parallel subregional organizations invite the question: does a multipolar world mean there have to be multiple, conflicting sets of human rights standards? International legal experts have come to accept fragmentation as an inevitable feature of an increasingly complex international legal architecture. However, are a new vision and new leadership needed for inclusive global governance, so that common ground and core ideals can be identified within plurality? Acknowledging points of ideological tension is key to fostering constructive and continuous dialogue, which is necessary for the recalibration of the international order in our multipolar world. Likewise, what is manifested through these clashes between Russia and Europe are ideological conflicts undergirding their respective understandings of human rights.[74] For example, Valery Zorkin, chairman of Russia’s Constitutional Court, has stated that it is senseless to choose between freedom and security, calling security one of the main human freedoms, for the sake of which the state can restrict others.[75] These ideological tensions further demonstrate Russia’s rejection of its role as belonging to the European periphery.
Within the CoE, Russia was a powerful member with a history of challenging Western notions of liberty and the importance of human rights.[76] Now, it may project instead a narrative in which it presents itself as the center of its own civilization. What has also become a theme of Putin’s regime is that sovereignty has come to be equated with independence from Western influence, and with it, the liberal human rights framework.[77] A foreign policy approach toward Russia cannot ignore its self-description as “an autonomous political subject” or a “sovereign democracy.”[78] However, the “unrestrained pursuit of the national interest” that comes as part and parcel of this political project is perhaps justifiably interpreted in Europe as a manifestation of Russian imperialism.[79] It is imperative that Russia’s unbridled challenge to international order be checked. However, Russia’s move to isolate itself does not facilitate accountability through the European Human Rights framework. Accountability through International Criminal Law forums while necessary, may not address the panoply of human rights violations of Russian policies, both within and beyond its borders. Russia’s departure from the European framework closes the door, at least temporarily, to facilitating more nuanced understandings of human rights considering the economic and sociopolitical realities of those living in Russia.
Russia in the UN Security Council
The UNSC is representative of a post–World War II great-power structure, with five states that are nuclear powers capable of determining global security decisions through their vetoes. To what extent these states’ power within the UNSC reflects their modern strength and influence beyond the confines of the UNSC is debatable. However, simply by virtue of their power within the Security Council, they have been given a significant platform that enables them to perpetuate their relevance and impose their interests on other states. It is a forum that deals with conflicts and security concerns that have profound human rights implications on the ground. In February 2022, the UNSC, including Russia, was able to speak in one voice through a watered-down statement calling for peace in Ukraine.[80] Despite this gesture, Russia has made it clear that it does not shy away from using its power in the UNSC to forward its own geopolitical agenda. For instance, since 2012, Russia has been increasingly involved in the Syrian conflict through both aerospace support and ground forces to combat the Islamic State and Western-backed, moderate opposition groups fighting against the Assad regime.[81] Russia has demonstrated that in the Syrian conflict it can leverage how the situation develops to its own advantage, in particular through the use of its UNSC veto power.[82] In exercising its veto it has undercut human rights on the ground by denying Syrians access to cross-border assistance,[83] to the detriment of their socioeconomic rights and human security that Russia purports to champion.
Russia’s actions in multilateral institutions such as the UNSC have to be seen in light of its ambitions to restructure axes of global power away from the Euro-Atlantic space, with a view to establishing itself as a key player in the emerging multipolar system.[84] China and Russia are acting as opportunistic strategic partners exercising a soft balancing of power within the UNSC by coordinating their actions on key international issues, one of their objectives being to manage U.S. power within the Middle East.[85] Moreover, India and Russia have agreed to work closely on key issues at the UNSC, “in keeping with the special and privileged strategic partnership between the two countries.”[86] Russia has also been extending its power and influence in Africa through business partnerships as well as state-to-state diplomatic and knowledge-sharing endeavors. The self-image that Russia tries to project pits itself against Western countries that have a history of colonial subjugation.[87] Accordingly, a report by the Valdai Club, a progovernment think-tank, states that “African countries still see Russia as their most likely ally in protecting their interests on the international stage and as a natural counterbalance to the hegemonic aspirations of one or several world powers.”[88] While such claims may not reflect the reality of Russia’s exercise of power in foreign countries, historically or at present, this narrative is indicative of the allies it is trying to build and the image it is attempting to project globally. Not unlike other P-5 countries, Russia uses its UNSC veto power to achieve greater clout, with clear implications for human rights accountability at the UN. It does so in a manner that prevents the UNSC from acting to protect human rights in countries where Moscow’s foreign policy interests are at stake.
Russia’s actions in the UNSC regularly demonstrate its capacity to bring instability to the international arena.[89] It has consistently vetoed resolutions on Syria, often with the backing of China. For example, in July 2020 both states vetoed a resolution proposed by Belgium and Germany, which, among other things, demanded that the Syrian authorities comply immediately with their obligations under international human rights law. In vetoing the resolution, Russia introduced its own draft resolution, which limited the number of crossing points to only one.[90] The U.S. representative has accused Russia of creating a false choice between humanitarian aid, sovereignty, and sanctions, and failing to save the lives of the Syrian people by siding with Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Similarly, in 2012 Russia vetoed a resolution on Syria, claiming that the UNSC refused to take its amendments into account.[91] Beyond the Syrian context, in March 2021 Russia failed to support a resolution (which among other things expressed concern at violations of human rights) with regard to the military coup in Myanmar.[92] In 2008, it vetoed a resolution on the situation in Zimbabwe, voicing its support for diplomatic measures adopted by leaders of other African states.[93] This is a pattern that shows Russia’s consistent derailing of UNSC efforts to take proactive measures that seek to address humanitarian situations affecting civilians’ human rights, by alluding to alternative resolutions and the potential for diplomatic solutions that have questionable capacity to deliver practical results.
