Sustainable peace can only be achieved in Tigray if the Ethiopian government and Tigray interim administration commit to the implementation of the CoHA. They must leverage relationships with regional and Western partners to address the war’s long-lasting and traumatic impacts, and to consolidate peace in neighbouring regions.
Ethiopia’s two-year civil war, which began on 3 November 2020, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and the displacement of millions until it was brought to a negotiated end at talks in Pretoria, South Africa, in November 2022. The conflict spread beyond the Tigray region to the neighbouring regions of Amhara and Afar, affecting the security situation in several other parts of the country and severely weakening Ethiopia’s social fabric. Gross violations of human rights, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, were committed during the war, and post-conflict trauma is likely to persist in the foreseeable future.
The war has also had a severely damaging economic impact, with the redirection of resources towards the war effort creating a significant drain on government finances. This has undermined attempts to manage a worsening debt crisis and respond to a number of shocks, including the COVID–19 pandemic, a desert locust swarm and severe drought. These events, coupled with a dwindling of development aid, have added to the fiscal difficulties of the federal government. According to official estimates, up to $20 billion – equivalent to one-fifth of the country’s GDP – will be required for the reconstruction of the northern part of Ethiopia that was affected by the war. This figure is expected to rise further following the violence on and resultant widespread damage to infrastructure that occurred in early August 2023 in the Amhara region. As well as driving Ethiopia itself into an ever-deepening political, security and economic quagmire, the conflict will continue to have far-reaching consequences – related to resources, trade and commerce, and regional stability – throughout the Horn of Africa region and beyond.
The Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (hereafter GFDRE) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) on 2 November 2022 in Pretoria. Since then, there has been significant progress on its implementation. Following the Pretoria talks, and subsequent discussions in Nairobi which culminated in agreement on the modalities for implementation, a high-level GFDRE delegation led by federal parliament speaker Tagesse Chafo visited Tigray in December 2022 prior to the restoration of the first basic services. Moreover, the stockpiling and decommissioning of heavy weapons by the TPLF paved the way for the return of the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and Ethiopian Federal Police to major cities in Tigray, and federal forces resumed control over key federal infrastructure such as airports and military camps. In late March 2023, Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed approved the appointment of Getachew Reda as head of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration, following the latter’s selection by members of the TPLF Central Committee, in accordance with the process set out in the CoHA.
The CoHA offers an outline process for peace, despite ambitious and unrealistic timelines. However, this process risks being derailed by the interests of neighbouring countries. The most notable is Eritrea, which remains isolated and hard to influence. Having encroached into significant areas of northern Tigray, Eritrea is likely to resent the continuity of TPLF control of the Tigray region as recognized by the CoHA. The Eritrean government has also attempted to establish relations at subnational level with elements of the political and military leaderships of Ethiopia’s regional states, which suggests that it is making preparations to protect its own interests in the eventuality of a cooling of its relations with the GFDRE.
Sudan has also had significant interests in the conflict, not least in connection with its historical border dispute with Ethiopia, and due to the perceived backing given by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to the TPLF during the war. It has also participated alongside Ethiopia and Egypt in tripartite negotiations over the management of Nile waters. However, the Sudanese government’s capacity to directly influence developments in Ethiopia and the wider region will be limited in the foreseeable future due to the eruption in April 2023 of a potentially protracted war across Sudan, primarily involving the country’s two most powerful armed factions, the SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The Sudanese government’s capacity to directly influence developments in Ethiopia and the wider region will be limited in the foreseeable future due to the eruption in April 2023 of a potentially protracted war across Sudan.
International actors also have a role to play in supporting sustainable peace. Türkiye and China are among the few states which have some influence on both Ethiopia and Eritrea. As guarantors of the 2018 peace accord signed in Addis Ababa between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia could also leverage their relations with Eritrea to convince it – if necessary – not to act as a spoiler in the achievement of peace in Ethiopia.
When war broke out in Tigray in late 2020, regional conflict resolution mechanisms – particularly the mediation efforts of the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – initially performed very weakly in the face of horrific atrocities, in part due to institutional factors. Ethiopia hosts the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and it has simultaneously been the most influential country in the regional bloc IGAD, which has made it difficult for either institution to adopt an assertive or constructive role in ending the conflict quickly. The concentration of power at leadership level across both organizations and the relative institutional weaknesses of both the AU and IGAD also contributed to their inaction. Ultimately, when the conditions on the battlefield were ripe, the AU and IGAD were part of a strengthened mediation process that played an important role in persuading the TPLF and GFDRE to sign the CoHA in Pretoria, and in establishing the subsequent confidence-building measures between the two parties to the Tigray conflict. But it would have been difficult to imagine the fulfilment of this role had it not been for the constant pressure and encouragement from the United States and, to a lesser extent, from the EU.