A key challenge to the judiciary’s independence is a centralization trend that dates back to the early days after the US-led invasion. In 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) issued CPA Order No. 35, creating a Council of Judges that designated the council’s head as the country’s chief justice. However, the problem was that Iraq had never previously had a supreme court, meaning that this was the first time that a single judge had carte blanche to select his team. In today’s Iraq, the term ‘chief justice’ can cause some confusion, and its definition is blurred. In the English language, foreign diplomats and organizations officially refer to the president of the Supreme Judicial Council, currently Faiq Zaidan, as the chief justice. However, on official Iraqi documents, Zaidan is referred to as the president or head of the Supreme Judicial Council. Nonetheless, Zaidan’s position on the council, along with his position as head of the Federal Court of Cassation (the country’s top criminal court), means that he has become the ultimate decision-maker on the appointment of judges in several of the top courts, as Table 1 indicates. Zaidan has acknowledged the benefits of a centralized judiciary, stating in an interview: ‘I believe in a centralized system in general, even in the political system … likewise in the judiciary, now if you hear the experts praise it is because we have centralization, I do not want to say that our situation is excellent, but I say that it is good.’ Zaidan is also directly responsible for appointing the heads of internal accountability mechanisms designed to oversee judges.
The power of appointment has given the president of the Supreme Judicial Council considerable influence over the judiciary and its accountability mechanisms, leading to perceptions that the judiciary has become less independent and, as such, less effective. One legal expert told the author that the centralization of decision-making had become part of a ‘judicial oligarchy’ (in Arabic, Awligarshiat al-Qadha). For example, the Public Prosecution Service has faced challenges exerting its authority and has experienced a decline in power across the country. Currently, the service remains under the authority of the Supreme Judicial Council and appears to lack autonomy. Similarly, some perceive the Federal Supreme Court, whose judges are selected by the Supreme Judicial Council, as struggling to maintain its independence. These factors can be seen as having collectively weakened the judiciary’s effectiveness and independence.
In interviews with the author, Zaidan has remained adamant that his role is as a judge and not as a political figure. However, he has been involved in key political discussions, for instance having an increasing presence at meetings of the so-called ‘three presidencies’ previously reserved for Iraq’s president, prime minister and speaker of parliament. These meetings have now come to be known as meetings of the ‘four presidencies’. Zaidan is also active in mediating political disputes, such as when he brought together Prime Minister al-Sudani and Mohammed al-Halbousi, at the time the parliamentary speaker, to resolve their rupture in April 2023. During several government formation periods, Zaidan’s name has even been floated as a prime ministerial candidate.
Perceptions that the judiciary has become more entangled in politics extend beyond questions around the position of any single individual. In an interview with the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), Hadi al-Ameri, the leader of the Badr Organization – a part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) – openly stated: ‘We as the political blocs threatened the judiciary in order to protect our corrupt politicians.’ Across the spectrum, Iraq’s ruling elite has recognized the potential power of the judiciary and has sought to limit this power. A senior political leader told Chatham House that the ‘judiciary is being politicized and is controlled by certain individuals […] the control over the judiciary prevents them from doing their work’. At times, members of the elite have used violence to try to influence judges.
Across the spectrum, Iraq’s ruling elite has recognized the potential power of the judiciary and has sought to limit this power.
Many observers have looked at the rise of Nouri al-Maliki, who was prime minister from 2006 to 2014, and have sought to connect this to his apparent influence over the judiciary. In his bid for power, according to constitutional lawyer Zaid al-Ali, al-Maliki ‘set his sights on the key institutions, starting with the parliament, the armed forces and the courts’. Following the 2010 national elections, the then president of the Supreme Judicial Council, Medhat al-Mahmood, issued a controversial ruling viewed by many as favouring the incumbent prime minister’s State of Law Coalition, which had won 89 seats, against Ayad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya Coalition, which had won 91 seats. The ruling, which allowed the losing State of Law Coalition to form a government, prompted an outcry among many Iraqis, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose office expressed concern about politicization of the judiciary and called for systemic reform.
More recently, following the October 2021 elections, several members of the political elite argued that the Federal Supreme Court seemed to have taken a political stance against them. During the government formation process that followed the national vote, the prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Masrour Barzani, and his Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) sided with Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s majoritarian government in calling for the replacement of the consensus-based political system. The national parliamentary speaker, al-Halbousi, also sided with this group. More specifically, the group called for the exclusion from the new government of specific members of the Shia Coordination Framework, including Nouri al-Maliki and PMF leader Qais al-Khazali.