Sanctions have become a go-to tool of Western states to punish other states for human rights violations. For example, following the recent attacks on Ukraine, a series of new sanctions were issued against Russia by the EU, North American, and some Asian states.[94] The UNSC, however, remains an ill-suited forum to impose sanctions against Russian threats to international security and human rights. This is so as Russia, for its part, has used its veto power to oppose UNSC resolutions that aim to implement sanctions, especially when its interests are at stake. In doing so, Russia has raised concerns about the impact of sanctions on individuals on the ground. For instance, it has noted the impact that imposing sanctions on the Assad regime would have on the Syrian people and territories under government control, specifically stating that increased shortages “of food, medicines and basic commodities, as well as rising inflation, are their direct consequences.”[95] The Syrian crisis demonstrates a fundamental aspect of Russia’s public stance on international intervention, which opposes any implicit or explicit endorsement by the Security Council of the removal of an incumbent government.[96] However, in all these instances, Russia’s demands for nonintervention need to be critically assessed in the context of its unequivocal pursuit of its own geopolitical and economic interests
Moreover, Russia has used language suggesting the West is pitted against state sovereignty, stating that Western members’ calculations “to use the Security Council of the United Nations to further their plans of imposing their own designs on sovereign States will not prevail.”[97] This rhetoric can also be seen in its labeling of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as “the troika of the three Western permanent members of the Security Council,” and seeking to delegitimize Britain by referring to its “colonial customs.”[98] Russia, therefore, has promoted a divisive narrative of two camps among the veto members, identifying itself as belonging to the camp that defends the sovereignty of the “non-West” and the Global South. These practices are eroding the basis for common understandings that are prerequisites of an international order and well-functioning multilateral institutions, while failing to offer a coherent alternative. Analyzing the language used by Russia in the UNSC is important, given that these shared understandings are generated and maintained through social interaction.[99] Jean-Marc Coicaud identifies two layers of principles that bind the international community together. The first relates to the elementary but crucial goal of securing the existence and coexistence of states—principles such as nonintervention in the internal or external affairs of other states, international cooperation, and good faith. The second layer comprises principles concerned with the democratic aspects of international relations, such as respect for human rights.[10]0 By accusing Western nations of infringing state sovereignty and violating norms of nonintervention, the language used by Russia in its statements in the UNSC tends to engage the first layer of principles, striking at the heart of what binds the international community together.
Recommendations
Ivan Krastev wrote in 2007 that “western policymakers are torn between their desires to ‘talk tough’ and ‘teach Russia a lesson’ and the realization that the West has limited capacity to influence Russia’s policies.”[10]1 This limitation cannot be pinned down to one root cause but rests on Russia’s continuing power within major international organizations, its unabashed exercise of aggression and military might both at home and abroad, the personality cult of President Putin, and a political culture of Russian exceptionalism with regard to the liberal human rights framework. This is particularly observable with the imposition of sanctions on Russia, which has not had a high success rate in achieving the intended human rights objectives. So far, the West’s tactics to hold Russia accountable, including through naming and shaming of individuals, have largely failed to yield results in improving that country’s human rights record. It remains to be seen whether the recent spate of sanctions on individuals as well as on various sectors will be successfully manipulated by the regime, as done in the past, to amplify its anti-West rhetoric.[102]
On the other hand, adopting an approach of “strategic patience” in anticipation of an inevitable decline in Russian power is also not wise, especially while the security of its neighbors and well-being of threatened individuals hang in the balance.[103] Some strategies for enhancing the human rights agenda focus on Putin himself and expect that a regime change would improve the situation. While acknowledging that a different leader would bring a different style and rhythm to international and domestic human rights policy, a Putin-focused strategy ignores the reality that “the fundamentals of the Russian ideological narrative are shared across the spectrum of the political elite.”[104] In any event, regime change itself remains problematic, given that Putin’s suppression of opposition makes it almost impossible to gauge his popularity, and the Russian mindset that favors the status quo “reconciles Putin’s supporters with his no-alternative legitimacy formula.”[105] However, we do not want to advocate defeatism, offering instead three recommendations that might help turn the tide on Russia’s relationship with human rights.
