The 20th CPC Politburo (including the seven members of the Standing Committee – the party’s supreme decision-making body) is made up of 13 returnees from the previous iteration, along with 11 new entrants. The newcomers’ published biographies confirm that each has been closely associated with Xi through various stints in senior provincial and/or municipal political roles. The 24 Politburo members carry critical weight in policymaking processes, ranging from economics to external affairs, at the central level, as well as managing some of China’s most important economic powerhouses at the provincial level.
The senior leadership of the CPC selects Politburo members based on three guiding principles: loyalty, competence and professional experience at grassroots level. Over the last four decades, beginning with the 12th CPC National Congress in 1982, new members have often been chosen for their strong professional experience in economic planning. Looking at the composition of politburos between 1982 and 2017, a notable number of members have had substantial experience in macroeconomic planning, which served as a key criterion for selection.
The appointment of the 20th Politburo has prioritized members with competence in science and SOE executive management, marking a fundamental shift in policy focus within the party leadership from maintaining double-digit economic growth to building economic resilience against external shocks. Reflecting Beijing’s deep anxieties about the country’s capacity for high-tech development and the vulnerabilities arising from its dependence on overseas suppliers for critical components from semiconductors to aircraft engines, Xi has for some years underscored the importance of a ‘holistic view of national security’ with scientific self-reliance as a core element. The make-up of the 20th Politburo – in which just one member, He Lifeng, has a strong background in macroeconomic planning, compared with three in the 19th Politburo – reflects this shift in political priorities.
China’s leadership is aiming to foster a new cohort of technocrats, with strong professional experience in homegrown scientific innovation, to help drive progress towards achieving Xi’s ambition of self-reliance in strategically critical sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing and semiconductors.
This is not to suggest that appointing accomplished scientists to Beijing’s senior leadership is a new phenomenon. Indeed, long-time China analysts might contend that appointing technocrats to high office has been a characteristic of Chinese elite politics for the last 50 years. Xi Jinping’s two immediate predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, had professional backgrounds in electrical engineering and hydroengineering respectively; while former premiers Li Peng and Wen Jiabao had early careers in, respectively, civil engineering and geology. Many distinguished scientists have also at various points led ministries or government agencies with science portfolios, among them the British-educated geologist Li Siguang (who headed the country’s geology ministry from 1952) and the MIT-educated and later California Institute of Technology professor Qian Xuesen (who headed China’s Fifth Academy of the national defence ministry). Qian, who was deported from the US in 1955 in a move eventually described by one senior US official as ‘the stupidest thing this country ever did’, went on to oversee China’s first successful space satellite launch, 15 years after his return to China. As well as leading China’s missile programme, Qian also had a critical role in grooming some of the new intake of Politburo members, including fellow rocket scientists Yuan Jiajun and Ma Xingrui.
However, what distinguishes the present generation of scientist technocrats, as a collective, from their predecessors is the scale and level of seniority they now represent in the Chinese political apparatus. Before entering politics, all five of the scientists featured in this paper had played a key role in leading advanced scientific research sectors such as aerospace, missiles and nuclear technology. They are now sitting at the second-highest tier of the CPC leadership, with significant responsibilities. Zhang Guoqing, for instance, one of the State Council’s vice-premiers, has oversight of China’s national scientific programmes as part of his portfolio; Chen Jining has the task of running Shanghai, China’s economic powerhouse; and Ma Xingrui is party secretary of the remote but politically and strategically important Xinjiang region.
What distinguishes the present generation of scientist technocrats, as a collective, from their predecessors is the scale and level of seniority they now represent in the Chinese political apparatus.
From a political perspective, by shifting from an earlier emphasis on appointments from among local officials, or party cadres, in the two previous politburos to prominent scientists in the 20th Politburo, Xi has broadened the profile of the party’s elite. The five newcomers featured in this paper have spent most of their careers in science sectors, with relatively brief stints in recent years as provincial governors. It is thus reasonable to assume they are more inclined to align themselves with the party and national leadership, and less with vested interests at the local level, which is likely to help Xi further consolidate his own authority. The scientist members of the Politburo can thus be regarded as ‘outsiders’, undermining the so-called ‘dukedom economies’ or locality-based political factions.
As has previously been pointed out by another China analyst, the nature of aerospace engineers’ work means they have often operated in an environment that brings relatively little interaction with local officials and interest groups. In addition, their extensive professional exposure in managing SOEs also brings practical experience that can apply to managing economic priorities at the provincial level. Among the five new scientist entrants to the Politburo, three are also former senior executives of SOEs, reflecting Xi’s focus on improving economic efficiency and sharpening the country’s international competitiveness.
Whatever its members’ professional backgrounds and past experience, the 20th Politburo will be expected to come up with detailed measures to manage the financial risks emerging from downsizing and addressing the debt crisis in China’s property sector, at the same time as channelling more money – both public and private – into scientific research and grooming the talent needed to spur innovation. It will also have to find ways to promote job creation and more equitable growth to support the country’s post-COVID recovery, in parallel with steps to enhance the country’s security in line with Xi’s ‘holistic’ approach.
