Enabling factors
Given the demographic and political weight of countries in the Indo-Pacific, as well as the region’s economic dynamism and its strategic significance, European countries and the US have a shared interest in maintaining stability and openness, and in pursuing trade and investment opportunities. The transatlantic partners also regard the same bilateral partners in the region – Australia, India and Japan – and engagement with regional organizations and platforms (ASEAN in particular) as critical in addressing global challenges and shaping the rules-based international order.
One crucial motivation for greater transatlantic cooperation on and with the Indo-Pacific is strategic competition with China and shared concern regarding China’s economic and military expansion. Specific examples of Chinese activities causing concern include the Belt and Road Initiative, the situation in the East and South China Seas, Hong Kong, Taiwan, human rights abuses including in Xinjiang, and China’s non-market economy practices in trade and investment, as well as efforts by China to set global rules and standards for technology. As China’s economic and military capacity and influence continue to grow, transatlantic actors and their core partners in the Indo-Pacific are increasingly concerned that China seeks to turn the Indo-Pacific into a Chinese sphere of influence. The Indo-Pacific region is therefore a testing ground for European and US efforts to balance China and reinforce the rules-based international order.
A greater degree of transatlantic policy alignment on China and the Indo-Pacific also reflects US leadership and pressure on European actors (e.g. over Huawei’s role in Western 5G telecoms networks) during the Trump administration. But, more importantly, it is driven by an increased focus on security and economic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and hardening attitudes towards China among policymakers and voters on both sides of the Atlantic.
Inhibiting factors
On security, the transatlantic players diverge in their perception of the scale and imminence of the Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific. Europe’s security focus on its immediate neighbourhood, coupled with aspirations of some European actors for greater strategic autonomy, make transatlantic cooperation on the Indo-Pacific more complex. While the links between economic and security issues are well understood in European capitals, the extent to which the Indo-Pacific is seen as relevant to national security varies. Indeed, except for France and the UK (both of which are military powers; France also has significant territories in the Indo-Pacific), and to a lesser extent Germany and the Netherlands, ‘hard power’ defence questions are generally seen within Europe as a policy area in which the US plays the greatest role. Aside from the above exceptions, most European countries have limited capacity or desire for military involvement beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.
European governments largely still see the Indo-Pacific through an economic prism, while focusing on associated ‘soft’ security issues such as climate change, cybersecurity, health, maritime challenges, and the need to diversify supply chains following COVID-19 and Chinese attempts at economic coercion targeted against individual states like Lithuania and Australia.
However, it is significant that the war in Ukraine has increased, rather than reduced, the EU’s interest in working with Indo-Pacific partners and in the region directly – furthering transatlantic goals, even if pursuing them via separate structures. For example, the EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, published in March 2022, stressed the need to strengthen bilateral cooperation on the Indo-Pacific with like-minded countries and strategic partners (such as Japan, the UK and the US), plus regional organizations such as ASEAN.
On economics, transatlantic competition for markets and investment in the Indo-Pacific continues to obstruct greater cooperation between European countries and the US. Divergent economic and regulatory models on both sides of the Atlantic – alongside policy debates within the EU – have long complicated collaborative efforts. In particular, the transatlantic partners differ on the governance and regulation of digital technologies. For that reason, there is currently no transatlantic agreement on digital standards and frameworks into which the Indo-Pacific region might be effectively integrated. This patchwork approach is reflected in the proliferation of initiatives and ‘minilateral’ forums for economic, technology and trade and investment cooperation with and in the Indo-Pacific. Examples include the EU–US–Japan trilateral efforts to tackle non-market economic practices and the US’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
Domestic politics at the national and regional levels have the potential to divert resources and bandwidth for transatlantic engagement on and with the Indo-Pacific. Following the UK’s departure from the EU, the UK announced a ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific in its Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy published in March 2021, yet EU–UK cooperation on the region has been limited due to the lack of a structured partnership and ongoing tensions between London and Brussels (and other European capitals) due to unresolved, Brexit-related issues. The upcoming US presidential election in 2024 could also lead to renewed transatlantic friction and undermine the prospects for European–US cooperation.
For almost every country in the Indo-Pacific region, China is simultaneously a security concern and a major economic partner.
The perspectives and positions of states within the Indo-Pacific naturally also present challenges for transatlantic alignment and policy coherence. For almost every country in that region, China is simultaneously a security concern and a major economic partner. These countries therefore seek to balance the maintenance, or even reinforcement, of security ties with the US against trade relations with China. This means they do not necessarily share the US or European positions on international governance issues. Many states in the region diverge from the transatlantic partners on issues such as how to address climate change and what count as human rights. For instance, India often diverges from Western approaches to global governance. Its approach to climate change frequently aligns with that of China and, until recently, it has tended towards protectionism rather than free trade. Regional institutions, aside from ASEAN, have meanwhile achieved little.
While the lack of an effective regional security architecture is one of the factors driving US engagement in the Indo-Pacific, weak institutions make a regional approach more complex and, instead, encourage bilateral engagement. The emerging trading architecture among countries in Asia and the Pacific seems likely to promote some form of regional approach, although this will not necessarily translate into better functioning regional organizations. Relations between many states in the region (e.g. China–India, India–Pakistan, Japan–South Korea) are strained, which can at times narrow the focus of their foreign policy and obstruct transatlantic attempts at regional engagement on wider security and economic issues that include rivalling countries.
The Russia–Ukraine context: Linking the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres
Countries in the Indo-Pacific have been divided in their response to Russia’s war on Ukraine, which presents a challenge for transatlantic engagement with nations like India that have avoided condemning Russia thus far. Those that have condemned the invasion and imposed sanctions against Russia, such as Japan and South Korea, have moved closer to the transatlantic partners in a joint approach to defending international law and the rules-based international order. In part, this was achieved via the G7 and the presence of the heads of government of NATO’s four formal Asia-Pacific partners (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea) at the organization’s annual summit in June 2022.
The return of conventional war in Europe has meanwhile affected Europe’s view of the Indo-Pacific’s importance. On the one hand, it has refocused European and US attention on Euro-Atlantic security. It has also highlighted Europe’s strategic dependence on the US (particularly following the deployment of extra US resources in Europe, under NATO’s latest conventional deterrence plans). Europe’s need to focus on its own security could reduce its willingness and ability to contribute to security in the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, transatlantic governments have emphasized the link between European and Asian security, citing the China–Russia partnership and Chinese support for Russian disinformation on Ukraine. Some transatlantic observers and policymakers have instead advocated for a renewed vigour in European investment in the Indo-Pacific.
Since the war in Ukraine began, the administration of US president Joe Biden has maintained that the Indo-Pacific remains the US’s priority theatre and has launched a series of initiatives with partners across the region – including hosting a meeting of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) leaders in May 2022. However, the renewed US involvement in European security has been the subject of strategic debates in Washington, with some arguing that the US should focus on China and the Indo-Pacific rather than dedicate more assets to Europe and Russia.