First, supporting local civil society remains vital, whether it is to facilitate regime change or to spread awareness of human rights and build a culture of human rights from within. Although this is not a unique or novel suggestion, it is one that is worth repeating. Attempts to transplant human rights through external imposition have been largely unsuccessful in Russia. Sally Engle Merry has compellingly demonstrated that international human rights norms are not fixed but need to grow roots through a process of “vernacularizing,” which is critical if they are to be adapted and legitimized in the local context.[106] It is also important to recognize, as Cooley does in chapter 4, that civil society is not a monolith and can itself become infiltrated by government interests, whether through the Kremlin or through more transnational influences.[107] A more challenging aspect of this proposal is to identify tangible ways in which the international community can support Russian civil society amid a strict crackdown on any civil society entities that are affiliated with foreign donors, as well as constant threats to dissidents’ lives and security. One very simple way to support human rights activists and scholars who are compelled to leave the country to continue their work is to provide such individuals with protection and resources abroad, as well as to facilitate mobility by making it easy for them to obtain visas to participate in international conferences and other forums. Importantly, on a more structural level, diplomatic engagement with Russia should consistently prioritize and incentivize the need to reverse the restrictions on civil society imposed through legal amendments. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Russia to liquidate Memorial International demonstrates that the Russian judiciary cannot be trusted to act as an effective check on state repression of civil society. Therefore, any demands to protect dissenting voices and civil society should be coupled with the need for the separation of powers that facilitates independent institutions.
Second, the global community must urgently recalibrate the human rights agenda so that it reflects the interdependency of human rights norms and concerns.[108] The decades following the end of the Cold War have produced various critiques and challenges to the “one size fits all” liberal human rights agenda.[109] Its formal guarantees appear overinflated when juxtaposed with its thin de facto implementation on the ground. The current paradigm’s tilt toward civil and political rights as seen through the lens of negative obligations continues to undermine the importance of positive obligations that are necessary for the realization and the interdependency of all rights, including socioeconomic rights, group rights, and third-generation rights.[110] Russia is undermining civil and political liberties by highlighting this discrepancy in the attention given by the West to economic rights. This dangerous trend must be reversed as these rights are not mutually exclusive and in fact are interdependent, operating as one “ecosystem.” Such a recalibration of the human rights agenda would gain broader legitimacy and buy-in from diverse states. This is not an invitation to lower human rights standards but a plea to refocus on the core structure of human rights principles in its entirety, with a plural and diverse international society in mind.
Third, bilateral and multilateral interactions must continue. The international community has sought to punitively exclude Russia from the world stage while Russia isolates itself with the support of only a few like-minded allies. In either case, Russia’s presence continues to be felt even in its absence from international forums, showing no remorse for its continued transgressions. Russia’s isolation also raises the difficulties of attempting to protect the human rights interests of individual Russians while imposing sanctions whose adverse economic effects will trickle down to ordinary Russian citizens. Isolationism also shuts down bilateral and multilateral interactions that are necessary to identify core values that can be shared by and bind together a heterogeneous international community.
Despite the complexity of the issue, the existing human rights accountability measures and advocacy initiatives need to be supplemented with inclusive project-based multilateralism, which has shared values as a goal rather than as a precondition.[111] It is crucial to identify windows of opportunity where such engagement becomes possible. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is an apt example. It is an inclusive agenda in which human rights are integrated, and it acts as a forum with concrete milestones and relatively uncontroversial goals, the achievement of which would still have significant positive impacts on human freedoms and dignity.[112] The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) strive to overcome siloed, piecemeal approaches and therefore are seen as interdependent, each integral to achieving sustainable development.[113] Most importantly, the agenda is a global platform with which Russia voluntarily engages; this can be contrasted with its usual approach of supporting subregional organizations that fragment human rights. While Russia’s performance in working toward the SDGs leaves a lot to be desired, the process of voluntary reporting by the state, in combination with civil society shadow reports, can facilitate a nuanced dialogue and engagement with Russia on contentious issues.[114] In the face of Russia’s exit from the CoE, the ICC is becoming a pivotal forum to raise accountability for violations suffered by civilians’ at the hands of Russia on foreign soil, even though Russia, much like China and the United States, does not accept the jurisdiction of the ICC. Future possibilities for global engagement may also have to envision forums currently not viewed as spaces for advancing human rights concerns. Such approaches may not explicitly use the language of human rights but could be more effective in achieving core human rights objectives of freedom and dignity.
Every day seems to be a new day on Russia regarding human rights within its borders and when it comes to its deployment of military forces within the borders of its neighbors. In these volatile conditions, isolationist strategies may be a helpful bargaining tool. However, they do not entirely replace dialogue and engagement, especially as a long-term strategy. Despite the violence unfolding in Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky remains confident about talks between Ukraine and Russia taking place at a future date and has stated that a bilateral talk between him and Putin might end the war in Ukraine.[115] Even amid war, optimism for bilateral engagement continues. This chapter urges cautious engagement with Russia in both bilateral and heterogeneous forums to supplement the existing accountability mechanisms, with the primary objective of ameliorating the situation of civil society and individuals within Russia as well as those affected by Russian action beyond its borders.
Notes
1. “Russian Federation Announces ‘Special Military Operation’ in Ukraine as Security Council Meets in Eleventh-Hour Effort to Avoid Full-Scale Conflict,” Security Council, 8974th Meeting (Night), February 23, 2022, https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14803.doc.htm; “Russia Rejects U.S. Suggestions It’s Looking for Pretext to Invade Ukraine,” Associated Press, January 17, 2022, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-ukraine-tension-1.6317497; “Sanctions on Putin Would Be Step Too Far, Kremlin Warns U.S.,” Moscow Times, January 13, 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/01/13/sanctions-on-putin-would-be-step-too-far-kremlin-warns-us-a76033; John Haltiwanger, “Russia Warns It Will Sever Ties with the US If It Sanctions Putin over Ukraine Crisis,” Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-warns-it-will-cut-ties-with-us-if-putin-sanctioned-over-ukraine-2022-1.
