Close India relations reflect bipartisan consensus in US politics

The Biden administration’s focus on India is driven by national security – but it builds on decades of US diplomacy.

Expert comment Updated 26 June 2023 3 minute READ

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington, one of only three state visits hosted by US President Joe Biden, casts a spotlight on a strategic partnership that has been more than two decades in the making, but has now taken on a new significance.

In the course of the last year, India has displaced the UK to become the fifth largest economy globally and replaced China as the most populous nation. In 2022, India was the fourth largest military spender in the world.

Combined with its position as the world’s largest democracy, a leader in technology and science, and a youthful nation, India makes for a compelling and attractive partner.

US–India connections are already strong: 4 million Indians reside in the US – a rapidly growing demographic and a wealthy one, with incomes double that of the median American household.

The US is also India’s largest trade partner, with trade between the countries exceeding $191 billion in 2022.

Republican and Democratic presidents stretching back to the Clinton administration have sought to forge a stronger relationship with India.

Modi’s trip will raise awareness in the US and help bolster the domestic underpinnings of the partnership, one that has previously been forged by elites – polls reveal that the US public remain largely unaware of India’s leader.

But the Biden administration’s focus on India is driven above all by its determination to manage China’s rise. As China has become more assertive, the US has doubled down on its partnership with India.

This is less a change of policy than a matter of degree. Republican and Democratic presidents stretching back to the Clinton administration have sought to forge a stronger relationship with India.

Hard choices

India failed to support the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a subsequent resolution calling for Russia’s suspension from the Human Rights Council, or US-led sanctions against Russia.

The visit underscores the fact that Biden’s embrace of democracy and human rights is tempered by a heavy dose of pragmatism.

The visit underscores the fact that Biden’s embrace of democracy and human rights is tempered by a heavy dose of pragmatism. 75 Democratic members of Congress signed a letter in advance of Modi’s state visit demanding that the US president raise human rights concerns with the Indian prime minister.

But Biden’s embrace of Modi is unambiguous. Modi’s US visit was timed to follow, and rather grandly, on the heels of US diplomacy in Asia, including high-level visits to South Korea, Japan, and finally Secretary Blinken’s trip to Beijing.

A steady supply of bipartisanship

Until now, the US-India relationship has flown under the radar. It continues to be largely free of the constraint of polarization in the US.

Post-Cold War presidents, Democrat and Republican, have actively forged a closer connection with India.

A keen awareness of India’s regional significance, the economic opportunity afforded by India’s market opening in 1991, and a growing focus on balancing China’s rise has underpinned a steady supply of bipartisanship, beginning with President Clinton’s visit to India in 2000.

President George W. Bush transformed the relationship by negotiating the US-India civil-nuclear deal, which gave India open access to nuclear trade and de facto recognition as a state with nuclear weapons.

President Obama, by the end of his presidency, embraced the US-India relationship as an essential part of a pivot to Asia. And President Trump’s anti-China bashing was matched by his move to forge a highly visible personal connection to Modi.  

One eye on China

As the US and India forge ahead with their strategic partnership, both have one eye on China’s regional rise and its global ambitions.

India seeks to balance China’s assertiveness closer to home, especially along the two nations’ shared 2100 mile-long contested border.  

Russia’s imminent invasion of Ukraine did not dissuade the US from releasing its Indo-Pacific Strategy, designed to manage China, in which India featured heavily.  

Modi’s visit concluded with announcements for deepening defence, technology, and space cooperation.

As the war in Ukraine raged, the US released its National Defense Strategy which labelled China as the overall ‘pacing challenge’ for the US and its most ‘consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades’.  

Material benefits and rewards

The strategic relationship also reaps material benefits. Modi’s visit concluded with announcements for deepening defence, technology, and space cooperation. India would also join the Mineral Security Partnership. An Indian Ocean Dialogue, designed to promote regional coordination across the region, was launched. 

An agreement for General Electric to co-produce fighter jet engines designed by the US in India stood out – especially given India’s status as a partner, not an ally, of the US.

It also builds on the January announcement of the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology, designed to deepen cooperation on technology and defence between these two states but also their universities and businesses.

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A partnership with the US also delivers concrete membership rewards. Together with  the US, Australia and Japan, India is a member of the Quad, a key forum for deepening maritime security, economic and technology cooperation designed to guard against China’s regional hegemony.

The I2U2, a grouping of India, Israel, the UAE, and the US is intended to tackle transnational challenges, not least energy and food security.

The limits to partnership

There are limits to the partnership. Ashley Tellis, a lead negotiator of the US-India nuclear deal, makes the case that the US is overestimating the potential of its partnership, and that India is unlikely to be a willing and able security partner to the US in the event of direct conflict with China.

India is realising that the benefits of its partnership with the US also come with clear limits.

But India’s value to the US is not limited to ‘when push comes to shove’ situations.

Equally, India is realising that the benefits of its partnership with the US also come with clear limits. The US has tried but failed to deliver on India’s ambition to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This effort continues, as does China’s success in obstructing India’s aspiration.

India has cultivated a strong international presence as a leader of the G20, but this has hardly satisfied its desire to have permanent representation at the top multilateral table.

Many Indians have harboured the belief that India fared better under Republican US administrations.

Modi’s state visit and his address to Congress has confirmed that when it comes to India, bipartisanship in the US is a feature of the present, not only the past.