| |
|
|
|---|
|
US
|
2,920.4
|
−896.0
|
|
China
|
−336.1
|
3,108.8
|
|
EU27
|
−4,101.8
|
2,256.3
|
|
Canada
|
64.0
|
559.0
|
|
Germany
|
−52.4
|
616.2
|
|
Australia
|
773.4
|
5.7
|
|
Spain
|
−1,608.2
|
−318.5
|
|
Russia
|
162.3
|
−424.4
|
|
Japan
|
−534.0
|
−255.0
|
|
South Korea
|
102.7
|
−177.5
|
|
Italy
|
−1,274.5
|
−450.5
|
|
France
|
−563.0
|
−538.8
|
|
Brazil
|
−253.2
|
−1,216.5
|
|
UK
|
91.5
|
−1,658.0
|
|
India
|
−1,314.1
|
−1,831.4
|
Source: OECD calculations, based on Scopus Custom Data, Elsevier, Version 6.2022, September 2022, https://stat.link/0akyvp.
The career path of another of the new appointees to the Politburo, the environmental scientist Chen Jining, is an example of successful talent-reshoring in the past. Like many of his colleagues in the Politburo, Chen took his bachelor’s degree at the prestigious Tsinghua University and subsequently continued his studies in the UK, graduating three decades ago with a PhD in environmental engineering from Imperial College London. He later returned to work as an academic at Tsinghua, eventually rising to the position of president of the university. His championing of interdisciplinary research at Tsinghua was popular with students and academics alike.
In common with several of his peers within the Politburo, Chen went on to combine his technical expertise and professional experience to launch a political career. He was awarded the position of environment and ecology minister in 2015. His success in introducing several radical environmental protection measures – a task requiring considerable agility in balancing vested interests – earned him the reputation of someone able to ‘get the job done’. As such, Chen’s trajectory is emblematic of Xi’s agenda to bring into senior positions cadres who combine expert technical knowledge with proven political loyalty.
Along with his track record in delivering the national government’s environment agenda, Chen also gained substantial experience in finding and mentoring emerging talent during his academic career at Tsinghua. In a speech to scholars and senior staff members there in 2014, he emphasized that: ‘[W]e must not only produce students who behave like high-performing robots without individual character and creative thinking, or students who are not ready to rise to the challenges of geopolitical volatility.’ Such a direct message from the president of this prestigious university pointed to deep anxiety about the direction of the talent-grooming drive, as well as concerns about China’s ability to attract the best talent to support the country’s ambitions to achieve true breakthroughs in its critical science and technology sectors.
Latterly, as CPC secretary in Shanghai (a crucial stepping stone for a party high-flyer expected to ultimately win a position on the Politburo’s Standing Committee), Chen has continued to advocate for talent to be attracted to and nurtured in this megacity, with an particular emphasis on talent-reshoring from centres of excellence worldwide.
Chen’s fellow scientist members of the 20th Politiburo, Yuan Jiajun, Li Ganjie, Ma Xingrui and Zhang Guoqing, have similarly, in their past provincial and regional party roles, called for the reshoring of talent in the aerospace, civil nuclear and digital economy sectors. Generous packages are often available for the people each province is looking to attract, in the form of accommodation in desirable neighbourhoods, subsidies for school fees, high salaries, and seed funding for start-ups. While party secretary of Shangdong, Li notably gave officials the task of devising quantitative targets for talent-reshoring, with a particular emphasis on AI and biochemistry. Achieving the set targets became one of the criteria for determining staff promotions during annual appraisals.
Considering China’s current domestic policy trajectory and the present global geopolitical context, it appears that Beijing remains committed to further strengthening the ‘infrastructure’ for innovation, but the ‘space’ that is equally required to drive Xi’s ambition for self-reliance in science and technology has diminished rapidly – for both external and internal reasons.
From the perspective of many researchers in advanced economies, a strong capacity for technological innovation tends to go hand in hand with respect for individual political freedoms. A key question, therefore, is the extent to which a deepening of the one-party state under Xi may support or impede innovation over the long term. China may have the ambition and enormous state-funded resources to advance its science and technology agenda, but what is now lacking is the political will to nurture critical thinking and to allow a new generation of researchers to challenge conventional wisdom and existing authority.
China’s advantage in terms of the sheer number of its STEM graduates gives it a solid foundation on which to pursue its ambitions to become a world leader in science and technology.
In 2020, Chinese universities awarded some 1.4 million engineering degrees at bachelor’s level, compared with roughly one-seventh of this number in the US. China’s advantage in terms of the sheer number of its STEM graduates thus already gives it a solid foundation on which to pursue its ambitions to become a world leader in science and technology. At the same time, however, a shrinking of the space for individual freedoms and creativity within the country’s institutions has discouraged potential global partners from working with China’s scientists in recent years.
From the 1980s until very recently in China, the steady rise in status of the private business and entrepreneurial classes led many talented young people to want to become the next Jack Ma, or China’s Elon Musk, rather than settling for less ‘fashionable’ work as a civil servant in local government. But under Xi Jinping’s leadership, there has been a marked shift in the political environment, with the CPC returning to the centre of all policymaking and almost all aspects of Chinese society. As a result, working for the party and government institutions has now regained popularity among young graduates in China.
While Xi and his Politburo may well be pleased to see young talent now keen to win party or government positions, they should also be wary of the potential negative consequences for innovation as political institutions attract the best and brightest at the expense of China’s small and medium-sized private tech companies. For Chinese graduates – whether educated at home or returning from abroad – the choices they make between working in party/government posts or for SOEs will become another important factor shaping China’s economic development. As Xi has sharpened his ideological focus on managing the Chinese economy through a security lens, and many young engineering graduates now expect to compete for government jobs rather than solve the riddle of producing semiconductors for an ‘iron rice bowl’, the implications for the success of the drive for scientific self-reliance are far from clear.