2. “Finland and Sweden Submit Applications to Join NATO,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization News, May 18, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_195468.htm?selectedLocale=en.
3. Anna Chernova and Joshua Berlinger, “Russian Court Shuts Down Human Rights Group Memorial International,” CNN World, December 28, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/28/europe/memorial-international-russia-intl/index.html; “Memorial: Russia’s Civil Rights Group Uncovering an Uncomfortable Past,” BBC News, January 2, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59853010; https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/russia/russian-courts-deal-a-blow-to-the-very-core-of-russia-s-civil-society.
4. In this chapter references to the liberal human rights paradigm mean the human rights framework enshrined in the multilateral human rights treaties implemented through UN Charter mechanisms as well as the European regional treaties and Court.
5. “Biden: ‘We Will Stand with Ukraine’ against Russia on Crimea,” Al Jazeera, February 26, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/26/biden-we-will-stand-with-ukraine-against-russia-on-crimea.
6. “Crimea Referendum: Voters ‘Back Russia Union,’ ” BBC News, March 16, 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097.
7. Abigail Williams and others, “U.S., E.U. Impose Sanctions on Russia over Navalny’s Poisoning,” NBC News, March 1, 2021, www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-eu-set-impose-sanctions-russia-n1259249.
8. “Fact Sheet: United States and G7 Partners Impose Severe Costs for Putin’s War against Ukraine”, The White House Briefing Room, May 8, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/08/fact-sheet-united-states-and-g7-partners-impose-severe-costs-for-putins-war-against-ukraine/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20will%20sanction,Stock%20Company%20NTV%20Broadcasting%20Company.
9. “How Many Ukrainians Have Fled Their Homes and Where Have They Gone?,” BBC News, May 25, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60555472; “Ukraine: Civilian Casualty Update 22 April 2022,”,News: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, April 22, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/04/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-22-april-2022.
10. See, for example, Thomas Graham, “Let Russia Be Russia,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2019, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2019-10-15/let-russia-be-russia; Dylan Myles-Primakoff, “America’s Russia Policy Must Not Ignore Human Rights,” Atlantic Council (blog), March 9, 2021; Emma Ashford and Matthew Burrows, “Reality Check #4: Focus on Interests, Not on Human Rights with Russia,” Atlantic Council (blog), March 5, 2021, www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/reality-check/reality-check-4-focus-on-interests-not-on-human-rights-with-russia/.
11. “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” Team of the Official Website of the President of Russia, April 21, 2021, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65418.
12. Gareth Price, “Ukraine War: Why India Abstained on UN Vote against Russia,” Chatham House, March 25, 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/03/ukraine-war-why-india-abstained-un-vote-against-russia; Frédéric Grare, “A Question of Balance: India and Europe after Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 16, 2022, https://ecfr.eu/publication/a-question-of-balance-india-and-europe-after-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/.
13. Vikas Pandey, “Quad: The China Factor at the Heart of the Summit,” BBC News, May 24, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-61547082.
14. Bethany Wright, “What the Pandemic Exposes about Russian Dependence on Oil,” World Crunch, November 16, 2020, https://worldcrunch.com/business-finance/what-the-pandemic-exposes-about-russian-dependence-on-oil; Daniel Treisman, “Is Russia Cursed by Oil?,” Journal of International Affairs 63, 2 (2010).
15. Vladimir Popov, “The Long Road to Normalcy,” UNU-WIDER Working Paper 2010/13 (2010), p. 2.
16. Miriam Lanskoy and Dylan Myles-Primakoff, “The Rise of Kleptocracy: Power and Plunder in Putin’s Russia,” Journal of Democracy 29, 1 (2018), pp. 76–77. Also see Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014).
17. “Russia,” Nations in Transit 2021, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/russia/nations-transit/2021.
18. William Partlett, “Can Russia Keep Faking Democracy?,” Brookings, May 22, 2012, www.brookings.edu/opinions/can-russia-keep-faking-democracy/; Aryeh Neier, “The Imitation Games That Authoritarians Play,” New Republic, March 24, 2020, https://newrepublic.com/article/156777/imitation-games-authoritarians-trump-putin.
19. “Alexei Navalny: Germany Urges EU Action over Novichok Poisoning,” BBC News, September 3, 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54010741; “Russian Opposition Leader Navalny Arrested upon Arrival in Moscow,” Politico, January 17, 2021, www.politico.eu/article/russian-opposition-leader-alexei-navalny-arrested-upon-arrival-in-moscow/; Anastasia Edel, “The Berlin Patient,” Foreign Policy, April 25, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/25/navalny-protest-dissent-russia-putin.
20. “Why Was Boris Nemtsov Murdered?,” Politico, March 5, 2015, www.politico.eu/article/why-was-boris-nemtsov-murdered/.
