The systems analysis in Figure 21 above illustrates these dynamics, showing how political support has been traded for authority and resources. These dynamics have, in turn, led to a situation in which combating migrant smuggling and TIP is just as profitable as facilitating these practices, creating de facto regulation of the sector in Zawiya but also blurring the boundaries between state and criminal activities.
Post-2011 partnerships and the battle
for influence
Soon after Gaddafi was ousted, the revolution’s various armed actors began strategizing to secure a share of power and resources that matched their contributions to the cause. Actors in Zawiya were seen as a significant force, with influence felt across the northwestern region. The city’s armed groups competed with those from the cities of Misrata, Zintan and Tripoli, each carving out spheres of territorial control in Tripoli. The political manoeuvring of Zawiya’s armed groups was bolstered by the city’s geographic location and strategic assets, such as the oil refinery.
While Zawiya-based actors were less influential than those in Misrata within the revolutionary camp, the former played a crucial role in the post-2011 restructuring of the security sector. In 2013, under the leadership of the Zawiyan commander Shaaban Hadiya (also known as Abu Obeida al-Zawi), the Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR) united Islamist armed groups from across the country. Zawiya’s strong security sector, combined with its proximity to Tripoli, meant that Zawiyan armed groups could directly impact certain critical assets in the capital, including access to electricity and gas. Combined with the opportunities for revenue generation, this turned the city and strategic assets like its oil refinery into sites for contestation between armed factions looking to exert influence over the capital.
The projection of force and tensions with neighbours
Following the 2011 revolution, Zawiyan armed groups and smugglers expanded their partnerships and influence along the coastal road extending to Tunisia. Initially, Zawiyan groups shared a unifying revolutionary identity with western rebel strongholds such as Zintan, and later formed a security bloc in Tripoli post-Gaddafi. This bond extended to smaller cities and towns like Zwara and Sabratha. These latter towns, known for their longer involvement in smuggling operations, particularly migrant smuggling, had well-established networks and supply chains that featured prominently in media coverage.
While fuel and gas smuggling activities established routes along the coast, the shift to an illicit economy centred on migrant smuggling and human trafficking emerged only after 2014.
Zawiya’s smugglers likely utilized the same coastal routes for transporting fuel across the Tunisian border and Mediterranean through cooperation with armed groups like the al-Nasr Brigade – an armed group led by Mohammed Khushlaf, a prominent militia leader from Zawiya – that controlled the city’s oil refinery, and counterparts in Zwara. But despite a degree of coexistence between actors from different areas, Zawiyan groups wanted absolute control over the territory, which they pushed for (and acquired) in 2019 after the formation of the state security Stability Support Apparatus (SSA). The Western coastal branch of the SSA was placed under the command of Zawiya’s Hassan Buzriba.
On the eastern front, Zawiya is separated from the capital by the Wershefana tribal area, whose influence expands southwest of Tripoli, with several lucrative smuggling routes cutting through its lands. Wershefana’s history as Gaddafi loyalists, and its shifting security alliances over the past decade, have meant that it has frequently clashed with Zawiya’s armed groups.
While fuel and gas smuggling activities established routes along the coast, the shift to an illicit economy centred on migrant smuggling and human trafficking emerged only after 2014. Until then, Zawiya’s leadership focused on securing state funds through political and security influence.
As leadership sought national relevance, younger local armed groups in Zawiya exploited access to fuel and gas to generate additional income. This reflected competing priorities: leadership seeking political leverage while local groups capitalized on economic opportunities.
Zawiya’s security landscape was influenced by a number of key players: Mahmoud Bin Rajab, commander of the 52 Brigade; Mohamed Bahrun (also known as ‘Al Far’ or ‘The Mouse’), who leveraged his position as commander of the First Security Division; and the Buzriba brothers (Essam, Hassan and Ali). These figures operated within a fragmented system where security actors oscillated between cooperation and competition. They competed for resources and government funding while exploiting Zawiya’s strategic location for smuggling operations. This competition intensified after the 2015 Skhirat Agreement and the formation of the Government of National Accord (GNA), which left many local actors out of the formal political process.
Post-2015 isolation and the rise of the Zawiyan militia smuggler
Between 2014 and 2019, several developments disrupted access to resources and power in Zawiya. The first major change was the ouster of key Zawiyan leaders from Tripoli, which significantly reduced the influence of the city and marked a shift in power dynamics in Zawiya, consequently intensifying competition between local groups for Zawiya’s resources and ultimately creating space for illicit activity to grow, which evolved into migrant smuggling and TIP.
