External pressure has bolstered mediation efforts by the African Union, which struggled to establish trust earlier in the conflict. The CoHA is holding, but the gains made under the agreement must be protected and the humanitarian situation across northern Ethiopia must urgently be addressed.
Before the outbreak of the Tigray war, the AU had demonstrated an increasing commitment to humanitarian principles under the Responsibility to Protect umbrella. But following the start of the war, pressure from its host Ethiopia saw the continental bloc revert to older principles of non-interference under a pan-Africanist narrative. The AU’s peace and security architecture was therefore disengaged from internal Ethiopian dynamics, including in Tigray, and the organization was unable to effectively lead on mediating the conflict. Moreover, relations between the Tigrayan authorities in Mekelle and the AU were strained in the early days of the war after Moussa Faki Mahamat, the chair of the AU Commission, classified the GFDRE’s offensive in Tigray as a ‘legitimate’ law enforcement operation, in the face of mounting reports of atrocities. Faki’s statement met with heavy criticism.
Growing condemnation of the AU’s inaction on mediation led to the appointment in August 2021 of former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo as AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa region, with a specific mandate on Ethiopia. The AU sought to reassert leadership with respect to the Tigray conflict, but Obasanjo struggled with staffing, budget and scheduling issues for much of his first year in office. Moreover, he found it difficult to gain the trust and confidence of Tigrayans due to widespread suspicions that he was colluding with the GFDRE. An offensive by federal government and allied forces from late August to October 2022 resulted in a series of heavy battlefield losses for the Tigrayan forces and mounting indiscriminate attacks against civilians in Tigray. These defeats, alongside a bolstered negotiation effort that included ongoing pressure from the US, coupled with the addition of former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta and South Africa’s Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka as co-mediators alongside Obasanjo, led to TPLF acceptance of the AU negotiations, despite strong reservations. Kenyatta’s participation and South Africa’s leadership were key factors in reaching an agreement.
The Pretoria negotiations, which took place over a matter of days, saw a TPLF vision of a phased peace process lasting 15 to 18 months set against government demands for an immediate peace deal that would lead to the unlocking of much-needed development aid and debt relief. The TPLF’s growing military weakness and lack of options for resupply, as well as the worsening humanitarian situation in the region and the expectation that the tilt in the balance of power would lead to further Tigrayan suffering, led the Tigrayan leadership to conclude that its only options were either a negotiated settlement or a long, difficult guerrilla war. The CoHA was considered a victory for the GFDRE, with the TPLF agreeing to disarm and accept the federal government’s sovereignty over Tigray.
The CoHA has thus increased pressure on the TPLF leadership, with the Tigrayan opposition and segments of the diaspora calling for accountability and an end to TPLF dominance over the governance of the region. Tigray-based opposition groups have largely boycotted participation in the TPLF-dominated interim administration, and in March 2023 hundreds of wounded Tigrayan soldiers protested in the regional capital of Mekelle, demanding better conditions. In March the UN and US suspended food aid in Tigray amid allegations of the misappropriation and diversion of food assistance that was intended for people placed in dire need by the conflict. Getachew, the leader of the Interim Regional Administration, has promised to address these issues, but such demands on the TPLF, as well as on the GFDRE, are likely to increase over the short to medium term, particularly if peace is not quickly translated into improvements in the everyday lives of the Tigrayan population.
Initially, the GFDRE envisaged an ambitious four-step approach to normalizing relations with Tigray. This included substantial steps towards the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of Tigrayan fighters, followed by the establishment of an interim administration in Tigray (including but not limited to the TPLF), the delisting of the TPLF as a terrorist organization and, finally, a regional election now tentatively scheduled to take place before September 2024. Some of these elements were subsequently brought forward, notably the establishment of the interim administration and the removal of the TPLF’s terrorist designation. In May 2023 the AU’s Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission confirmed that the disarmament of the TPLF forces was 85–90 per cent complete. Despite these important advances, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia rejected the TPLF’s request to be reinstated as a legal political party; the decision prompted complaints on the part of the TPLF and the interim administration of Tigray, both of which warned that it risked threatening the stability of the Pretoria agreement. Unless resolved amicably, this issue could strain the relationship between the TPLF and GFDRE.
Immediately following the signature of the CoHA, the GFDRE considered the holding of a regional election in Tigray under federal auspices as being a crucial step towards the full resumption of its relations with the TPLF. However, with the agreement holding and cordial relations developing with the TPLF leadership, the federal government’s prioritization of elections in Tigray has diminished somewhat. Moreover, the TPLF was reported to have nominated a deputy commissioner and additional experts, at the request of the GFDRE, to serve in the newly established National Rehabilitation Commission, led by former minister and ambassador Teshome Toga. This promised to be an important confidence-building measure, given that the commission is entrusted with overseeing the complete withdrawal of Eritrean forces in addition to the demobilization and reintegration of Tigrayan combatants.
The TPLF leadership is hoping that a rapid improvement in the humanitarian situation and a normalization of life in Tigray will quieten criticism of the deal both within the region itself and among its influential diaspora constituencies. However, the situation in Tigray continues to worsen, with the regional administration announcing in July 2023 that over 100 people had died due to hunger in the three months since the suspension of food aid. Momentum still lies with the CoHA’s supporters, particularly in the wake of the resumption of some basic services. In order to secure additional buy-in, the TPLF has indicated that it plans to expand the cabinet of the Interim Regional Administration by including representatives of the diaspora, opposition and civil society organizations. However, in reality the administration is still principally composed of members of the TPLF and the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF), with only a few representatives of one or other of the region’s opposition parties. Additionally, reports from Mekelle suggest that internal fissures are rife within the TPLF, where several members of the ‘old guard’ are trying to undermine Getachew and his cabinet. To prevent backsliding on the Tigrayan side, the gains made under the CoHA must be protected, principally through the resumption of large-scale and unhindered humanitarian engagement involving international aid agencies, the full resumption of basic services in the region and the honouring of the provisions of the agreement.
How civil war evolved to regional conflict: the implications for mediation
Consolidating the gains brought about by the Pretoria agreement will require the GFDRE and its regional partners to navigate dynamics that have their roots outside Ethiopia’s borders. What began as a civil war in Ethiopia has developed into a regional conflict with several layers of interest and influence (see Figure 2). Eritrea is deeply implicated; the Sudanese military-led regime has been involved (with suggestions that Egypt has also engaged through a proxy); there was growing concern among other neighbouring countries, including Djibouti and Kenya; and the GFDRE is receiving significant support from other regional and international actors, including China, Türkiye and the UAE.
As illustrated below, Eritrea had a direct involvement in the Tigray war and Sudan was indirectly involved. Eritrean troops fought alongside the Ethiopian government and regional allies throughout the two years of the conflict. Several reports suggest that Eritrean forces committed grave human rights violations and war crimes in Tigray. For its part, Sudan annexed large swathes of land along the common border following the outbreak of the Tigray war, leading to a diplomatic row between the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments that was further exacerbated due to Sudan’s alleged support to the TPLF. The US played a key role in the negotiation process, and was trying to build a concerted regional mechanism to respond to Ethiopia’s crisis alongside the AU, IGAD, UAE, Kenya and Djibouti. The UAE, Türkiye and China played a role in providing military equipment to the GFDRE.