21. “The Khodorkovsky Trial: A Report on the Observation of the Criminal Trial of Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky and Platon Leonidovich Lebedev, March 2009 to December 2010,” International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI), September 2011; “Russian Oligarch in London Fatalistic about His Safety from Attack,” The Guardian, March 20, 2018, www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/20/russian-oligarch-in-london-fatalistic-about-his-safety-from-attack; “Russian Businessmen Declared Prisoners of Conscience after Convictions Are Upheld,” Amnesty International, October 13, 2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20111013071109/http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/russian-businessmen-declared-prisoners-conscience-after-convictions-are-uph.
22. Michael Waller, Russian Politics Today: The Return of a Tradition (New York: Palgrave, 2005).
23. “Russia: Persecution of ‘Undesirable’ Activists,” Human Rights Watch, January 18, 2020, www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/18/russia-persecution-undesirable-activists#:~:text=The%20law%20on%20%E2%80%9Cundesirable%20organizations,%2C%20defense%2C%20or%20constitutional%20order.
24. Dmitry Dubrovsky, “Foreign Agents and Undesirable Organizations,” IWM Post 116 (Fall 2015), p. 21.
25. “Online and on All Fronts,” Human Rights Watch, July 18, 2017, www.hrw.org/report/2017/07/18/online-and-all-fronts/russias-assault-freedom-expression; “Russia: Growing Internet Isolation, Control, Censorship,” Human Rights Watch, June 18, 2020, www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/18/russia-growing-internet-isolation-control-censorship. In 2018 Russia filed a lawsuit to limit access to the Telegram messaging app after the company refused to give Russian state security services access to its users’ secret messages. In March 2021, Russia started suing five social media platforms for allegedly failing to delete posts urging children to take part in illegal protests concerning the detention of Navalny. See “Russia Files Lawsuit to Block Telegram Messaging App,” Reuters, April 6, 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-telegram/russia-files-lawsuit-to-block-telegram-messaging-app-idUKKCN1HD143; “Russia Sues Google, Facebook, Twitter for Not Deleting Protest Content: Report,” CTV News, March 9, 2021, www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/russia-sues-google-facebook-twitter-for-not-deleting-protest-content-report-1.5339374.
26. 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1396th mtg.) 109, 112, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1396 (1966).
27. In the Soviet Constitution of 1977, these are the right to work (Article 40), right to rest and leisure (Article 41), right to free health care (Article 42), right to social security (Article 43), right to housing (Article 44), right to education (Article 45), and right to cultural benefits (Article 46). See also the 1936 Constitution.
28. In the Soviet Constitution of 1977, rather than characterizing civil and political rights as negative rights requiring state nonintervention, the state’s role in the positive obligations relating to civil and political rights was expressly delineated. As was the case with the 1936 Constitution, civil and political rights were guaranteed but with obvious caveats: according to Article 50, freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions, and demonstrations are guaranteed in accordance with the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system. Mary Hawkesworth, “Ideological Immunity: The Soviet Response to Human Rights Criticism,” Universal Human Rights 2, 1 (1980), pp. 67–84.
29. Bill Bowring, “Russia and Human Rights: Incompatible Opposites,” Göttingen Journal of International Law 1, 2 (2009), pp. 257–67.
30. Ibid.
31. Mikhail Antonov, “Conservatism in Russia and Sovereignty in Human Rights,” Review of Central and East European Law 39, 1 (2014), p. 24.
32. See Russia’s Constitution of 1993, Articles 8, 9, 35, and 36; property rights provisions received detailed regulation in the Civil Code of 1994, the Land Code of 2001, and various other specialized legislative acts.
33. Vladislav Starzhenetskiy, “Property Rights in Russia: Reconsidering the Socialist Legal Tradition,” in Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Strasbourg Effect, edited by Lauri Mälksoo and Wolfgang Benedek (Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 295–97, 299; Felix Yurlov, “Russia—A Lost Decade,” World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 3, 3 (1999), pp. 80–95; Michael D. Intrilligator and others, “What Russia Can Learn from China in Its Transition to Market Economy,” in Clumsy Solutions for a Complex World: Governance, Politics and Plural Perceptions, edited by Marco Verweij and M. Thompson (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
34. Stephen Holmes and Ivan Krastev, The Light That Failed: Why the West Is Losing the Fight for Democracy (New York: Pegasus Books, 2020), p. 84.
35. Brian Z. Tamanaha, “The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development,” Cornell International Law Journal 44, 2 (2011), pp. 209–15.
36. Mikhail Antonov, “Philosophy Behind Human Rights: Valery Zorkin vs. the West?,” in Russia and the European Court of Human Rights, pp. 150–57.
37. Holmes and Krastev, The Light That Failed, p. 79. Antonov, “Conservatism in Russia,” p. 13, states that Russian judges and lawyers continue to view attempts to advance international jurisprudence at the cost of Russian domestic law as an inadmissible encroachment upon Russian sovereignty.
38. Nandini Ramanujam, Mara Verna, and Julia Betts, “Rule of Law and Economic Development: A Comparative Analysis of Approaches to Economic Development across the BRIC Countries,” Rule of Law and Economic Development Research Group, December 2012, pp. 78–79: “The Soviet Union’s institutions were themselves largely a continuation of tsarist institutions, which were predicated on absolutist law and oligarchy.”
