Neither Iran nor Israel will win in this fight

The loss of Nasrallah is devastating for Hezbollah but Israel might be overplaying its hand. A diplomatic solution requires Washington to exercise its leverage on Tel Aviv.

Expert comment Updated 2 October 2024 4 minute READ

The intensification of violence between Israel and Hezbollah is at its root a contest of wills between Israel and Iran. Tehran wants to impose a new strategic reality on Israel by establishing military linkage and potential interdependence between the battlefields of Gaza, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Israel is countering Iran’s plan through brute force. The result has been strategic failure on both sides, along with tens of thousands of innocent people killed and immense human displacement and physical destruction.

The loss of Nasrallah is absolutely devastating for the group. He was the spinal cord and the beating heart of Hezbollah.

Although armed groups loyal to Tehran have attacked Israel from Iraq and Yemen, the two main areas of confrontation are Gaza and Lebanon, where Israel is fighting Hamas and Hezbollah respectively. The first real application of Iran’s new military doctrine was Hezbollah’s campaign against Israel which it launched on 8 October, a day after Hamas invaded southern Israel and massacred 1,200 people. 

Hezbollah said then, and continues to say, that its attacks against Israel are in support of Hamas, following the Israeli offensive in Gaza in retaliation for the group’s 7 October operation.

So far, there is no clear winner, and there probably won’t be. Hamas’ military capacity is decimated, and Hezbollah has suffered losses like never before in its 42-year conflict with the Jewish state. The organization just confirmed the killing of its top leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in an Israeli strike in a residential neighbourhood in the southern suburbs of Beirut. 

Yet despite its tactical successes, Israel is nowhere near achieving strategic gains. Its northern region is almost entirely depopulated, its international reputation is in tatters for the killing and suffering of so many civilians, its economy is in serious trouble, and its domestic politics is in turmoil.

Absent a diplomatic strategy, continuing to pummel Hamas and Hezbollah – while politically useful for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – will not address any of Israel’s above-mentioned challenges. On the contrary, Israel’s reliance on the military instrument alone, as it is prone to do, will not make it safer. Decades, not just years, of confrontation with these resilient and determined armed groups can attest to that.

Miscalculations that could lead to all-out war

It is reasonable to argue that Israel is trying to weaken both Hamas and Hezbollah as much as possible before it entertains diplomacy. In theory, that’s a sound approach and a classic dictum in war and international relations: you simply don’t negotiate with a weak hand.

However, in this case, Israel might be overplaying its hand.

By refusing to reach a ceasefire in Gaza, which is the key to stopping the escalating fight with Hezbollah, it is dragging the region to an all-out war. 

Why Netanyahu continues to reject a ceasefire in Gaza is no mystery. His own political survival depends on maintaining this state of war, even if it leads to catastrophe. He knows, and is manipulating the fact, that Israeli society will not remove their leader while the country is in danger. 

US leverage

Even the United States, Israel’s closest friend, has publicly expressed its frustration with Netanyahu’s lack of cooperation. Of course, the situation may be different if Washington did more than show bewilderment and annoyance every time Israeli action in Gaza causes further death and destruction.

It is not that difficult: the Israeli war machine cannot continue without US military assistance, so America could choose to exercise its significant leverage over the Jewish state to force it to exchange military action for diplomatic engagement. But we are unlikely to see US leadership or serious diplomatic involvement before the presidential elections in November are over.

Hezbollah will fight for survival

Iran cannot feel that its new plan of encircling Israel with regional fires is proving a success. Its Palestinian ally Hamas has suffered a major blow from which it will take years to recover. Hezbollah, its ace in the hole, has lost the majority of its political and military leaders and the remaining ones are afraid of meeting or even communicating without getting blown up by Israeli technology or air strikes.

It would be a huge mistake to assume that Hezbollah is now helpless, or that it will fold because of Israeli hits. 

Never has the mighty Hezbollah appeared this fragile and disoriented. The loss of Nasrallah is absolutely devastating for the group. He was the spinal cord and the beating heart of Hezbollah, a man whose influence and aura extended well beyond Lebanon’s borders. How, or whether, Hezbollah recovers from this major blow is a huge question now.

But it would be a mistake to assume that Hezbollah is now helpless, or that it will fold because of Israeli hits. That’s just not its philosophy. Even Israel has admitted that the group still has significant military capabilities. The harm it is capable of inflicting on Israel could still be devastating. Its precise missiles can strike any strategic facility or urban centre in Israel, although now one has to wonder about its command-and-control abilities with the loss of Nasrallah, who used to personally command operations.

Article second half

Yet Israel must now face this dilemma: if it continues to escalate its attacks against Hezbollah, and the group starts to feel like its own existence is at risk, it will likely lash out in ways that Israel has never seen before, regardless of Iranian interests. After all, how relevant is Hezbollah’s strategic deterrent if Hezbollah itself no longer exists or is rendered militarily irrelevant? The first deterrent Hezbollah must establish is against a fatal Israeli campaign, not an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear sites.

Lessons learned?

Israel is currently drunk on its own tactical successes, assuming it can do to Hezbollah what it has done to Hamas. But Hezbollah is a very different kettle of fish. 

If Hezbollah starts to feel like its own existence is at risk, it will likely lash out in ways that Israel has never seen before, regardless of Iranian interests.

Israel would be foolish to mount a new ground invasion of Lebanon – as some of its leaders have warned is the plan – because that’s precisely where Hezbollah might have the upper hand. It knows the terrain best and is trained to fight quite effectively. The mountains and valleys of southern Lebanon are not the neighbourhoods of Gaza. 

It is true that the Israeli military learned lessons from the 2006 fight, but so did Hezbollah. The question now is whether Israel has learned anything from 18 years of occupation of southern Lebanon.

It’s high time for diplomacy, and it all starts with a ceasefire in Gaza. That would lead to pacifying the Israel-Lebanon borders and Hezbollah moving to positions north of the Litani River, as demanded by UN resolution 1701 which was passed in 2006. But reaching that point depends on two equally important factors: Benjamin Netanyahu’s cooperation, and whether Washington will do the right thing and force its junior ally to stop the worst from happening. Currently there is little reason for optimism in either case.