To maintain impunity from societal accountability mechanisms – such as protests, the media or elections – members of Iraq’s elite use their capture of the bureaucracy to target potential public mobilizers. This includes shutting down media channels, jailing protest-minded candidates for election to political office, and policing activism.
As with state institutions, Iraqi civil society in theory has the tools available to limit and regulate the power of the bureaucracy and elite. These powers are enshrined in the constitution and practised by citizens through voting in national and local elections, or through supporting civil society organizations, an independent media, campaigning and the right to protest. Ideally, these powers should contribute to accountability by enabling the disclosure of information about the government’s performance or about official wrongdoing, and by amplifying the dissemination of that information. Social mobilization campaigns can also – at least in theory and if connected to a concerted reform strategy – pressure the elite to act on a given issue.
In reality, however, capture of much of the bureaucracy has given the elite greater power to coerce and control the public. Mechanisms designed to keep the state accountable have instead been directed to ensuring elite impunity and undermining societal channels of protest. Arrest warrants have been issued against individuals who pose threats to elite power. The elite has also relied on control of the security sector to silence dissenting voices and prevent meaningful scrutiny. This chapter explores how Iraq’s post-2003 elite redirected the government’s own accountability mechanisms against the public.
The use of legal mechanisms against the public
The elite has used its influence over the judicial authorities to restrict free expression and protest. These attempts to silence criticism are grounded in laws dating back to the Saddam Hussein regime. The penal code has played a key role. For example, Article 226 states: ‘Any person who publicly insults the National Assembly or the government or the courts or the armed forces or any other constitutional body or the public authorities or official or 1 [sic] semiofficial agencies or departments is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 7 years or detention or a fine.’ Critically, according to civil society leaders, the problem with Article 226 is that it does not clearly define the term ‘insult’. Also in the penal code, Article 403 stipulates the following: ‘Any person who produces, imports, publishes, possesses, obtains or translates a book, printed or other written material, drawing, picture, film, symbol or other thing that violates the public integrity or decency with intent to exploit or distribute such material is punishable by a period of detention not exceeding 2 years plus a fine not exceeding 200 dinars or by one of those penalties. The same penalty applies to any person who advertises such material or displays it in public or sells, hires or offers it for sale or hire even though it is not in public or to any person who distributes or submits it for distribution by any means. If the offence is committed with intent to deprave, it is considered to be an aggravating circumstance.’ The judiciary has defined violation of ‘decency’ as a criminal offence. In early 2023 the president of the Supreme Judicial Council, Faiq Zaidan, reiterated this position in a letter sent to all courts and departments of the judiciary. However, civil society leaders argue that the lack of a clear definition of indecent content in Article 403 makes citizens vulnerable to arbitrary arrest, allowing authorities to target civil society and activists who post online.
Numerous arrests have been made on the basis of these two articles, resulting in sentences ranging from three months to two years in prison. For instance, in February 2023, several courts, including the Karkh court and the Maysan court, issued arrest warrants against individuals for online criticism of the elite. The third investigative court in Karkh has added a focus on media and publishing matters, and as such has become a key mechanism for issuing arrest warrants against civil society. Ahmed Mulla Talal, a well-known television personality, ran a 10-minute satirical interview with the actor Iyad al-Taee, who was dressed as an Iraqi general, on the misappropriation of funds and the sale of senior positions in the military. Following this episode, both Talal and Taee were arrested. The government’s Communication and Media Commission (CMC) suspended Talal’s programme due to ‘a clear insult to the Iraqi army and all its members’. Similarly, arrest warrants were issued to journalist Suadad al-Salihi for her role in criticizing the Iraqi army’s independence; to journalist Muntadhar Nasser for his criticism of the elite; and to Mohammed Na’na and Laith Shubbar for criticizing Prime Minister al-Sudani. In June 2022, an arrest warrant was issued against Sarmad al-Taie for openly criticizing Faiq Zaidan and Qasim Sulaimani, the former head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, on a live television broadcast. In response, Zaidan sent a note to the head of the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), the channel on which the show was aired, expressing his displeasure. Zaidan contended that criticism of the judiciary could erode people’s trust in state institutions and that, as a result, it should not be permitted on state television. In another example, in October 2022 Ismail al-Waeli, who had criticized Zaidan and accused him of collaborating with the IRGC, was sentenced to prison. Protest-minded MPs are also subject to similar penalties. For instance, in December 2022 the Rusafa court summoned MP Sajad Salim, who had been vocal in his criticism of PMF chairman Falih al-Fayadh and PMF chief of staff Abu Fadak.