39. Левада-центр»: 64% россиян готовы участвовать в голосовании о поправках в Конституцию, 72% их поддержат’, 10 февраля 2020 [Levada Center: “64% of Russians are ready to vote on amendments to the Constitution, 72% will support them,” February 10, 2020], https://meduza.io/news/2020/02/10/levada-tsentr-64-rossiyan-gotovy-pouchastvovat-v-golosovanii-o-popravkah-v-konstitutsiyu-72-ih-podderzhat.
40. “Russians Vote on Putin’s Reforms to Constitution,” BBC News, June 25, 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-5317606.
41. Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?,” Washington Quarterly 29, 1 (2005), pp. 131–44. For a discussion on China’s foreign policy and engagements with human rights, see “Exploring Public International Law Issues with Chinese Scholars—Part 4,” International Law Programme Roundtable Meeting Summary, Chatham House, June 2–3, 2018, www.chathamhouse.org/2018/06/exploring-public-international-law-issues-chinese-scholars-part-four.
42. On nativism, see Benedikt Harzl, “Nativist Ideological Responses to European/Liberal Human Rights Discourses in Contemporary Russia,” in Russia and the European Court of Human Rights, edited by Mälksoo and Benedek, pp. 355–56; on LGBT and the rights of the traditional family, see Federal Law 135-FZ, June 29, 2013, on “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations” and Federal Law 167-FZ, July 2, 2013, on measures relating to adoptions; and Andrea Chandler, “Russia’s Laws on ‘Non-Traditional’ Relationships as Response to Global Norm Diffusion,” International Journal of Human Rights 25, 4 (2021), pp. 616–18.
43. Harzl, “Nativist Ideological Responses,” p. 358; Holmes and Krastev, The Light That Failed, p. 132.
44. Antonov, “Conservatism in Russia,” p. 25.
45. Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” Social Text 25/26 (1990), pp. 56–80.
46. Antonov, “Conservatism in Russia,” p. 27.
47. Holmes and Krastev, The Light That Failed, p. 82.
48. Alicia Ceccanese, “‘Disastrous for Press Freedom’: What Russia’s Goal of an Isolated Internet Means for Journalists,” Committee to Protect Journalists, May 23, 2022, https://cpj.org/2022/05/disastrous-for-press-freedom-what-russias-goal-of-an-isolated-internet-means-for-journalists/.
49. Lauri Mälksoo, “Introduction: Russia, Strasbourg, and the Paradox of a Human Rights Backlash,” in Russia and the European Court of Human Rights, edited by Mälksoo and Benedek, p. 4.
50. Yuri Ivanovich Kalinin, “The Russian Penal System: Past, Present and Future,” lecture delivered at King’s College London, November 2002, p. 9, www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/website_kalinin.pdf.
51. Louis Charbonneau, “Putin Says U.S. Wants to Dominate World,” Reuters, February 10, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa-idUSL1053774820070210.
52. Mälksoo, “Introduction,” p. 10.
53. Council of Europe, “Resolution CM/Res(2022)2 on the Cessation of the Membership of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe,” adopted by the Committee of Ministers at the 1428ter meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, March 16, 2022; “Russia Quits Council of Europe Rights Watchdog,” Reuters, March 15, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-formally-quits-council-europe-rights-watchdog-2022-03-15/; Jannika Jahn, “The Council of Europe Excludes Russia: A Setback for Human Rights,” EJIL: Talk!, March 23, 2022, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-council-of-europe-excludes-russia-a-setback-for-human-rights/#:~:text=Upon%20unanimous%20request%20of%20the,to%20withdraw%20the%20preceding%20day.
54. See James Nixey, “Lavrov and Russia Outplay the European Union Yet Again,” Chatham House, February 15, 2021, www.chathamhouse.org/2021/02/lavrov-and-russia-outplay-european-union-yet-again.
55. Ibid., p. 718.
56. Anna Matveeva, “Russia’s Power Projection after the Ukraine Crisis,” Europe-Asia Studies 70, 5 (2018), pp. 711–13, www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09668136.2018.1479735.
57. “The European Court Grants Urgent Interim Measures in Application Concerning Russian Military Operations on Ukrainian territory,” Press Release, Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, March 1, 2022.
58. Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 48787/99, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, July 8, 2004.
59. Abdulkhanov and Others v. Russia, 22782/06, European Court of Human Rights, October 3, 2013; Turluyeva v. Russia, 63638/09, European Court of Human Rights, June 20, 2013; Maskhadova and Others v. Russia, 18071/05, European Court of Human Rights, June 6, 2013; Sabanchiyeva and Others v. Russia, 38450/05, European Court of Human Rights, June 6, 2013.
60. There is one more case relating to Georgia pending in the ECtHR. Georgia v. Russia (IV), 39611/18, European Court of Human Rights, August 22, 2018, relates to the human rights situation along the administrative boundary lines between Georgian-controlled territory and Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
61. On November 27, 2020, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in interstate application Ukraine v. Russia (re Eastern Ukraine), 8019/16, decided to join to that application two interstate applications, Ukraine v. Russia (II), 43800/14, and The Netherlands v. Russia, 28525/20, which were pending before a chamber. Another case, Ukraine v. Russia (III), 49537/14, was struck off after the Ukrainian government stated that it did not wish to pursue it.
