Three key summer deadlines will reveal how Trump views the future of US power

The US will hit three self-imposed deadlines this summer: on tariffs, international organizations and the debt ceiling. Administration choices will make it clearer how President Trump sees the global order – and harder to argue that the fundamentals of US strength are undamaged.

Expert comment Published 1 July 2025 3 minute READ

As NATO suddenly appears to be back in President Trump’s good books, Middle East diplomacy and IAEA inspections are seemingly out. For observers who are trying to keep up and understand how the Trump administration views the US’s role in the world, three upcoming deadlines should help clarify things.

The first is 8 July, when the 90-day grace period for bilateral trade negotiations around Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs will expire – or not, creating intense drama and uncertainty for most of the world’s economies. The second deadline is 3 August, which is the delivery date for a Trump-mandated review of all treaties and international organizations in which the US participates. The third deadline comes in August, when Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent says that the US will reach its debt ceiling and will be unable to borrow money, unless Congress raises or suspends the limit before summer recess begins in July. 

Together, these moments all point in a direction away from the rules, norms and mutual obligations that built predictability into the global system – and towards a system where great powers do as they wish. But Trump is no isolationist and has no intention of withdrawing from the world stage. Where international architecture offers him a stage for performance and victory, he will make use of it. Where it instead offers limits or alternate power sources, he will attack them – even if that means attacking sources of US strength.

Deadline one: tariffs

The July deadline for a return to reciprocal tariffs may be the least dramatic of the three. Trump and Bessent have each indicated they would extend deadlines for countries and blocs that are ‘negotiating in good faith’. Reports from ongoing negotiations with the EU, Japan, India and others suggest strife and disagreement among the US negotiators, and confirm that the outcomes are unlikely to be more than frameworks for yet more talks. 

Meanwhile, courts have blocked application of Trump’s reciprocal tariffs while appeals proceed over whether he usurped Congressional authority to impose them. The case is likely to go all the way to the US Supreme Court, and not to be concluded until the autumn. Although it remains to be seen whether the tariff deadline will be marked with a new flurry of tariff activity or a quiet set of rollovers – or some of each – we will not see anything like a comprehensive trade deal or a return to a steady, predictable global economy.

Deadline two: review of international organizations

While long-term tariff uncertainty in the world’s largest importer is a serious blow to the WTO, the Trump-mandated review puts the same fundamental challenge to every international organization and treaty with which the US engages. Back in February, the State Department was ordered to determine which organizations, conventions and treaties are contrary to US interests and whether they can be reformed. 

There has been little public information about the review but some indications of what sort of recommendations to expect can be gained from the Republicans’ Project 2025 and the Trump administration’s 2026 budget proposal, put forward in June.

Project 2025 took an aggressive approach to international organizations, calling on the US to exit the World Bank, IMF and the OECD, and withdraw from and cease to implement most treaties not ratified by the US Congress.  

The president’s 2026 budget proposal suggests a somewhat more moderate approach, at least when it comes to the international financial institutions (IFIs). They will see a 39 per cent cut in funding, although larger cuts are aimed at their climate-focused programmes. 

Proposals for other organizations are more existential. The United Nations faces a proposed 83 per cent cut in US funding – and the complete elimination of funding for UN peacekeeping, as well as UNICEF and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). US funding for some organizations, including the OECD, the vaccine alliance Gavi, and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), is completely zeroed out. 

Of course, the budget proposal is just that – a proposal. And members of Congress would normally be expected to reshape it in line with their own interests. But these are not normal times. In June, members of the House of Representatives who had previously expressed concerns failed to stop a bill that proposed slashing the current year’s international spending, including on to the UN and contributions to UNICEF, UNDP and UN peacekeeping. 

Deadline three: the debt ceiling

The debt ceiling is the legal limit on how much the US is allowed to borrow to finance its massive debt. Washington’s fiscal health – and how that affects its global standing – is not often thought about in the same context as the relatively tiny sums spent on international organizations. But a budget proposal that depends on revenue from tariff hikes and cuts to US international spending is linked to Congress reaching agreement on increasing – or scrapping – the debt ceiling.

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Indeed, Bessent suggested that court battles over tariffs could affect how quickly Washington hits the ceiling. The smooth management of the debt, and the belief that US market fundamentals can sustain it, are central to the standing of the dollar and to Washington’s global power – however exercised.

It will become harder to insist that the world needs America more than America needs the world. 

By the end of summer, a few realities will be clear. There will not be a return to the pre-April global economy, in which US consumers were grumpy but still vital guarantors of the WTO. Nor will there be stability at some new level of tariffs.

Brinksmanship, litigation and month-to-month changes are likely to be the new normal. Likewise, Washington will no longer be a reliable partner in international institutions. Some will be left entirely to their own devices without US funding, others will be faced with US officials using the promise of continued resourcing to push for significant change.

A debt ceiling fix will be found, but the path there may somewhat undermine its value. Amid the frenzy of tariffs, soaring debt, declining infrastructure and bubbling political violence, it will become increasingly hard to argue that the fundamentals of US strength are undamaged. It will also become harder to insist that the world needs America more than America needs the world.