The elite has also relied on judicial and regulatory mechanisms to close media channels that have covered protests and civil society. In 2019, the government issued 19 orders to shut down local, regional and international media outlets, most of them covering the Tishreen protests. Accusations of violations such as ‘not abiding by the journalistic code of conduct’ or ‘offending national and religious symbols’ are often used against media channels that oppose the ruling elite. The process of shutting down media channels and intimidating journalists became easier for their opponents after the judiciary closed several ‘specialized’ courts, including the specialized court for media, in 2017.
The elite has also relied on judicial and regulatory mechanisms to close media channels that have covered protests and civil society.
Members of the elite also rely on directly coercive mechanisms such as the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS), which in 2022 arrested Ali al-Dhabhawi, a journalist with Al-Baghdadia TV. He was interrogated for four hours without any formal reason and was told simply that he needed to be less critical of Iraqi politicians. Political intervention was also seen as having been responsible for the use of anti-riot police to target protesters in October 2019, resulting in at least 500 deaths and thousands of injuries in the first few weeks of the protests. It is estimated that 89 journalists have been killed by armed groups with members linked to the elite since the October 2019 protests. In 2021, young Iraqis demonstrated against poor living conditions. They blamed the Sadrist movement, which they argued was in control of the government, and demanded accountability. Instead, the Sadrists are believed to have used their networks in the MoI to have some of the activists arrested. Such cases have become common not just in Baghdad but across Iraq, where citizens are increasingly afraid of speaking out.
Many journalists fear covering stories that criticize armed groups. One journalist told the author that, because he is critical of some armed groups in his writings, he has been advised by human rights defenders to ‘spend most of his time in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and, when in Baghdad, to stay under cover and not disclose his location’.
However, some space remains for activists to influence public opinion and engage in legal advocacy to push back against elite mechanisms of repression. The eventual release of youth activist Haider al-Zaidi (see Chapter 1) indicates that building connectivity between civil society, lawyers and reformists in government can have some success in resisting political repression, and that such methods present a potential channel for reform efforts (see Chapter 5).
The use of ideological mechanisms against the public
Iraq’s elite also uses the power of the media to have a coercive effect on society, building and disseminating narratives that undermine opposition or dissent. To pursue this battle of narratives, members of the elite rely on their control over much of the media, think-tanks, research centres and civil society organizations. Aida Kaisy, a media consultant and researcher, writes: ‘Media are strongly affiliated to their funders and political parties, who are seen as highly corrupt and unethical. As such, media content and narratives are viewed as unrepresentative of the needs of the people. Media stakeholders felt constrained and restricted within this environment.’
A senior official in the state-funded independent Iraqi Media Network (IMN) told the author: ‘There is political meddling within the work of the media in Iraq, and both the IMN and CMC suffer from that. The absence of proper media laws set the ground for CMC to take advantage of this.’ Following the October 2019 uprising, for example, members of the elite sought to portray the protesters as spoilers (mukharabeen) who were part of a ‘third party’ or foreign conspiracy. For instance, the Al-Hadaf Centre for Studies, which is linked to Kataib Hezbollah, a PMF-affiliated paramilitary organization, worked to portray civil society and protesters as part of an American plot against Iraq. Similarly, the Badr Organization used its networks of contacts in the Badr Centre for Strategic Studies and Al-Ghadeer TV to spread anti-protest narratives.
Each elite faction owns or operates media assets such as radio stations, websites and social media platforms, which are used to promote particular narratives in the competition for ideological power. The ideas propagated through such assets often serve as justifications for intimidating and attacking civil society in Iraq. For instance, armed groups used the false portrayal of a Basra activist, Reham Yacoub, as a member of a pro-US lobby to justify her assassination in 2020. They justified their claims by pointing to Yacoub’s previous membership of the Iraqi Young Leaders Exchange Program, which helps Iraqi high school and undergraduate students develop leadership skills. Beyond creating a hostile environment for civil society, members of the elite use the media to maintain their own social bases.
The ideological power which the elite exploits in these ways not only weakens the accountability mechanisms of society, but also hampers reform efforts within the bureaucracy, notably in building a public constituency in support of change. According to an Iraqi senior official: ‘Because the media and public pressure instruments are politicized, there are no effective means to notify the public of our work.’
