Systems analysis of the development of migrant smuggling and TIP in Libya reveals three broad phases, illustrating how international intervention has led to de facto regulation of migrant smuggling practices.
The Kufra, Sebha and Zawiya systems analyses presented in this paper highlight more similarities between these locations than differences. The individual systems analysis of each site has revealed two interconnected feedback loops. The first is a dispute over authority in each location, which spurs competition that leads to violent conflict. In turn, this violent conflict further aggravates the dispute over authority. The second is grounded in economics: the structure of the economies in the three locations is reliant on informal and illicit cross-border trade and the movement of people. As state support has diminished and the informal and illicit sectors have expanded, reliance upon the latter to support wider economic activity has grown. In this context, migrant smuggling and TIP are not perceived negatively and serve as a significant source of revenue, especially in a context where state support is in decline. These two feedback loops have contributed to entrenchment of armed groups that fight over authority and over control of economic activity, feeding a pervasive conflict economy. Consequently, the current context continues to frustrate hopes to establish unified and accountable governance in Libya.
This chapter distils the dynamics observed across the three case study locations into a national-level systems analysis. Given the multifaceted nature of social systems and the practices in question, this overarching systems analysis has been simplified as far as practicably possible. The purpose of the national-level analysis, which divides the development of the migration sector into three broad groups, is to identify entry points for policy interventions that can mitigate the harms caused by migrant smuggling and TIP.
Phase one: Expansion amid the development of Libya’s war economy 2011–17
Figure 24 identifies six causal loops that, together, shaped the dramatic expansion of migrant smuggling and TIP practices in the post-2011 period. As this paper has shown, bouts of violent conflict in Libya are representative of a struggle for power among a wide range of social groups. As loops 1 and 2 in Figure 24 illustrate, disputes over legitimacy, both local and national, control of territory, and the system of governance remain unresolved.
At the national level, this has led to governance actors seeking to sustain local alliances through patron–client relationships – such as the LAAF with the armed faction Subul al-Salam in Kufra, or the Government of National Unity with Mohamed Bahrun’s forces in Zawiya – rather than through the delivery of public goods (loop 1). The ongoing disputes over legitimacy have created cyclical relationships whereby patronage networks are sustained at the cost of strengthening formal state institutions. This is mirrored at the local level (loop 2) where disputes are ongoing over who has the right to govern the area – as witnessed in Kufra, Sebha and Zawiya – leading to a fragmentation of legitimate authority and a relative decline of law and order. Again, this is seen to be a cyclical relationship that inhibits state building at the local level. These two loops have led to the fragmentation of security actors in Libya.
Following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime’s security apparatus in 2011, the Libyan security sector became a site of open competition, with local groups – based on kinship and locality – developing their own armed factions (loop 3). While the role of armed groups is much criticized, local communities continue to see the existence of their own armed groups as necessary for protection. The character of these groups varies significantly by location, with some resembling little more than organized criminal factions – as is the case in Zawiya – while others have developed into more professionalized forces and continue to play a significant role in providing security services. Other groups share characteristics with both ends of this spectrum, Subul al-Salam in Kufra is a good example of this.
