Post-2011 reconfigurations of power
Experiences of the 2011 conflict in Libya varied considerably across the country. The rebels captured the capital, Tripoli, in August 2011, heralding the defeat of the regime. But it was not until September 2011, weeks after the regime’s defeat that rebel fighters from various factions took control of Sebha. While the city had been spared the intense fighting of cities on the northern coast, Sebha’s social fabric would face significant upheaval in the post-2011 period. In the aftermath, ‘tribal and ethnic identities became more salient and politicised as a result of collective punishment in 2011’. During the 2011 uprising and in the months that followed, acts of retribution and violence that included human rights violations and war crimes were committed by rebel fighters against regime elements and their communities.
The most defining tribal conflict in Sebha after 2011 was between the Awlad Suleiman and the Tebu, starting in March 2012.
There was a violent shift in social relations. Pro-revolutionary armed groups from the Nafusa-mountain city of Zintan (see Figure 3) expanded the territories under their control into the Fezzan region. The Awlad Suleiman, which had been toppled from its pre-eminent position in the Fezzan under the Gaddafi regime sought to restore its political dominance. The city and its environs was subsequently carved up into Awlad Suleiman and Tebu areas of control. Sebha’s crime rate increased drastically after 2011. Robberies, carjackings and kidnappings for ransom became a daily occurrence.
The fracturing of the anti-Gaddafi revolutionary coalition and competition for control
The most defining tribal conflict in Sebha after 2011 was between the Awlad Suleiman and the Tebu, starting in March 2012. The conflict with the Tebu galvanized the Awlad Suleiman factions – which had fought on either side of the 2011 war – and thereby fractured the revolutionary coalition. Following the Awlad Suleiman’s effective victory Qadhadfa, Hasawna, Muhamid, Tuareg and Tebu interests were all marginalized.
The second major phase of armed conflict unfolded in early 2014 once again between the Tebu and Awlad Suleiman, and quickly drew in other tribes that were caught in the crossfire or allied with either of the warring factions. Elements of the Qadhadfa and Magarha tribes took advantage of the turmoil to seize Tamanhint airbase outside Sebha and present their advance as a resurrection of the Gaddafi regime but were quickly pushed out and several men were arrested. This incident alerted revolutionary factions in western Libya and prompted the deployment of a contingent of forces from Misrata city to contain the ‘insurrection’ and secure Sebha. The deployed group, known as the Third Force, would remain in the city for over three years, backing the dominant Awlad Suleiman factions. While the Third Force contained tribal tensions, it would be responsible for the mass killing of over 140 young soldiers at the Brak al-Shati airbase to the north of Sebha in 2017. Those killed were affiliated with Khalifa Haftar’s forces that were contesting power with the government in Tripoli, which was supported by the Third Force. Subsequently, the Third Force was disbanded and removed from the Fezzan.
LAAF consolidation and a divided city
Following its gradual expansion into the south of Libya in 2016–18, the LAAF considerably reshaped the Fezzan’s security landscape, centralizing chains of command and promoting a small number of privileged forces, while chipping away at rival networks of allegiance. Its most prominent forces in the region expanded geographically while absorbing smaller local factions. Haftar and his inner circle gave direct orders to the commanders of these forces and exerted authority through regional command structures.
Despite broad affiliation with the LAAF, security dynamics in the city became fragmented, with tribes coalescing in areas that ‘their’ armed groups controlled. A study of post-revolution Sebha concluded that ‘daily life in Sebha has been profoundly shaped by violence’. The city is now divided into fiefdoms and a much greater degree of segregation is present than ever before. Revolutionary violence and subsequent local conflicts led to large-scale displacement and tribespeople flocking together for mutual protection. The city’s urban geography has been unable to contend with these pressures, with chronic housing shortages in the city’s centre.
Migrant smuggling and TIP as key sources of revenue
Informal trade had long been a lifeline for those in Sebha and became all the more essential for the population during the 1990s when international sanctions hampered formal trade flows. However, the main catalyst for the rise in transit migration and smuggling was the fall of the regime in 2011 and the ensuing power vacuum in the absence of a central state authority. While Libya’s transitional government had other priorities, the collapse of the old order and reconfigurations of power and security structures in the southwestern region resulted in porous borders. This meant that there were now fewer entry barriers to the smuggling sector, and thus a multitude of new actors appeared, with little to no prior experience. After 2011, numbers of small players involved in Niger–Libya cross-border smuggling rose dramatically.
Economic decline of state-supported industries
The decline of Sebha’s state supported industries began long before the fall of Gaddafi, and this deterioration accelerated in the immediate post-2011 period. This trend is observable in the state-run agricultural sector. Agriculture is of major importance to Sebha and surrounding municipalities, which are barely industrialized. A 2018 study found that more than half of households in Sebha reported being engaged in agricultural activities. Yet, agricultural labour is not seen as particularly desirable. As a result, public and private farms have long relied on seasonal workers from neighbouring countries. Agricultural production in state-led crop farming has declined in the post-2011 period (see Figure 13 below). Only one agricultural project, Al-Aril, has witnessed increases in production since 2011. The sector is reported to have been suffering from a lack of structural investments and state oversight, electricity shortages affecting water supply, unavailability of machinery and maintenance, and insecurity affecting the transportation of crops. In 2017, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) found that 25 per cent of those previously engaged in agricultural production in Sebha had abandoned the sector.
Analysis of the 262 companies on the Sebha commercial register in 2024 demonstrates that Sebha’s commercial sector remains limited. As Figure 14 (below) shows, more companies focus on agriculture and livestock (37) than any other sector, while sectors associated with cross-border trading – automobile (22), import-export (14) and logistics/trucking (12) – account for a significant proportion of businesses. Of these companies, only 18 are listed as employing more than 100 people, while 94 companies are listed as employing 19 people or fewer.