Meanwhile, internal conflicts among rival armed groups in Zawiya continued to escalate. In June 2017, the killing of Ibrahim Hneesh, a young militia leader, triggered further violence among competing factions. This incident exemplified the volatile and fragmented nature of power within the city, as different groups vied for dominance. The ensuing violence destabilized the city and surrounding areas and created opportunities for new leaders to emerge amid the chaos.
Around the same time, Mahmoud Bin Rajab, the aforementioned leader of the 52 Brigade, was arrested in Saudi Arabia and later transferred back to Libya, where he was placed under LAAF detention. His absence created a power vacuum that Mohamed Bahrun quickly filled. Bahrun’s rise marked a significant shift in Zawiya’s power structure, as his First Security Division began to exert considerable influence over local armed groups from 2016 onwards. This allowed him to control key security operations and engage in smuggling.
During this period, Bahrun consolidated his power, while a new player Abd al-Rahman Milad (‘al-Bidja’) was appointed as commander of the coast guard. The two actors, leading different security bodies, would go on to have a relationship characterized by rivalry, especially after al-Bidja would become an actor synonymous with migrant smuggling. This appointment signalled the expansion of a lucrative, predatory business exploiting migrants.
With its coastal location, Zawiya appealed to migrants and human traffickers as a launch pad to Europe. Meanwhile, the oil refinery, a coveted asset, became a linchpin for smuggling operations, with armed groups jockeying for control and profits. The heavy securitization of the port led various actors to seek institutional appointments with Ministry of Interior agencies to secure their claims as protectors of the port, thereby legitimizing their control over this critical infrastructure.
The reports of severe human rights abuses in detention centres and the growing number of migrants in the city underscored the close relationship between armed groups and criminal enterprises. This nexus gained international recognition in June 2018, when Ali Ahmed al-Dabbashi, a migrant smuggler from Sabratha, and Khushlaf and al-Bidja in Zawiya were sanctioned by the UN for their roles in human trafficking and smuggling. These sanctions highlighted the extent to which smuggling and trafficking had become integral to the operations of Zawiya’s armed groups.
Resurgence of Zawiyan influence in post-2019 ‘mafia state’
The competition among militias over resources has resulted in a fluid and often volatile security situation in Zawiya itself, as different local actors jostled for control. The offensive launched by the LAAF on Tripoli between 2019 and 2020 introduced new tensions among Zawiya’s actors, with divisions emerging among local actors in relation to the LAAF.
Following the failure of the LAAF to capture Tripoli, an internationally convened political process appointed the Government of National Unity (GNU) in March 2021. However, the failure of the GNU to hold elections in December 2021 saw divisions re-emerge. A rival Government of National Stability (GNS) was formed in March 2022. Zawiyan groups were crucial in the negotiations to form the GNS. The Buzriba brothers’ positions in this rival authority demonstrate this key contribution: Essam served as the minister of interior of the GNS, Hassan led the Stabilization Security Apparatus West – a major armed group – and Ali served as a prominent politician within the House of Representatives and was also a notable social figure. The Buzribas’ positions provided them with significant influence in Zawiya’s political and security landscape.
Zawiya’s armed groups’ relationships with the Libyan state are marked by their integration into national security frameworks. Many of these groups are officially affiliated with the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Defence of the GNU or GNS, providing them with a semblance of legitimacy while allowing them to operate autonomously.
Despite Zawiya’s substantial fishing industry and being the home of Libya’s largest oil refinery and power station, the city’s licit economy is constrained by ongoing internal conflicts and a decline in opportunities for legitimate income, which have resulted in factory closures and an increased dependence on imports. Since 2011, the city’s economy has been volatile due to a combination of conflict and political dynamics that have disrupted supply chains and reduced the availability of goods and services.
Compounding the country’s financial situation, families face rising food prices without the funds to meet those increases. Between 2019 and 2022, Zawiya’s minimum expenditure basket (MEB) went through several fluctuations (see Figure 22). In one instance, the MEB rose over 13 per cent in a five-month period from LYD 745 ($152.42 approximately) in March 2019 to LYD 845.23 ($172.83 approximately) in July 2019. The MEB returned to previous levels after this period, likely pointing to a brief disruption caused during the Haftar offensive to take Tripoli in early 2019. Respondents to an XCEPT-commissioned survey noted that significant price rises in the city had accompanied previous wars and conflicts during the past 10 years. Once again, the shift towards the black market is very pronounced in Zawiya; 88 per cent of respondents to the survey in the city said that they had not used the black market to purchase items in 2010, but by 2020 more than half (52 per cent) had bought something from the black market in the last year.