During this time, the Federal Supreme Court began issuing rulings that limited the KRG’s oil and gas exports, and declared the KRG’s oil and gas law unconstitutional. In response, Barzani called the court unconstitutional after these rulings. He told US White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, Brett McGurk, that the rulings were ‘politically motivated’. Months later, when the same court ruled against the transfer of the Iraqi Joint Operations Command Center to the KDP, Barzani tweeted: ‘Today’s “federal court” decision is a farce -mb.’ Similarly, the Federal Supreme Court expelled al-Sadr’s other ally in this episode, al-Halbousi, from his role as speaker of parliament. Al-Halbousi’s political party issued a statement claiming that the ruling was ‘a blatant violation of the constitution and was motivated by political targeting’. Both these senior members of the political elite – Barzani and al-Halbousi – believed politicization of the Federal Supreme Court was behind their punishments.
The executive and government ministries
Iraq’s executive and government ministries have also had problems with accountability mechanisms. One example can be seen in the now-defunct Inspector General Offices (IGOs), created by CPA Order No. 57 in 2004. These independent bodies were mandated to investigate misconduct in the bureaucracy and uphold proper governance. They were supported by the Commission of Integrity (CoI) and the Federal Board of Supreme Audit (FBSA), which carried out specific audits and investigations. However, according to Zaid al-Ali, the IGOs suffered from several flaws: ‘The inspectors lack any standard operating procedures, so that individual auditors and investigators have no instructions about how specific tasks should be carried out and what each task’s objective should be. Lacking capacity, inspectors general remain largely passive, acting only on specific allegations, despite their presence in each ministry.’
In addition, over the years members of Iraq’s elite captured and gained influence over the IGOs, undermining their independence and rendering their work ineffective. For instance, the Inspector General in the Ministry of Health was Ahmad al-Saadi, a member of the Sadrist movement. Many saw his role as competing with that of the health minister, Adila Hammoud, who had links to a rival political bloc, the State of Law Coalition. Hampered by a lack of adequate independence, the IGOs were widely perceived as politicized.
The IGOs were eventually abolished in 2019, during the October 2019 ‘Tishreen’ anti-government protests that erupted in Baghdad and southern Iraq. Public pressure and a loss of relative influence led the Sadrists and their ‘Sairoon’ coalition to push for the IGOs’ closure. Nonetheless, the IGOs represent an important case study into how mechanisms designed to promote accountability were widely seen as having been captured by members of the elite in their efforts to compete for political power.
Another key government accountability mechanism is the Commission of Integrity (CoI), set up in 2004 through CPA Order No. 55 as an independent commission tasked with implementing basic integrity measures across the government bureaucracy, including investigating corruption and enforcing public service standards. The CoI today is governed by Law No. 30, enacted in 2011 and later amended in 2019 to grant it more authority over the bureaucracy, particularly concerning declarations of wealth by senior civil servants.
The CoI’s primary responsibility is to conduct criminal investigations, which are supervised by a judge appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council. However, administrative investigations now take place within the legal directorates of the ministries or commissions themselves. Financial investigations are typically referred to the FBSA. Once a criminal investigation is concluded, the case is referred to the judiciary to proceed with legal action.
The director of the CoI holds significant authority. Its director has the power to authorize full inquiries, approve requests for criminal investigations to be forwarded to the judiciary, and control the scope of investigations. The director also possesses the authority to expand or restrict the powers of subordinates, as well as to order the cessation of inquiries or investigations.
The process for appointing the head of the CoI involves a nomination by the Council of Ministers and subsequent approval by parliament. This potentially creates a risk of political interference. In 2022, the new al-Sudani government chose a former judge, Haider Hanoon, to become head of the CoI, even though Hanoon’s links with the Fateh Alliance were considered by some to raise concerns about political independence. One of Hanoon’s first cases was the investigation of the ‘heist of the century’, where the government was perceived by some to have been uneven in its investigation of different individuals and political factions.
On average, only about 25 per cent of investigated cases make it to the courts and even fewer cases ultimately reach a final verdict.
Concerns about the politicization of investigations have been noted more broadly. A former MP told the author: ‘During my time as an MP, I submitted hundreds of cases to the CoI, but just a few were pursued to completion. Senior politicians used to meddle in the work of CoI through their personnel, and some even sought to sway me by sending their representatives.’ On average, only about 25 per cent of investigated cases make it to the courts and even fewer cases ultimately reach a final verdict. An official inside the commission claimed to the author that political interference had been a primary inhibitor of its work.
