In just a week, there have been three major speeches on foreign policy from the government (the prime minister and foreign secretary) and the Labour opposition (the shadow foreign secretary). Such a focus on foreign affairs in an election year is rare and the vote, when it comes, will turn more than usual on these questions.
It is therefore striking that the approach of the two main parties is so similar. It points to a growing pragmatism in British foreign policy, one that is welcomed in a new Chatham House paper, ‘Three foreign policy priorities for the next UK government’. The paper sets out a map of realistic ambition for the winner of the election: get the key relationships right and spend more time and money overall.
In his speech, Rishi Sunak said that only the Conservatives could be trusted with security – national, economic and energy – in the face of many dangers facing the country. In that, he aims to differentiate his government from its opposition. But on much foreign policy, the two parties at the moment sound similar: full-throated support of Ukraine, a nuanced but careful approach to China and support for Israel’s right to defend itself while criticizing the consequences of its actions in Gaza.
Their greatest differences are on the Rwanda policy (as a response to illegal migration) and on Europe. Foreign secretary David Cameron and shadow foreign secretary David Lammy both included the word ‘realism’ in their speeches, reflecting the growing role that foreign policy is playing in this election year – but also a recognition that the UK must judge carefully where it retains influence.
Chatham House’s new paper recommends a path through the hardest choices for whoever walks into 10 Downing Street after the election.
Key relationships
First, the new government needs to get the relationship with the US and China right. Whoever wins the US presidential election, the UK should build on historic ties but not promise or expect too much, and plan a response to likely higher tariffs and perhaps more scepticism about NATO.
It is unlikely to get a free trade agreement; it should focus on narrow sectoral agreements and partnerships on military and critical technologies. On China, it needs to balance trade with self-protection more carefully than in the past and develop more strengths in new technology and communications.
Second, it needs to develop links with the EU and wider Europe that respects public opinion at home (which is still wrestling with Brexit) but improve UK trade and security. It should maintain emphatic support for Ukraine and improve security collaboration. It might consider more participation in the EU’s scheme for military cooperation – PESCO – and an administrative arrangement with the European Defence Agency.
There are some small opportunities to smooth out post-Brexit impediments to trade but Labour, which has put much apparent weight on these, should be careful not to overstate the economic potential.
Those relationships are the basis of a coherent foreign policy. But third, the report argues, the UK should explore the realistic potential of its influence by bringing more consistency into its role in global governance and international development.
The UK has credibility (even if it has sometimes treated its reputation casually) on climate change, international development, rule of law and technology governance. The next UK government will confront a world with a more assertive Global South and a more influential and activist range of other mid-sized powers.
Building shared goals, including in the reform of international financial institutions, will be valuable for the UK in its relationships with these pivotal mid-sized powers. But with a more vocal constituency worldwide challenging the perceived double standards of Western democracies, the UK will find this area of influence out of reach unless it brings its own behaviour, at home and abroad, more in line with the values it advocates.
Affording it all
Paying for this agenda will demand hard trade-offs, but it is clear that in a more complex world and post-Brexit, the UK needs to spend more on defence, development and diplomacy.
The government’s recent announcement that it intends to meet its target of spending 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence by 2030 is welcome. But there are questions about how this uplift will be funded, and it still may only fill existing budget gaps. Given the risks the UK faces (as the prime minister emphasized), particularly from Russian aggression in Europe, the next government should consider a target of 3 per cent of GDP on defence.