The new heights reached in bilateral relations between North Korea and Russia, as exemplified in their signing of the comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in June 2024, have been reflected in increasingly frequent ministerial visits between the two countries; the sending of North Korean troops to aid Russia’s war effort; and a successful undermining of the UN Security Council, to the benefit of North Korea, Russia and China. In light of the concerning implications for regional and global security, this section of the paper proposes five policy recommendations aimed at assisting key stakeholders, including the US, Japan and South Korea, to address the growing threat posed by these developments.
Increase South Korean support for Ukraine
South Korea has hitherto been reluctant to provide lethal assistance directly to Ukraine, not least to avoid jeopardizing its economic ties with Russia. Yet, as then South Korean national security adviser Chang Ho-jin made clear in June 2024, Russia’s signing of the comprehensive strategic partnership treaty marked the crossing of a ‘red line’. With North Korea providing not just artillery shells, ballistic missiles, but also troops to aid Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, South Korea must follow through on its rhetoric and consider providing military assistance to Ukraine in the short term. Such assistance can comprise defensive forms of lethal aid, such as air defence systems, as well as the deployment of South Korean military officials to monitor the strategies and postures of their North Korean counterparts. In the longer term, South Korea should also contribute to Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction efforts, for which it could draw on its own experience of recovery following the Korean War. While South Korea must remain vigilant of the risk that North Korea will view any such provision of aid – not least lethal aid – as an escalation in tensions, the deployment of North Korean troops has only emphasized how South Korea’s interests are now directly involved in the Ukraine war.
Strengthen US-led efforts to deter a nuclear North Korea and reassure Japan and South Korea of support for their security interests
However differently they interpreted the North Korea–Russia relationship, interviewees for this paper all stressed the importance of strengthening bilateral and trilateral security cooperation between the US, Japan and South Korea in response. Although the outgoing Biden administration did little to reduce North Korea’s belligerence, it sought to reassure its allies in Japan and South Korea through the Washington Declaration of April 2023, and the trilateral Camp David Summit in August that year. With the possibility – albeit low – of the US weakening its extended deterrence over the Korean peninsula causing a concern among policymakers in Washington and Seoul, the incoming US administration should seek to reassure and engage its allies via two principal pathways:
- First, by continuing bilateral and trilateral military exercises involving the US, Japan and South Korea – such as the ‘Freedom Edge’ drills of June 2024 – as a sign of resolve. Moreover, the three countries should also maintain their participation in larger drills, such as the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise held by the US Indo-Pacific Command.
- Second, using the existing ‘2+2’ and three-way high-level talks involving the US, Japan and South Korea. These talks are vital to bolster information-sharing mechanisms with respect to tracking and anticipating North Korean missile launches, which are likely to increase in frequency. Through these talks, Japan and South Korea will be afforded greater involvement in combating the North Korean nuclear threat. The first-ever meeting between the defence chiefs of the US, Japan and South Korea, in July 2024, offered a useful starting point for such cooperation by institutionalizing the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework and committing all parties to addressing the North Korea–Russia partnership. Furthermore, the US and South Korea should quickly implement the goals of the Nuclear Consultative Group, created as part of the April 2023 US–South Korea Washington Declaration, particularly by deploying US strategic assets on and around the Korean peninsula as a way of bolstering an integrated system of deterrence against North Korea.
Sustain momentum in bilateral and trilateral relations between Japan, South Korea and China
South Korea’s historically frosty bilateral relations with Japan have hindered cooperation against regional threats. South Korea’s recent proactive foreign policy towards Japan, featuring regular high-level dialogue, should continue given the urgency of the response to North Korea’s renewed cooperation with Russia. With newly elected Japanese prime minister Shigeru Ishiba going as far as to call for the establishment of an ‘Asian NATO’ to combat regional security threats, the recent momentum in bilateral ties between Japan and South Korea must be sustained. Strengthening existing mechanisms for intelligence-sharing, such as those outlined in the General Security of Military Information Agreement, which entered into force in March 2023, is one example of how this aim could be achieved.
Sustained cooperation between Japan and South Korea might offer one possible way, albeit difficult, for engaging with China, in order to ‘draw a wedge’ in the North Korea–Russia relationship – particularly if China’s dissatisfaction with North Korea’s pivot to Russia grows. China – together with North Korea and Russia – continues to deride the US’s strengthening relations with Japan and South Korea as ‘an effort to create a northeast Asian version of NATO’. Indeed, in response to these strengthening defensive alliances, Beijing believes that such bilateralism and trilateralism will form a coalition against China’s own interests. China, however, is no benign actor. At the same time as it voices its dissatisfaction at the relationship between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul, Beijing continues to assist Pyongyang in evading multilateral and unilateral sanctions. At the same time, however, regular ministerial meetings between China, Japan and South Korea, such as that in June and July this year, offer a starting point towards achieving a consensus between those countries on their response to the intensifying North Korea–Russia relationship, even if any such consensus remains elusive.
Encourage more robust engagement between South Korea and existing minilateral institutions in the region, as well as with European allies and partners
In addition to strengthening its alliance with the US, South Korea should reinforce security- and defence-related engagement with like-minded partners and institutions elsewhere, not least if South Korea is to become a ‘global pivotal state’. Given the possible consequences of North Korea–Russia cooperation on international security, South Korea should consider its participation in regional minilateral forums and bolster bilateral security ties with European partners, including the UK. In particular, South Korea should revisit the possibility of joining pillar II of the AUKUS security partnership and/or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) to institutionalize its existing bilateral partnerships with member states.
While the likelihood of South Korea joining these forums as a formal member remains low, it should maintain robust bilateral relations with existing individual member states and consider engaging with the institutions themselves, albeit not as a full-fledged member. In just one example, Seoul’s recent increased engagement with NATO, without being a formal member of the organization, has underscored South Korea’s growing importance as a contributor to, and provider of, global security.
With North Korea’s missile and nuclear proliferation threatening to destabilize the Korean peninsula and northeast Asia, the strengthening of regional security has formed an essential component of the Indo-Pacific strategies of many states, not least those in Europe. To this end, European countries should uphold their current sanctions regime against North Korea. Importantly, South Korea is not just an economic partner for these states, but also a vital security partner. Here, the UK could play a key role in assisting South Korea as a core security partner, as outlined in the Downing Street Accord signed in November 2023. In the short term, the UK should bolster its involvement in military defence exercises around the Korean peninsula, as in September 2024, when the UK Commando Force participated in the joint Ssang Yong US–South Korea military drills. The UK should also continue to monitor and support the imposition of sanctions against North Korea, which has become an increasingly urgent task given the demise of the UN Panel of Experts and North Korea’s continued sanctions violations amid its heightened cooperation with Russia.
Conduct a concerted campaign to increase information flows into North Korea
The threat emanating from North Korea goes beyond its expanding nuclear weapons and missile programmes and its cooperation with Russia. With the Kim regime continuing to violate the human rights of North Korea’s population, Western states should recognize the multifaceted nature of the North Korea ‘problem’. As such, South Korea, together with its allies, partners and non-governmental organizations, should continue to support campaigns to send outside information into North Korea – for example, via radio broadcasts and supporting the activities of North Korean defector-led organizations in South Korea. The possibility of longer-term change in the attitudes of the North Korean people towards the Kim regime – however improbable in the short term – is a goal that must not be abandoned, even if the prospect of North Korean denuclearization remains distant.
