Kenya has played a key role in regional mediation efforts on the Tigray conflict and has promoted the need for unity and integrity of states across Africa. If relations between Ethiopia and Egypt can be progressed after years of tensions centring on the use of the Nile waters, it could provide opportunities to lessen external interference and enhance outcomes towards regional stability, including in Tigray.
Kenya
The bilateral relationship between Kenya and Ethiopia was maintained during the Tigray conflict, with Kenya’s overriding concern remaining the humanitarian, regional security and economic impacts of any significant sociopolitical shocks occurring on its northern neighbour’s territory (for example, exposure to Ethiopian internal unrest in the context of a long and porous border, and the presence of multiple cross-border ethnic groups). Kenyan officials repeatedly stated that the Kenyan government sought to avoid the disintegration of Ethiopia at any cost, and to shift the focus of the AU back to the protection of the unity and integrity of African states. Kenya’s interest in mediating in the conflict in Tigray (and in the separate conflict in Oromia) was also framed by the country’s significant economic interest in Ethiopia. Kenya’s Safaricom was awarded a licence to operate telecommunications services in Ethiopia in May 2021, for a fee of $850 million, making it the single largest foreign direct investment into Ethiopia at that time. Kenya also indirectly benefited from Ethiopia’s suspension from the US’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) preferential trade programme in January 2022, following the onset of the Tigray war. Kenya hosts one of the largest Ethiopian refugee populations in Africa – at the peak of the political crackdown in 2021, several thousand Ethiopians fled to Kenya, and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) was reported to have sought refuge within Kenya’s Oromo communities. In March 2022, Ethiopia named Major General Bacha Debele, a controversial military figure who was the face of the Tigray war, as its ambassador to Kenya. The move heralded a shift in Ethiopia’s policy towards Kenya, with security interests amplified alongside economic priorities.
In March 2022, Ethiopia named Major General Bacha Debele, a controversial military figure who was the face of the Tigray war, as its ambassador to Kenya. The move heralded a shift in Ethiopia’s policy towards Kenya, with security interests amplified alongside economic priorities.
With significant economic, diplomatic and military means at its disposal, Kenyatta spearheaded regional mediation efforts with backing from the US, which between 2021 and 2022 included outreach to Ethiopian prime minister Abiy and Tigrayan representatives. As a rotating member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) representing Africa between 2020 and 2022, Kenya also played an active role in withstanding calls for sanctions against the GFDRE. In mid-September 2022 the new Kenyan president William Ruto appointed his predecessor Kenyatta as a peace envoy to Ethiopia and the Great Lakes region. Following pressure from the US and TPLF, Kenyatta was invited to join the AU-led mediation team on the Tigray conflict. His inclusion was intended to balance Obasanjo, who had been a difficult interlocutor for the West and who was viewed with suspicion by senior TPLF leaders. Kenyatta was seen as neutral, and his seniority positioned him as a much-needed bridge between the AU and Kenyan mediation tracks. He is reported to have played a crucial role at the Pretoria talks, helping to achieve agreement on the two most contentious obstacles – the future of Western Tigray/Welkait and the need for the removal of Eritrean forces from Tigray. In the wake of the Pretoria peace conference, Kenya also facilitated two further meetings in which the majority of the proposals for implementing the CoHA were discussed by representatives of the TPLF and the GFDRE.
Egypt
Ethiopia’s relations with Egypt have been characterized by long-running tensions centred around their strategic interests in utilizing the waters of the Nile. Both countries have populations in excess of 100 million, for whom the Nile waters are a critical resource: for Egypt, the priority is water security, with 95 per cent of its population living close to the Nile Basin, while for Ethiopia, the hydroelectric potential of the Abay (known outside Ethiopia as the Blue Nile), which will be realized with the completion of the GERD, represents a crucial element of the government’s development ambitions. Egypt has also been hostile to Ethiopia’s interest to establish a naval or military base on the Red Sea via Djibouti or Eritrea, leveraging its substantial diplomatic heft to ensure that Ethiopia was not included in the Red Sea Council, a forum established by Saudi Arabia in 2020 that has so far had little bearing on cross-regional issues.
The construction of the GERD has put the two countries increasingly at odds within the region over the last 12 years. For several years Egypt strengthened its alliance with the government of Eritrea, in part due to the latter’s hostile relations with Ethiopia between 1998 and 2018. Egypt’s relationship with Eritrea – which had been largely tactical and aimed at containing Ethiopia – was weakened after Abiy came to power in Ethiopia, due to the resumption of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the conclusion of the peace agreement between the two countries in 2018. It was further undermined by the collaboration between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 2020 in the context of the Tigray war. During the war, Ethiopia alleged Egyptian collusion with the TPLF and other Ethiopian armed groups, but did not provide evidence to back up these claims.
Egypt has long sought to influence outcomes in Sudan to maintain its own security and economic interests, with its southerly neighbour viewed as Egypt’s gateway to sub-Saharan Africa and a critical ally in asserting its interests on the Nile, including tripartite negotiations over the GERD. Egypt has cultivated good relations with the post-coup authorities in Sudan and maintains significant influence on key Sudanese actors, most notably through its military cooperation with the SAF. Egypt is aware that if a pro-democracy civilian government were to take root in Sudan, its own influence would likely wane, and that this could have consequences for its interests with respect to the Nile waters and the GERD, particularly as the project moves towards completion.
Egypt’s ‘red lines’ on the Nile waters remain unclear, despite repeated statements from the Egyptian government that it views water security as a national security priority. In mid-July 2023, following a meeting between Prime Minister Abiy and Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Cairo, Ethiopia and Egypt agreed to restart negotiations towards reaching agreement on the filling of the GERD and its operations within four months. This dramatic shift and signal towards the possibility of an improved bilateral relationship has been enabled because of several factors. First, the construction of over 90 per cent of the dam and the commencement of the fourth filling during the rainy season (June to September) means that Egypt must now accommodate the reality of the dam. Second, Ethiopia’s assurance that it will prevent significant harm to downstream countries during the current filling goes some way towards establishing trust ahead of tripartite negotiations, expected to take place in the UAE. Third, the domestic landscape in Egypt, which includes significant economic pressures and an election in 2024, have encouraged el-Sisi to demonstrate regional statesmanship and an ability to manage the GERD issue.
