Core transatlantic interests in the Indo-Pacific and rationale for cooperation
The transatlantic partnership between Europe and the US rests on a set of shared values and interests – including democracy, the rule of law, international security and free markets. With the global economic and strategic centre of gravity shifting eastwards, the Indo-Pacific will play an increasingly important role in determining the viability of both the rules-based international order and multilateralism in general. The transatlantic partners are unsurprisingly placing greater focus on that region as a result.
As well as seeking to further their economic interests, they express similar concerns about the implications of China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. However, there are important differences between the approaches of the various European actors and the US – including over the level of priority given to the Indo-Pacific, the principal issues, the key regional partners for cooperation and the most useful forums for engagement.
This paper explores the scope for cooperation between Europe and the US on the Indo-Pacific. After discussing the factors that enable or inhibit transatlantic cooperation, the paper looks at priorities, partners and platforms for European and US engagement on and in the region. Although the paper focuses on economic and security aspects, it does not place them in silos as the boundaries between defence, technology, trade and finance are becoming increasingly blurred.
It also acknowledges that neither Europe nor the US are uniform actors. On the European side, in particular, the EU needs to be differentiated from its key member states. Following the UK’s exit from the EU, questions also remain about the level of trust and cooperation between London and Brussels, and about whether the UK can play a bridging role between the EU and the US.
Drawing on interviews with policy professionals on both sides of the Atlantic, this paper deliberately focuses on the transatlantic (and intra-transatlantic) dynamics of cooperation on the Indo-Pacific. A future paper will discuss the extent to which these transatlantic efforts align with the interests of countries and groupings in the Indo-Pacific region itself.
European and US approaches and strategies on the Indo-Pacific
The transatlantic partners have increasingly adopted strategies and policy documents focused specifically on the Indo-Pacific, following the publication in 2017 of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) ‘vision’ and as the importance of the region has grown. For example, France and the US issued Indo-Pacific strategies in 2018 and 2019; several iterations have been produced since – most recently in 2022., Other individual European states – including Germany, the Netherlands and the UK – and the EU followed suit with their own guidelines and policy documents for the region during 2020–21. NATO also adopted the Indo-Pacific terminology in its 2022 Strategic Concept.
Each of the main strategies involves elements of security and trade, and connectivity/infrastructure development. While these strategies and policy documents do not necessarily reflect policies currently in practice, they nonetheless offer a starting point for understanding the position of different transatlantic partners, the principal issues and objectives for each and the main instruments through which they intend to pursue their goals.
It is hoped that, by strengthening trade and investment ties with the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the US can support domestic economic growth, as the Indo-Pacific region is expected to contribute over 50 per cent of global GDP by 2050.
European countries and the US have a shared understanding of the importance of the Indo-Pacific. This includes the geographic conception of the region, with general agreement on the inclusion of India, Japan, Southeast Asia, South Korea, and Australia, New Zealand and the wider South Pacific. (France also includes the African littoral of the Indian Ocean in its strategy.) It is hoped that, by strengthening trade and investment ties with the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the US can support domestic economic growth, as the Indo-Pacific region is expected to contribute over 50 per cent of global GDP by 2050. The Indo-Pacific also has the potential to play a leading role in setting global technology and trade standards.
The transatlantic partners regard the rules-based international order as being increasingly challenged by China’s norms, its growing military capabilities and its aggressive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific. This is another reason why European and US involvement in the region has grown and will continue to do so. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has ensured that Europe and its immediate neighbourhood will remain the primary focus for the EU, as well as for the UK and other European states.
While the war in Ukraine has taken up much of the transatlantic partners’ attention and has refocused Western attention on Russia, it has also underscored how interconnected the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions are in strategic terms.
Many countries on both sides of the Atlantic share the view that the challenge of Russia is immediate and that of China longer-term, with the former being a direct military threat and the latter predominantly a geo-economic competitor with concerning military ambitions, and that each of these threats requires a different set of tools and policies. However, there is a pronounced difference between the transatlantic partners regarding China, in that the US views China as already posing a systemic challenge that requires addressing in the short, medium and long term, and that the US prioritizes the Indo-Pacific as a military theatre.
Europe, meanwhile, still takes a more pragmatic approach to China in the Indo-Pacific than the US. Moreover, there are limits to the EU’s ability to act on Indo-Pacific-related issues, in part due to disagreement between member states regarding China (with different views and priorities in Germany, Greece, Hungary or Lithuania, for instance). This intra-European divide extends beyond the UK’s relationship with the EU to relations between the UK and individual European governments, given the UK’s closer relationship with the US and hardening views on China among British policymakers. Those views are likely to remain sceptical under the new UK prime minister, Rishi Sunak, or become harsher still amid growing concerns over Chinese government or government-affiliated behaviour within the UK’s borders.