62. “ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan QC Announces Deployment of Forensics and Investigative Team to Ukraine, Welcomes Strong Cooperation with the Government of the Netherlands,” International Criminal Court: News, May 17, 2022, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-qc-announces-deployment-forensics-and-investigative-team-ukraine.
63. Navalnyy v. Russia, 62670/12, European Court of Human Rights, November 17, 2016; Navalnyy v. Russia, 32058/13, European Court of Human Rights, May 15, 2014; Navalnyy v. Russia, 1176/15, European Court of Human Rights, February 20, 2018; Navalnyy v. Russia, 25809/17, European Court of Human Rights, June 19, 2017; Navalnyy v. Russia, 67894/17, European Court of Human Rights, March 9, 2018; Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, 78193/17, European Court of Human Rights, December 21, 2017; Navalnyy v. Russia, 55589/17, European Court of Human Rights, January 28, 2020; Navalnyy v. Russia, 56491/18, European Court of Human Rights, January 28, 2020; and Navalnyy v. Russia, 36418/20, European Court of Human Rights, January 12, 2021.
64. “Navalny Must Be Freed, European Rights Court Tells Russia,” BBC News, February 17, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56102257.
65. “Europe’s Top Human Rights Court Demands Russia Release Alexey Navalny Immediately,” CBS News, February 17, 2021, www.cbsnews.com/news/alexey-navalny-european-court-human-rights-demands-release/.
66. OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 14902/04, European Court of Human Rights, July 31, 2014 (just compensation).
67. Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of July 14, 2015, N 21-P, St. Petersburg, https://rg.ru/2015/07/27/ks-dok.html.
68. “Russia Passes Law to Overrule European Human Rights Court,” BBC News, December 4, 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35007059.
69. Final Opinion on the Amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court, Opinion 832/2015, European Commission for Democracy through Law, June 13, 2016, para. 38.
70. Martin Russell, “Constitutional Change in Russia: More Putin, or Preparing for Post-Putin?,” European Parliament Briefing, May 2020, www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/651935/EPRS_BRI(2020)651935_EN.pdf.
71. Paul Kubicek, “The Commonwealth of Independent States: An Example of Failed Regionalism?,” Review of International Studies 35, S1 (2009), pp. 237–39.
72. Report: Co-Existence of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the European Convention on Human Rights, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 9075, May 3, 2001, https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=9298&lang=EN.
73. Paul Stronski and Richard Solosky, “Multipolarity in Practice: Understanding Russia’s Engagement with Regional Institutions,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 8, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/08/multipolarity-in-practice-understanding-russia-s-engagement-with-regional-institutions-pub-80717.
74. Ždanoka v. Latvia, judgment (Grand Chamber), appl. 58278/00, March 16, 2006, para. 98 notes that the ECHR was designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society. Democracy is thus the only political model contemplated by the Convention and, accordingly, the only one compatible with it.
75. Зорькин призвал добавить в правовую систему “военной суровости” [Zorkin urges the addition of “military necessity” to the legal system], ZAKS, November 25, 2015, https://www.zaks.ru/new/archive/view/147253.
76. Mälksoo, “Introduction,” p. 11.
77. Holmes and Krastev, The Light That Failed, p. 13.
78. Andrey S. Makarychev, “Russia’s Search for International Identity through the Sovereign Democracy Concept,” International Spectator 43, 2 (2008), p. 49.
79. Ivan Krastev, “Russia vs Europe: Sovereignty Wars,” Open Democracy, September 5, 2007, www.opendemocracy.net/en/russia_vs_europe_the_sovereignty_wars/.
80. “Security Council ‘Speaks with One Voice for Peace in Ukraine,’ ” UN News, May 6, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/05/1117742.
81. “Russia/Syria: Possibly Unlawful Russian Air Strikes Entire,” Human Rights Watch, October 25, 2015, www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/25/russia/syria-possibly-unlawful-russian-air-strikes.
82. Nikolay Kozhanov, “Russian Policy across the Middle East,” Chatham House Research Paper, February 21, 2018, www.chathamhouse.org/2018/02/russian-policy-across-middle-east/russias-pivot-middle-east-after-2012.
83. “Russia Unmoved as Security Council Again Warned of Syrian Children’s Plight,” Arab News, February 26, 2021, https://arab.news/2xprz.
84. Stronski and Solosky, “Multipolarity in Practice.”
85. Mordechai Chaziza, “Soft Balancing Strategy in the Middle East: Chinese and Russian Vetoes in the United Nations Security Council in the Syria Crisis,” China Report 50, 3 (2014), pp. 243–58, at p. 247, https://doi.org/10.1177/0009445514534126. China and Russia have also used vaccine diplomacy to expand their influence across borders, including in the Middle East, and are engaging in joint space exploration projects. Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, “The West Should Pay Attention to Russia and China’s Vaccine Diplomacy,” Financial Times, February 10, 2021, www.ft.com/content/c20b92f0-d670-47ea-a217-add1d6ef2fbd.
86. “India and Russia Agree to Work Closely on Key Issues at U.N. Security Council,” The Hindu, February 17, 2021, www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-and-russia-agree-to-work-closely-on-key-issues-at-the-un-security-council/article33858914.ece.
