UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer returned from COP29 in Baku having been one of only two G7 leaders to attend the global climate summit. He followed this with a visit to the G20 in Brazil, launching the UK’s ‘clean power alliance’ with 12 other countries. This was preceded by a summer of travel including the July NATO summit, the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Samoa and confidence-building visits to France and Germany to discuss shared defence and geopolitical priorities.
This is a fairly long list for only five months in office. But there are good reasons Starmer has been abroad so much. His election coincided with a run of international obligations which would have attracted comment if he did not attend. He also faces an unusually difficult international climate, one which necessitates not just visits abroad, but a significant focus on foreign affairs.
There were always big foreign policy risks on the horizon for a new UK government: the war in Ukraine, the Middle East crisis, growing economic protectionism, and intensifying climate change. Donald Trump’s election for a second term complicates all of these.
Beyond that, the key post-war relationships on which UK foreign policy has relied are shifting. The US is more politically unpredictable and Europe has become more fractured at the same time as it faces an aggressive and revanchist Russia. An active foreign policy is hardly a choice in this environment.
Nonetheless media reports about voters’ dissatisfaction that Starmer is abroad a lot exacerbate perceptions that a focus on international issues is irrelevant (or worse). This is especially the case when there are pressing challenges at home, not least the UK’s long-running lack of economic growth.
All this comes in the context of a wider right-populist movement that often paints centre-left governments like Starmer’s as out of touch ‘globalists’. The government has little choice but to seek investment, manage crises, and secure alliances abroad, but they will need to work on communicating why this is important to voters and connecting international policy meaningfully with domestic priorities.
A second Trump term compounds foreign policy challenges
Trump’s return makes several challenges more acute. On trade, the US President has threatened to impose 10 to 20 per cent tariffs across the board on imports. On defence and security, his long-term commitment to collective defence via NATO is in doubt, and his disdain for European countries spending minimal percentages of their GDP on defence is crystal clear.
The UK may be less of a target for Trump’s most punishing tariffs than countries with whom the US has significant trade deficits but there is still a risk. Trump has appointed Jamieson Greer as his US Trade Representative (USTR), who worked as Chief of Staff to Robert Lighthizer, the previous Trump USTR. Lighthizer was also a proponent of tariffs and an advocate of the belief that the US’s global trade deficit is a problem which weakens it economically. A wider trend towards protectionism will mean an economic hit for the UK, as might pressure from the US to align with its tariffs on China.
Negotiating all of this – especially seeking exemptions on tariffs or other protectionist measures – will require effective, active trade diplomacy. Countries like South Korea have well-developed tools for this, securing exemptions from some tariffs in Trump’s first term and from some of the protectionist measures brought in by Biden.
The UK, a country which began pursuing an independent trade strategy only after it voted to leave the EU trade umbrella in 2016, will need to develop similar dogged, effective trade diplomacy to navigate a more protectionist world.
These circumstances may force the UK to focus on another area that is critical for Trump’s relations with Europeans – defence spending. Biden and other previous administrations have pushed for Europeans to spend more on defence but Trump is likely to do this more aggressively – potentially making it a feature of trade discussions.
Additionally, most future scenarios for Russia’s war on Ukraine require Europe to be much more capable of defending and guaranteeing its own security. This would be necessary both if the bloc ends up sending military aid to Ukraine without US support or upholding the terms of a negotiated end to the conflict.
Not only might this mean spending more but also working more with European allies on defence planning and shared capabilities. Work on this has already begun – witness Starmer’s visit to France straight after Trump’s election, as well as the UK-Germany defence agreement signed in October.
Linking foreign and domestic priorities
The UK public fairly consistently support higher defence spending and polls show they are concerned about a number of international issues, particularly climate. But, as with most political issues, when asked to engage with trade-offs, people are reluctant to redirect funding away from, for example, health or education, or endure personal hardships. And domestic issues, especially the NHS, top public priorities consistently.
Public consent and understanding of foreign policy priorities is critical. Brexit was, in part, a signal that decision-makers had taken public approval and understanding of the UK’s relationship with the EU – a core aspect of its foreign policy – for granted. The result has been a tectonic shift in the nation’s economic and geopolitical position.