From the perspective of policymakers both inside and outside Iraq, Sadr has been an enigmatic leader. He has claimed multiple identities, from insurgent militia leader to reformist protest leader – and from election winner to revolutionary – complicating simplistic labels such as ‘reformer’ or ‘anti-Iranian’ which continue to be assigned to him. This research paper has sought to present an interpretation of Sadr’s words and actions in the context of the dilemmas he faces in the management of both elite politics and his own support base. In the past, Sadr has balanced these competing demands through a strategy of controlled instability, not to reform or revolutionize Iraq’s political system, but to gain ground for his movement within the Shia apportionment of the Iraqi state.
However, changing demographics have been seen as a medium-term challenge to the post-2003 Iraqi political order, which is widely regarded as becoming ideologically and economically bankrupt. Many young Iraqis struggle to find jobs. They no longer believe their leaders’ nationalist, sectarianist or reformist rhetoric. In this light, Sadr’s protest agenda represents an attempt to distance himself and his movement from a toxic political order which harms Iraqis on a daily basis. It also represents a tool to gain leverage over political rivals.
Sadr’s goal is to match the controlled instability that came between 2015 and 2018, when he convinced many that he was a protest-minded leader while still maintaining leverage inside the government. This allowed him to install more loyalists across state institutions, with the ultimate intention of removing from power his primary political adversary, Nouri al-Maliki.
Sadr’s protest agenda represents an attempt to distance himself and his movement from a toxic political order which harms Iraqis on a daily basis.
However, Sadr’s rise within Iraqi politics backfired with his base. Failing to sufficiently include his followers within the gains of increased power fed disillusionment with the political system and reinforced tendencies within the base against the traditional political consensus. Chatham House survey data indicates that the base will push the Sadrist movement in more radical directions. However, it is not going to abandon its religious leaders, protests or electoral politics, all of which tend to be seen by Sadrists as complementary strategies.
Sadr was also unable to navigate the incoherent and fractured structure of the state to maximize the opportunities afforded by his 2021 election victory. Instead, the prevailing system was deployed to stop his bid for power. His opponents’ control of the judiciary and over security institutions provided judicial and security mechanisms to halt Sadr’s rise.
Despite ‘quitting’ at the end of August 2022, Sadr is by no means ‘done’ with politics. His move back to an agenda of street protests is part of a strategy to garner more votes, further empowering him in a future election and government formation process. However, the attempted shift from Shia-centric to Sadr-centric state-building, and growing dissatisfaction with status quo politics within his base, are now pushing Sadr’s model of controlled (or contained) instability to breaking point. The result is a more unstable and reactionary Sadrist politics and a great Sadrist proclivity for risk-taking – and, consequently, a proliferation of miscalculations and missteps by Sadr (such as withdrawing his MPs, or criticizing his own followers for the escalation of violence in Baghdad’s Green Zone in late August 2022). Ultimately, a less stable Sadrist movement means a tilt towards greater instability for Iraq’s political system.
Many Western policymakers were surprised and upset with Sadr’s increased appetite for risk. The rhetoric quickly changed from ‘reformist’ to ‘hostage-taker’, with many asking the authors of this paper how Sadr could hold the country hostage. Sadr was an unreliable ally to pursue certain Western interests and reform Iraq’s political system. Despite notions held in foreign capitals that Sadr was ‘anti-Iran’ or ‘pro-reform’, the reality of Iraq’s elite networks is more complicated. Sadr, like any other political leader, navigates across the political spectrum and cannot be boxed into any single category. This reality means that policymakers cannot depend on Sadr or any other individual within Iraq’s political system to channel reform. At times, their support – even if tacit – fuels power plays in the local context. Instead of picking favourites or ‘winners’, policymakers should focus on building coherent institutions that hold to account the entire network of elites.