The resignation in 2011 of the CoI’s former head, judge Rahim al-Ugaili, showcased concerns about institutional capture. In his resignation letter, al-Ugaili claimed he had been asked by various members of the political elite to use the CoI’s anti-corruption mechanisms against political opponents. However, when al-Ugaili refused to do so, he said he had felt he had no option but to leave his position. In 2013, an arrest warrant was issued against him, and he was charged with corruption and terrorism-related offences. Subsequently, in 2015, al-Ugaili was sentenced to seven years in prison on corruption charges. Another case was raised against him in 2021 by Nouri al-Maliki, who was no longer prime minister at that time but has retained significant political power in Iraq. These events highlight the complexities that can arise for judges in the CoI pursuing anti-corruption cases.
Another key accountability mechanism is the Federal Board of Supreme Audit (FBSA), the sole body authorized to audit the financial accounts of government entities. Established in 1927 and retained in the post-2003 state, the FBSA is designed to function as an independent body directly connected to the Council of Representatives, Iraq’s legislature. The FBSA’s independence is enshrined in Iraq’s 2005 constitution, specifically in Article 103, and further reinforced by Law No. 31 of 2011. Its core mandate is to guarantee the efficient, effective and lawful use of public funds. To fulfil this mandate, the FBSA conducts comprehensive financial and performance audits, scrutinizes cases involving financial irregularities and corruption, and offers recommendations aimed at enhancing financial management and fostering accountability.
However, the FBSA is also potentially susceptible to elite influence. A senior official within the Prime Minister’s Office told the author: ‘The FBSA’s job is critical, but political involvement has caused it to be regarded as a non-important stakeholder.’ A former MP also told the author: ‘The FBSA is an old and prestigious institution, but we all know that we should not count on it because it has been weakened intentionally by members of the political elite.’ The potential for concerns in this area became clearer in 2011 when the Federal Supreme Court issued a ruling that linked the FBSA and other commissions – though constitutionally mandated as independent – to the Council of Ministers. While this ruling was later deemed unlawful and overturned, in reality the ruling elite is widely perceived as having continued to interfere in the FBSA’s work.
There remain concerns about the FSBA’s effectiveness. For instance, a Guardian investigation suggested that during the ‘heist of the century’ the FBSA had been unable to inspect the tax commission’s accounts adequately. A researcher in the CoI claimed that the FBSA had been unable to audit the $2.5 billion taken from the bank accounts in question, partly as a result of the political obstacles it had encountered. Irregularities in the process were also highlighted in a statement by the FBSA explaining its failure to prevent the theft.
The legislature’s accountability mechanisms
The Council of Representatives (CoR) is Iraq’s parliament, and the primary legislative body in the country’s democratic system. Its key role is to enact laws, oversee the executive branch and advocate for the interests of the Iraqi people. The CoR plays a vital part in ensuring government accountability through legislative scrutiny. Its mandate includes ‘monitoring the executive authority to ensure compliance with the laws and achieve the country’s highest interests’. Any MP, with the agreement of 25 MPs, may ask a question to the prime minister or a minister.
However, as a senior economic adviser at the Prime Minister’s Office told the author: ‘Parliament is responsible for both overseeing financial institutions and enacting legislation that enforces accountability in Iraq. MPs, however, do not execute this function and are just interested in serving their political interests.’
The work of MPs is organized through various committees. One of the most significant is the Finance Committee. This committee carries out critical tasks, including reviewing and amending the government’s annual budget before presentation to a parliamentary vote. The Finance Committee is also responsible for monitoring the budget and ensuring proper government spending. Among the 25 permanent parliamentary committees, the Finance Committee holds particular importance and its membership is often subject to contestation among different political powers. Members of the elite may seek to influence this committee in various ways, for example by ensuring that certain MPs are (or are not) on it. In 2023, MP Sajad Salim, who held a position on the committee and was known for his outspoken stance against elite financial corruption, publicly disclosed information through the media regarding government financial allocations to the PMF armed groups. In response, Salim claimed on television, members of the political elite were mobilizing to remove him from the committee. This action effectively restricted his future access to similar information.
The Finance Committee is also responsible for monitoring the work of financial institutions, making it a potential target for elite capture. A former MP from the committee told the author that ‘being part of the committee grants you access to many governmental institutions; we have to use that to serve the people but unfortunately many members use that privilege for the benefit of their political parties’. Another member of the committee told the author that although the committee’s mandate is to scrutinize government spending, ‘we never have real access to [information on] government expenditure in the ministries’. Without the data on spending, the committee is less able to pursue its function as a financial overseer.