87. Vadim Balytniko, Oleg Barabanov, Andrei Yemelyanov, Dmitry Poletaev, and Igor Sid, “Russia’s Return to Africa: Strategy and Prospects,” Valdai Discussion Club Report, October 2019, p. 35, https://valdaiclub.com/files/27418/.
88. Ibid.
89. Holmes and Krastev, The Light That Failed, p. 114.
90. Letter dated July 8, 2020, from the president of the Security Council addressed to the secretary-general and the permanent representatives of the members of the Security Council, UN Security Council, July 9, 2020, S/2020/661, Annex 18.
91. “The Situation in the Middle East,” 6,711th meeting UN Security Council, S/PV.6711, February 4, 2012.
92. “China, Russia Stop UN Security Council Move to Condemn Myanmar Coup,” Financial Express, March 10, 2021, https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/world/china-russia-stop-un-security-council-move-to-condemn-myanmar-coup-1615350622. Russia also opposed a resolution in 2007 on the situation in Myanmar proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States. “The Situation in Myanmar,” 5,619th meeting, UN Security Council, S/PV.5619, January 12, 2007.
93. “Peace and Security in Africa (Zimbabwe),” 5,933rd meeting, UN Security Council, S/PV.5933, July 11, 2008.
94. Minami Funakoshi, Hugh Lawson, and Kannaki Deka, “Tracking Sanctions against Russia,” Reuters, May 24, 2022, https://graphics.reuters.com/UKRAINE-CRISIS/SANCTIONS/byvrjenzmve/.
95. Letter dated July 10, 2020, from the president of the Security Council addressed to the secretary-general and the permanent representatives of the members of the Security Council, UN Security Council, July 13, 2020, S/2020/693, Annex XVIII. Russia’s approach indirectly harks back to the Soviet legacy of socioeconomic rights that are affected by the use of sanctions.
96. Samuel Charap, “Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention,” Survival 55, 1 (2013), pp. 35–36. “The Situation in the Middle East,” 6,627th meeting, UN Security Council, October 4, 2011, S/PV.6627.
97. The Western members of the Council have refused to work on the text of the draft resolution (S/2012/547, Rev.2) submitted by the Russian delegation.
98. “The Situation in the Middle East,” 7,785th meeting, UN Security Council, S/PV.7785, October 8, 2016.
99. Jutta Brunnee and Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 64.
100. Jean-Marc Coicaud, “Deconstructing International Legitimacy,” in Fault Lines of International Legitimacy, edited by Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 29–50.
101. Krastev, “Russia vs Europe.”
102. Ashford and Burrows, “Reality Check #4.”
103. Nicu Popescu, “Why the EU Should Stop Waiting for the Godot of Russian Decline,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March 5, 2021, https://ecfr.eu/article/why-the-eu-should-stop-waiting-for-the-godot-of-russian-decline/.
104. Matveeva, “Russia’s Power Projection,” p. 714.
105. Holmes and Krastev, The Light That Failed, p. 100.
106. See Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice (University of Chicago Press, 2006). See also Sally Engle Merry, “Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle,” American Anthropologist 108, 1 (2006), pp. 38–51.
107. Saskia Brechenmacher and Thomas Carothers, “Examining Civil Society Legitimacy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/02/examining-civil-society-legitimacy-pub-76211; Thomas Carothers and William Barndt, “Civil Society,” Foreign Policy 117 (Winter 1999–2000), pp. 18–24, 26–29.
108. Engle Merry, “Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism.”
109. Andrey Kortunov, “Multilateralism Needs Reinventing, Not Resurrecting,” Russian International Affairs Council, December 9, 2020, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/multilateralism-needs-reinventing-not-resurrecting; Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?,” International Affairs 74, 1 (1998), pp. 1–23; Ratna Kapur, “Human Rights in the 21st Century: Taking a Walk on the Dark Side,” Sydney Law Review 28, 4 (2006), pp. 665–87; Makau Mutua, “Human Rights in Africa: The Limited Promise of Liberalism,” African Studies Review 51, 1 (2008), pp. 17–39; Simon Tisdall, “Tunisia Shows That Democracy Will Struggle If It Can’t Deliver Prosperity,” The Guardian, August 1, 2021, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/aug/01/tunisia-shows-that-democracy-will-struggle-if-it-cant-deliver-prosperity?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.
110. Tisdall, “Tunisia Shows That Democracy Will Struggle.”
111. Kortunov, “Multilateralism Needs Reinventing, Not Resurrecting.”
112. Key Messages, “Transforming Our World: Human Rights in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” Office of the Higher Commissioner for Human Rights, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/MDGs/Post2015/HRAndPost2015.pdf.
113. Agnello and Ramanujam, “Recalibration of the Sustainable Development Agenda,” p. 89.
114. “Voluntary National Review of the Progress Made in the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” Russian Federation, 2020, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26959VNR_2020_Russia_Report_English.pdf; “2020–2030: Decade of Action in Russia—Challenges and Solutions,” Coalition for Sustainable Development of Russia, Moscow, 2020, https://action4sd.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Russia-VNR-report-2020.pdf.
115. “Zelensky: Only Diplomacy Can End Ukraine War,” BBC News, May 21, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61535353.
