With 2024 recently confirmed as having been the hottest year on record, the climate crisis is undeniably here. And yet, despite significant technological, policy and diplomatic advances – such as the explosive growth of low-carbon technologies in China, the successful implementation of carbon pricing in the UK, and the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, signed by nearly every country in the world – planet-warming emissions continue to rise and to accumulate in the atmosphere.
China and the UK understand the urgent need to tackle the causes of climate change, and to adapt to its effects. They share ambitious climate change mitigation goals: the UK was the first major economy to commit to net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, enshrining this target into law in 2019. In 2020, China pledged to achieve peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060; the latter, if realized, would constitute the most significant contribution to mitigating climate change by any country in history. China and the UK have also been actively developing comprehensive policy frameworks for climate change adaptation, as illustrated by China’s National Adaptation Strategy, launched in 2022, and by the UK’s series of climate change risk assessments and national adaptation programmes.
China is recognized as an important partner for the UK in tackling global issues, especially in the post-Brexit era. However, recent shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine have fused with longer-term trends, such as the growth of right-wing nationalism in wealthy countries, to destabilize global politics. Part of the fallout from this has been a marked deterioration in the relationships between China and the West, especially the US and increasingly the EU. The UK–China relationship has not been unaffected by this turbulence, and much has changed since the ‘golden era’ of the mid-2010s (see Box 1). The new Labour government in the UK is ‘auditing’ every aspect of the bilateral relationship, and while details had not been released at the time of writing, the process can be expected to emphasize the dilemma between pursuing closer economic ties and maintaining a measure of diplomatic distance – the latter to manage security threats and other risks associated with China’s political system and increasingly assertive regional and global agenda.
Nevertheless, climate change cooperation between China and the UK has continued over many years, albeit at varying intensities. Climate action is frequently cited at the highest political levels as an area of mutual interest on which the two countries can and should cooperate, irrespective of differences in other areas. In a 2021 Chatham House assessment of G20 countries as ‘partners’, ‘neutral’ parties or ‘rivals’ to the UK across six identified global goals, China was identified as a ‘partner’ to the UK on climate change (alongside France, Germany, Italy, the US and the EU), making it the only non-G7 country to be categorized thus. Senior Chinese officials have often approvingly cited the UK’s science-driven approach to climate policy and its success in reducing emissions.
According to a recent UK study, 46 per cent of the British public favour working with China on climate change, while 24 per cent do not. Although the UK is one of the largest emitters in cumulative terms, today it accounts for less than 1 per cent of global emissions, having reduced them by 53 per cent since 1990. Arguably, therefore, the biggest contribution the UK can now make to tackling climate change is not only to further reduce its own domestic emissions but to cooperate effectively with China, which accounts for around 30 per cent of current global emissions, a greater share than any other country’s. Recognition of the fact that climate change cannot be tackled without China is likely to be a factor in the British public’s degree of support for cooperating with China on the issue, despite other misgivings. China’s impressive recent progress in deploying renewable energy and electric vehicles (EVs) suggests its emissions reduction pledges are more than mere rhetoric. However, awareness of this among the UK public appears to be limited: the study cited above also showed that China is perceived as ‘not pulling its weight’ in addressing climate change.
Arguably, the biggest contribution the UK can now make to tackling climate change is not only to further reduce its own domestic emissions but to cooperate effectively with China, which accounts for around 30 per cent of current global emissions.
Notwithstanding the need for political caution in the relationship with China, the Labour government in the UK has declared itself ‘back in the business of climate leadership’ and, partly to this end, says that it seeks ‘serious, stable and pragmatic re-engagement’ with China. High-level political signalling is being accompanied by calls from scientific advisory bodies in the UK and China to consider the opportunities for deeper bilateral cooperation on climate change. This is not only to advance each country’s respective climate goals but also to provide a much-needed strengthening of multilateral efforts, currently struggling for effectiveness and credibility.
That climate multilateralism urgently requires better support was underscored by the weak outcome of the COP29 climate conference, held in Azerbaijan in late 2024. The conference’s concluding agreement bitterly disappointed many participating national delegations and observers, in particular failing to satisfy developing countries that the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance will provide them with adequate funding to simultaneously transition their economies and cope with the increasingly severe effects of climate change. Concerns about the failure of climate multilateralism have become all the more pressing now that the US is expected once again to withdraw from international climate diplomacy under the second Donald Trump administration. China has indicated a willingness to take on a greater role in this area, and a common UK–China front could be a powerful diplomatic force in climate change negotiations at a time when concerted international leadership is more lacking – and more necessary – than ever.
With the above context in mind, this research paper makes the case for increased UK–China climate cooperation, and proposes the forms such activity could fruitfully take. Specifically, the paper sets out how the UK government might develop its scientific, technical and policy cooperation with China on climate change, and identifies policy options with the potential to accelerate emissions reductions, build resilience to climate impacts and support global climate governance. The paper also identifies potential challenges to bilateral cooperation given current and anticipated political and geopolitical constraints, and suggests how such challenges might be circumvented or addressed.
Background to this paper
In 1999, Chatham House hosted the UK prime minister, Tony Blair, and China’s president, Jiang Zemin, for the launch of the UK–China Forum, a bilateral dialogue initiative. The initiative covered seven themes, among them the environment. In the years since then, Chatham House has continued to convene meetings and consultations with government officials, experts, academics and private sector representatives from the UK and China for dialogue on climate change and the energy transition, as well as for joint research and diplomatic initiatives.
This paper is based on a series of in-depth dialogues in 2023 and 2024 between the two expert panels that, respectively, advise the UK and Chinese governments on climate change. The series, part of a decade-long relationship mediated by Chatham House, provided a level of access to government officials and advisers unique among think-tanks, enabling the formulation in this paper of timely, relevant and granular recommendations.
The paper does not reflect the positions of the British and Chinese governments or their officials.