In a landslide victory, former President Donald Trump has been elected to be the 47th president of the United States. This election was laden with the expectation that a dead heat would lead to delay, legal challenge, extremism, and possible violence. It has instead passed quickly, decisively, and peacefully. More than 67 million Americans who voted for Kamala Harris have demonstrated restraint and accepted the result. By this measure, democracy in the United States has prevailed.
Across Asia and Latin America, leaders have been preparing for a second Trump term. They are pragmatic and resolute in their belief that they can work with the once and
also future US president. In Europe, leaders have been less certain. They have oscillated between two approaches. The first, of ‘Trump-proofing’ – an instinct if not a strategy that builds on the quest for strategic autonomy, championed by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron. The second, a calculation by some, not least the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, that they can present themselves as top-tier partners to the US in a new approach to transatlantic security.
Trumpism is not an aberration
For eight years, world leaders and foreign policy experts have been debating whether President Trump was the cause of a radical change in the US, or merely a symptom of powerful trends in the American body politic: rising inequality, a loss of manufacturing jobs – a demographic defined by white male non-college-educated voters who feel left behind – a deeply engrained anti-elitism, and a society in desperate need of a new kind of political leadership.
In Trump’s first term, many leaders acted on the basis that he was an aberration, not a symptom. That meant that foreign leaders assumed his policies might disappear with his future electoral defeat, and short-term strategies designed to ‘work around’ Trump were a good bet.
The next US president would return to a familiar agenda (free trade, market access, strong alliances, a commitment to climate action, extended nuclear deterrence and deepening transatlantic ties) and so America’s friends could wait this out. Indeed, civil servants frequently pointed to the strength of bilateral working relations, despite an often disruptive high-level political style.
President Joe Biden’s commitment to multilateralism, the transatlantic partnership and Ukraine seemed to confirm the view that Trump’s policies were an anomaly and that America had reverted to normal. Gradually, though, Biden’s policies began to chip away at this assumption. He continued Trump’s tariffs, executed a reckless and unilateral exit from Afghanistan with little consultation, and pushed through a transformative but also protectionist climate investment bill in the Inflation Reduction Act.
Fast forward to this election result. A stunning – many would say shocking – victory must put to rest any assumption that Trump is an aberration. It may have started that way, but today it appears there is no going back. The world is now confronted with a president that has had time to sharpen and hone his instincts, to prioritise loyalty in appointing a close circle of advisers, and to lay the foundation for his Vice President JD Vance to carry forward his vision once his second term ends.
First moves
What will Trump do first? Several things are in store: A sharp immigration policy including deportations is likely to be top of Team Trump’s agenda in its first 100 days. This may prove to be inflationary – deporting millions of undocumented migrants would shrink the labour supply – but that is unlikely to restrain Trump in the short-term. A 2.0 version of his so-called ‘Muslim ban’ could also feature. And immigrants will continue to take a hit rhetorically, labelled as outsiders and as criminals.
The punishment for noncompliance could also be harsh. If Mexico does not demonstrate its willingness to cooperate, retaliation might take the form of tariffs, or a tough review or even renegotiation of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2026.
The return to tariffs as the front line of trade policy is virtually certain. Trump has telegraphed this for months. China can expect far harsher tariffs. What is more difficult to discern is whether these will be a bargaining tool with conditions attached, or a ratcheting up towards a new level of protectionism.
For Asia, there is grave uncertainty. No one can be sure what Trump’s strategy will be towards Taiwan. Investment in the latticework of mutually-reinforcing partnerships across the region may take a back seat. But how Trump will manage North Korea’s nuclear threat is unclear. So too is the question of whether under his watch, US nuclear deterrence will continue to provide enough assurance to prevent South Korea and Japan from developing their own nuclear weapons.
Still, it is Europe that is likely to face the sharpest edge of Trump’s second term. Tariffs in search of reciprocal market access and reducing America’s trade deficit with Europe are more likely than not. But it will be the existential and enduring shift in America’s commitment to Europe and its security that will hit hardest.