Most EU member states define their Indo-Pacific strategies, at least in part, as specifically European rather than transatlantic. For instance, Italy frames its Indo-Pacific strategy as a contribution to the overall EU strategy, while the Netherlands divides its strategy into action points for the EU and for itself in a complementary role.
However, European countries have divergent views on the nature of transatlantic cooperation in general and on cooperating with the US on the Indo-Pacific specifically. First, the Indo-Pacific strategies of countries such as France or organizations like the EU must be seen in the context of European efforts to achieve greater strategic autonomy. Or, put differently, some European approaches to the Indo-Pacific are a form of self-assertion and reflect the ambition of those countries’ policymakers to provide alternatives to the US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Conversely, others – primarily countries in Central and Eastern Europe – are keen to use the Indo-Pacific as a way for Europe to add value on the US’s top foreign policy priority.
Cooperation does not require, or necessarily lead to, alignment. The level and degree of cooperation can vary within a hierarchy – from sharing information, through deconfliction and coordination of individual policies, to joint approaches and action. A similar spectrum applies to the forms of cooperation, ranging from informal and ad hoc mechanisms to institutional (legally and diplomatically structured) forms.
Some European approaches to the Indo-Pacific are a form of self-assertion and reflect the ambition of those countries’ policymakers to provide alternatives to the US strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
Policymakers on either side of the Atlantic currently appear not to prioritize a common approach to the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, efforts to shape cooperation are likely to become a priority over the coming years. The US National Security Strategy from October 2022 emphasized the need for closer alignment of different partners and forums – including ‘by encouraging tighter linkages between likeminded Indo-Pacific and European countries’.
Various ways to deepen transatlantic engagement are available. The EU and the US, and bilateral efforts by European states, have made a promising start through high-level dialogues on China and the Indo-Pacific, as well as the EU–US Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The UK is engaging in similar discussions bilaterally with the US, although UK–EU cooperation remains in flux due to continued political tensions over Brexit. Tension between the UK and France over AUKUS appears to have subsided, with on-the-ground cooperation resuming and military-to-military cooperation continuing as before.
Neither Europe – whether via individual states or the EU – nor the US has the resources to take on the defence and economic challenges of the Indo-Pacific alone. Moreover, many of the countries in the Indo-Pacific have limited capacity to respond to the growing interest in their region – especially if that interest is uncoordinated. There is a strong imperative therefore to strengthen transatlantic cooperation to enable more effective engagement.
