Stemming from his drive for China’s scientific self-reliance and talent-reshoring, Xi Jinping has also prioritized the building of a robust and expansive digital economy as one of the key elements of the pathway to economic resilience. The country is an important player in digital technology and cyberspace, and has pioneered a range of initiatives aimed at harnessing the power of emerging technologies as catalysts for socio-economic development, innovation and competitiveness. China has long recognized the power of digital and cyber governance to achieve its strategic ambitions and improve the lives and livelihoods of its citizens.
However, Beijing has different approaches to digital and cyber governance compared with Western norms. These differences are rooted in political ideology, the roles of central and provincial governments, and precarious geopolitical realities. The application of technology in building a digital economy cannot exist in a political vacuum: it carries values, along with differences in governing ideologies and sources of power. Political considerations of technology are never far from the centre of the wider debate between technology and governance.
A new National Data Bureau was established in March 2023 within the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s powerful economic planning agency, while the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) was brought under the party’s direct control. The CAC’s function as an enforcer of data governance in China is increasingly prominent, and its role extends far beyond that of a policy adviser to the State Council.
These shifts underscore Beijing’s determination to promote the development of the country’s digital economy, and to address digital vulnerabilities that might threaten China’s national security. The new National Data Bureau will be responsible for regulating China’s digital economy and implementing a national big data strategy, including digital infrastructure and public cloud infrastructure.
The creation of the National Data Bureau also serves as a further mechanism to support Beijing’s efforts to control and use certain data for state-led development initiatives, in line with central government oversight of other economic inputs like land, capital and labour.
In terms of China’s digital economy and cyber governance, a trend has been emerging whereby the central government and legal authority issue relevant legal documents and executive orders; individual provinces and municipalities then adapt these to local governance rules and regulations, and put them into practice. As with many evolving policy initiatives in China, the central government issues overall policy guidance while giving some autonomy to allow various provinces to tailor implementation. This often starts with local pilot studies and then is later expanded across the country. Digital and cyber governance also follows this trend, most notably in China’s most economically vibrant areas.
Two of the new scientist members of the Politburo members, Ma Xingrui and Yuan Jiajun, were pioneers in building a digital economy with Chinese technologies during their respective tenures as provincial party secretaries in Guangdong and Zhejiang.
Ma, like Yuan, is another space scientist who notably led Chang’e 3, China’s first lunar mission. He became party secretary of the tech and innovation hub of Shenzhen in 2015, and was promoted to the position of governor of Guangdong, one of the country’s major economic and export hubs, in 2017.
Ma’s distinguished academic background – he has published a large number of articles in peer-reviewed journals in the fields of aerospace and astronomy – and professional track record have been very helpful to him as a provincial leader in one of the country’s richest provinces. In Guangdong, his influence was a critical factor in the establishment of an international science and technology innovation centre in the Greater Bay Area, in response to escalating trade frictions and technological competition with the US.
During Ma’s tenure as governor of Guangdong, a number of new laboratories were established within the province, contributing to China’s work in the fields of digital economy, 5G, 4K/8K ultra-high-definition video, new-energy vehicles, and industrial robots. Previously, in Shenzhen, he had championed use of digital currency for businesses and consumers, and had the ambition for the province to be an early adopter of digital initiatives developed by the central government, just as Shenzhen had earlier been a pioneer in the reform and opening up of China after 1978.
Since 2021, Ma has been party secretary of Xinjiang. His appointment to this highly politically sensitive position suggests Xi places significant trust in him. The key challenge facing Ma is whether he will be able to apply his pro-business attitude and tech innovation advocacy in a region like Xinjiang, which has an entirely different economic structure from southern China and where social and ethnic tensions are prevalent.
In the eastern province of Zhejiang, Yuan Jiajun won respect among private business and small to medium-sized tech companies by encouraging innovation in grassroots digital economy initiatives. Zhejiang has long been one of the main drivers of China’s economy and has become a cluster for emerging tech sectors.
As party secretary in Zhejiang, Yuan championed efforts to find market-oriented ways to access data and empower the local economy with data-driven activities, including through building an advanced public cloud system. He encouraged collaboration between Zhejiang University, one of the leading academic centres for science and innovation, and several private tech companies to provide datasets for export manufacturers, another core element of the local economy.
Not least from his background as a rocket scientist and experience in managing space competition with his NASA counterparts, Yuan is acutely aware of China’s long-term competition with the US in areas of critical technology. In line with this, he urged Zhejiang’s ‘little giant’ tech companies to focus on this strategically important sector, in line with Xi’s ambitions for China’s technological self-reliance.
Now, as party secretary of Chongqing, a politically critical megacity with a population of some 32 million, it is reasonable to assume that Yuan will continue to advocate for the rapid development of the digital economy in southwest China. It is to be expected, too, that he is well placed to draw on his professional background in the vanguard of China’s space industry to respond to Xi’s ambitions to build self-sufficiency in science and technology. His successes now may help him build unique political capital to help him rise even higher in China’s party leadership.
China has yet to find a workable balance between delivering economic benefits and exerting control when it comes to the digital economy and digital governance. Given the greater emphasis on ideological control across all aspects of Chinese society under Xi’s leadership, it is inevitable that there will be blurred lines between commercial opportunities and national security concerns. This is clearly seen, for example, with the Chinese government’s regulation of ChatGPT and other generative AI with general application to ensure these embody ‘socialist values’.
The real challenge for the new scientist members of the Politburo is whether they can use a tried and tested formula to roll out digital governance for their respective economically vibrant regions that can apply for the rest of the country. Equally, demonstrating political loyalty to Xi will require them to follow ideological over pragmatic lines, as these often contradict each other. Having reached the Politburo, all five prominent scientists will be expected to both toe the party line and deliver on an ambitious policy agenda.
