The Houthis have cracked down brutally on Yemeni civil society. A strategic response is required

The clampdown represents a new phase of authoritarian rule that will hinder the peace process and inhibit aid to ordinary Yemenis.

Expert comment Published 7 August 2024 4 minute READ

Farea Al-Muslimi

Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

At the end of May 2024 the armed Houthi group in Yemen (also known as Ansar Allah) conducted a new round of raids across the capital Sana’a, forcibly disappearing dozens of Yemenis including activists, researchers, INGO workers and diplomatic staff. Following the arrests, the Houthis publicly denounced targets inside and outside the country on television. I was among those targeted, accused of being part of a ‘foreigner spying network and implementing foreign agendas in the country’, a charge I reject entirely.

The Houthis have broadcast several statements by detainees who may well have been tortured in which they ‘confess’ they are part of a larger Israeli-American spying network in Yemen. 

But the arrests and public attacks were not about specific individuals or catching spies. They are intended primarily to intimidate Yemenis and silence dissent. This latest wave of arrests is not the first clampdown, but it does herald a new phase, as those detained include some of the Houthis’ own members, illustrating a further narrowing of the scope for dissent. The crackdown is the strongest attempt yet to ‘clean’ Yemeni civil society and crush oppositional voices both inside and outside the country.

Why are the Houthis doing this now?

There are two main reasons why the Houthis have chosen to behave in a more authoritarian fashion.

The Houthis feel safe enough to do whatever they want to Yemenis and appear unconcerned about a possible international backlash. 

The first is a sense of impunity. The Houthis are more comfortable with Saudi Arabia, after the two sides agreed to end open hostilities earlier in the year. Meanwhile the Houthis’ continuing attacks in the Red Sea have emboldened the group, elevated their status in the Iran-led ‘axis of resistance’, gained them regional and global visibility – and shown the limits of an international response. 

In this context, the Houthis feel safe enough to do whatever they want to Yemenis and appear unconcerned about a possible international backlash – even detaining UN employees and giving Yemenis working with INGOs or foreign embassies 30 days to hand over any information or documents to Houthi authorities.

The second reason is the Houthis’ much improved surveillance capacity. The transfer of technology and training from Iran has, as recent reports show, built the Houthis’ ability to surveil the population and control the flow of information.

Implications for the Yemeni peace process

In both the short and long term, the Houthi clampdown will damage the UN-led peace process. The last UN-led peace talks were held in Kuwait in 2016. 

Since then, various UN envoys have struggled to bring the parties together in an inclusive peace process. The UN’s public silence over the clampdown – and even arrests of their own staff – will further undermine its credibility in any negotiations. 

Should the UN go ahead and implement the ‘road map’ arranged by the Saudis in these circumstances, it risks being seen as simply facilitating Saudi-Houthi arrangements at the expense of Yemenis’ basic human rights.

Endangering much needed humanitarian aid

The worst effects of the Houthi crackdown will be felt by ordinary Yemenis. 

Why would any Western donor send their taxpayers’ money to a militia-controlled area with no independent oversight, where aid workers can’t be protected? 

Many of those arrested are people connected with delivery of humanitarian aid – targeted in some cases for exposing the Houthis’ diversion of that aid. 

One such example is the death sentence imposed on the CEO and owner of the country’s largest provider of aid monitoring and evaluation services. The company’s almost 1000-strong staff have been sacked.

Most donors and organizations will now be hesitant to risk working in Houthi-controlled areas. And why would any Western donor send their taxpayers’ money to a militia-controlled area with no independent oversight, where aid workers also can’t be protected? The German Development organization GIZ already started shutting down its aid and development programmes in Houthi-controlled areas in the first week of August.

How should the international community respond?

There are two schools of thought within the international community and Yemeni activists over how to respond to the Houthi crackdown. 

The first, spearheaded by many Western states, argues for further military action, diplomatic isolation and more sanctions. 

The other, pursued by Omanis, Saudis and some UN officials, calls for quiet diplomacy. 

But both strategies have already been proven wrong. What is needed is more considered and structured engagement, alongside clearly articulated red lines, and consequences if they are breached.

No military action will tame the Houthis. Since the first war against the group in Sadah in 2004, all the way to the Saudi-Emirati led Operation Decisive Storm in 2015 and the US-UK led Operation Pros Guardian in 2024, no amount of bombing has changed the Houthis’ behaviour. 

The group thrives in war far more than in peace. If anything, the evidence suggests that further confrontation will only harm Yemeni civilians and increase the group’s military ties with Iran. 

Approaches seeking to isolate the Houthis have also backfired. Part of the reason the Houthis have felt able to crack down on civil society is the fact that there is no diplomatic mission in Sana’a, aside from Iran’s, to whom they would have to explain such actions.

Engagement with the Houthis will remain difficult. But there is still a strategic case for it. Giving up on the population in northern Yemen only plays into the Houthis’ hands. And there are differing opinions within the Houthi leadership, which the international community should seek to influence. Some are seeking to pull back from the authoritarian crackdown, which is seen to be led by a pro-Iranian Revolutionary Guard faction within the group. 

The international community must continue to engage, but impose clear red lines on the distribution of aid and the treatment of civil society. 

No amount of bombing has changed the Houthis’ behaviour. The group thrives in war far more than in peace.

The Houthis do not respect international norms or human rights-based approaches. But there are instances in which they are vulnerable to financial pressure. Notably, they have backed off from similar previous actions on aid INGOs in December 2018 after a serious threat from donors and the World Food Programme to cut aid to areas under the Houthi control. 

Referring the Houthis to the International Criminal Court should also be considered – as should investigating and legally targeting the group’s political leaders and financial interests. Houthi leaders do not travel to signatory countries of the ICC, but the symbolism of being placed on a list with the very Israeli leaders they are seeking to fight would be strong.

It is clear that doing nothing is not an option. That would allow the Houthis an unobstructed path to further destabilize Yemen, dim prospects for peace, and build a mafia-style state at the heart of the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea. A strategy to exert available forms of diplomatic pressure on the Houthis in order to protect the interests of ordinary Yemenis is the only effective way forward.