The CoR also has an Integrity Committee, consisting of approximately 25 MPs. Its primary responsibility is to set laws governing anti-corruption institutions and accountability mechanisms, and to investigate financial and administrative corruption within the bureaucracy. The committee is also mandated to monitor the work of other independent accountability institutions such as the CoI and FBSA. However, some members of the Integrity Committee have complained that, instead of ensuring accountability, this mechanism has been abused. They claim that corruption files and cases have been used to attack or even blackmail political opponents. In September 2019, MP Ali al-Sajri resigned from his position as the committee’s head. In his resignation letter, he stated: ‘I decided to relinquish the position of Chairman of the Integrity Committee due to political pressures and the participation of most [political] blocs in the spread of financial and administrative corruption.’ Al-Sajri described the committee as ‘clinically dead’.
Adding to the perceptions of politicization, at times parliament has reversed laws that provided for the imposition of harsh penalties on public officials convicted of corruption. For instance, in 2007 the CoR passed Law 45 repealing Revolutionary Command Council Order 38 (1993), a measure that had mandated the immediate detention of any public official accused of corruption. In repealing such laws, critics argue, the parliament effectively removes punitive mechanisms designed to combat corruption.
The government bureaucracy’s security mechanisms
In the formal bureaucracy, Iraq’s security institutions include the Ministry of Interior (MoI), National Security Council (NSC) and Ministry of Defence (MoD). In addition to their principal security responsibilities, these institutions serve an enforcement function for the country’s accountability mechanisms. The most influential in this respect is the MoI, which is effectively mandated with policing society. After 2003, the US-led CPA controlled the army and civil defence corps, while the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) founded the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). However, the MoI became a key asset which Iraqi politicians and armed groups sought to access (and influence), both because it was not as dominated by the occupying Americans and because its premises were outside the heavily fortified Green Zone, making it easier to reach. Andrew Rathmell, a UK security consultant who was based inside the ministry, writes that the American decision for control of the MoI in effect to be parcelled out between different elite factions ‘left the MOI and its subordinate entities as the only central security apparatus over which Iraqi politicians could exercise influence and through which they could deploy state-sanctioned coercion’. Rathmell adds: ‘This meant that each could use their parts of the ministry to build up patronage networks and paramilitary and intelligence capabilities through official channels.’ One senior security official told the author: ‘In those years, the ministry was divided by floors. Each one for one of the parties. And they fought to control their patronage.’
Over the years, the elite has effectively controlled much of the security arena. For instance, Nouri al-Maliki’s drive to centralize power was widely viewed as having resulted in the removal of some senior officers from the MoD, MoI and INIS. At the time, an INIS spokesman ‘accused Maliki of firing 190 employees for political reasons’. There were also claims that al-Maliki had replaced many of the people in these positions with his own loyalists.
In short, state capture has led to a security sector that is politicized, incoherent and fundamentally unable to enforce accountability. By politicizing much of the security sector’s senior management, breaking its chain of command and fragmenting its esprit de corps, the elite continues to undermine the coherence of each service – and the ability of the sector as a whole to hold the elite to account. Instead, many police and security officials serve elite interests. A senior official from the NSC told the author: ‘There are only a few of us who are trying to uphold the rule of law. The others are appointed by the parties and only serve their interests. This makes our job in the security sector very difficult.’
The ideological power of accountability mechanisms
The failure of accountability mechanisms is reflected in a lack of public trust towards them. In 2022, Iraq ranked 157th globally in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). In a 2022 Arab Barometer survey, only 19 per cent of Iraqi respondents said they trusted the parliament, and only 40 per cent said they trusted the judiciary. These two vital institutions are on the front line of accountability and anti-corruption efforts, but they have lost the public trust.
Iraq’s elite may have shown little interest in upholding a genuine system of accountability, but it is still sensitive to popular views on accountability. Most members of the elite claim to be crusaders against corruption, and express recognition of the value of accountability mechanisms. Moreover, 20 years since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, the ruling elite is now less able to influence the public through other ideological narratives such as ethnic nationalism or sectarianism. As such, most leaders claim to support the idea of liberal democracy, and the accountability associated with it, as a means of winning over the public or maintaining ideological authority. This in turn encourages members of the elite to paint their opponents as corrupt.
To examine views on political accountability, notably on the responsiveness and effectiveness of Iraq’s bureaucracy, Chatham House conducted a survey of 1,600 Iraqis across all 18 governorates in late 2021. The survey covered subjects that included the perceived success of various actors at holding the elite accountable, and which bodies or actors the public believe should be holding the elite accountable.
