Policymakers must move beyond securitized strategies and develop a comprehensive ‘whole of route’ approach to tackle migrant smuggling and TIP.
This paper has utilized systems analysis to explore the development of migrant smuggling and TIP through the lens of conflict, seeking to understand how smuggling activity connects to national-level and cross-border trends. Viewing the development of migrant smuggling and TIP in this way generates three principal takeaways for Western policymakers with the potential to mitigate the factors that have facilitated the rise of these practices.
Law enforcement and border externalization have limited impact. There is a need for a ‘whole of route’ approach
Western policy towards migrant smuggling and TIP via Libya has been driven almost exclusively by a desire to reduce flows of irregular migration to European shores. But this has also created a political reality that prioritizes stopping arrivals at all costs. There are strong domestic political incentives in European states for such a position, as public support for a reduction of immigration is popular, especially in states where arrivals are concentrated. In this context, the focus on criminality and an emphasis on law enforcement is something that is easy to communicate to European electorates.
A dominant framework of border externalization has emerged, whereby European countries seek to enhance border controls in transit states. This has led to a series of efforts to control borders over vast territories that have never before had strict boundaries and that have historically been connected through transnational trading routes and communities – which traverse modern state borders. Moreover, a series of agreements have been made with states – including Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Lebanon and Libya – that prioritized the political imperative of immediately reducing flows through transactional arrangements in a form of ‘refugee rentierism’. These policies have also incentivized transactionalism. There is a reason that a new route for crossing the Mediterranean emerged in Libya’s east in recent years: those actors in control of the area knew that they would be able to extract financial, political and economic concessions from European leaders if they leveraged their ability to facilitate a spike in arrivals in Europe. Such an approach is not new, as evidenced by the fact that Gaddafi warned in 2010 that Europe would ‘turn black’ unless the EU provided funding to Libya.
These deals have come under attack by rights groups and advocates. But, just as importantly, such agreements have been shown to be of limited effectiveness.
This paper has illustrated the flaws in the approach adopted in Libya. Enforcement on the Libyan coast has been limited and underwritten by an expansion of ‘abuse-for-profit’ practices in places like Zawiya. Meanwhile, smuggling and trafficking continues nearly unabated in Sebha and Kufra. In this context, EU migration and border externalization policies have become tools of ‘migration proxy warfare’ whereby external states have delegated migration management to armed groups affiliated to the Libyan state. As this paper has shown, these practices have expanded Libya’s conflict economy instead of restraining it.
More effective policy must be based on the realization that Libya’s migrant smuggling and TIP activities are intricately connected to wider transnational dynamics. Policy responses must therefore account for these transnational aspects. Conflict and subsequent instability in Libya have created a fertile environment for migrant smuggling and TIP activities to develop, in turn leading to the growth of smuggling in other locations along an established route. This has led to an increase in the number of migrants entering Libya and the expansion of Libya’s conflict economy. To date, international approaches have sought to isolate choke points along these routes, as illustrated in the targeted interventions in Niger and on the Mediterranean.
A more effective policy approach would be to assess migrant smuggling and TIP activities from the point of origin, via transit locations, to their destination. Such an approach allows for the examination of interconnections between these locations and the identification of entry points for policy. This paper is part of a series of systems analyses of migrant smuggling and TIP (the other papers focus on Niger and Nigeria) that have identified distinct dynamics in each location, which need to be addressed through tailored policy tools. For instance, programmatic interventions aimed at local development in Edo State in Nigeria could make people less likely to become vulnerable to migrant smuggling, thereby reducing the source of those most likely to become victims of Libya’s conflict economy.
While this is a resource-intensive task, given the importance that European governments have placed upon countering irregular migration, such an approach could represent a sensible investment, especially when considering the significant cost of addressing the migration issue further down the chain. In 2023, the EU laid out its intent to develop a ‘whole-of-route’ approach to tackle issues relating to irregular migration, but this does not extend beyond policy tools directly associated with combating smuggling and trafficking and the rescue and return of migrants. A truly ‘whole-of-route’ approach would need to be broader to be effective. Specifically, it must contain a wider suite of policy tools than simply enforcement, including sustainable local development and peacebuilding efforts to reduce demand and the perceived need for migrants to move. These have the potential to tackle the enabling environment in which criminal groups operate. As it stands, current approaches run the risk of temporarily disrupting smuggling journeys, with migrants bearing the brunt of these policies, only to be reintroduced to the conflict chain and associated economies at a later point.
There is a need to focus on conflict reduction and align policy objectives in Libya
Looking at the range of issues that influence migrant smuggling and TIP through systems analysis in Libya reveals that a more sustained focus on conflict reduction could provide the key to more sustainable policy outcomes in the medium and long term. At present, however, European states’ foreign policy tools designed to reduce flows of irregular migration are often at odds with policies to support transitions to peace and accountable governance.
Systems analysis shows that attempts to counter irregular migration have, in fact, contributed towards entrenching conflict dynamics in Libya. An example of this is Zawiya’s former coast guard commander and head of the naval academy, Abd al-Rahman Milad (al-Bidja), who, despite his role in migration control, was deeply involved in smuggling and trafficking activities, before his recent assassination. His agency received EU capacity-building support, including logistical aid and coordination for border control. This dual role, as both a state-backed migration official and a criminal actor, exacerbated competition with other factions in Zawiya, leading to violent clashes over territory and resources, destabilizing the city and causing casualties.
The expansion of state-affiliated armed networks is one of the greatest impediments to reaching a political settlement in Libya. Ultimately, policies that empower these actors and shield them from accountability – as European support has done – leads to the undermining of state-building efforts. In this sense, European policies formed to counter migration are, at best, poorly aligned with stated political objectives to achieve accountable and sustainable governance.
Reducing conflict and supporting a transition to more accountable governance will enable the creation of an environment with stronger state institutions that can boost meaningful efforts at law enforcement and economic development. The challenge therefore is to explore how European policymakers can harmonize their approaches towards conflict resolution and stabilization with their attempts to reduce irregular migration. A start here would be to accept that credible reports of human rights violations should result in a halt to provision of funding to the perpetrators’ armed factions. Moreover, European policymakers should seek to support the development of initiatives that establish codes of conduct for armed actors in Libya and support the development of central law enforcement to push back against the culture of impunity that has prevailed. Such initiatives would boost UN-mediated conflict resolution efforts, which could also be significantly expanded with European support.
Outside of direct engagement with armed actors, indirect efforts to mitigate conflict dynamics, such as reform of national funding mechanisms could have a major impact. Strong economic incentives remain for participation in migrant smuggling and trafficking. Sebha, Kufra and Zawiya have each benefited from the revenues generated by migrant smuggling and TIP. In particular, Sebha and Kufra, as key trans-Sahelian transit points, have long relied on cross-border trade, especially following the deterioration of the Libyan economy under international sanctions from the 1990s onwards.
This is a conundrum that is very difficult to solve, requiring long-term strategic economic development and diversification rather than sudden influxes of cash. The reliance on armed factions and revenues generated from the illicit sectors in Kufra, Sebha and Zawiya since 2011 have exacerbated conflict dynamics. To tackle this, solutions must be found to mobilize state funds for the re-development of local economies to support broader forms of economic activity – in particular away from oil and gas – across different sectors, including agriculture, renewable energy, investments in small businesses and human capital. In practical terms, this requires the political will of international policymakers and their Libyan counterparts to support reform of the funding mechanisms of the Libyan state, potentially through decentralization.
With greater support from national government, it is possible to generate leverage over local actors to reduce their engagement in the illicit sector. Conditioning the distribution of local development spending upon a requirement for reasonable attempts to reduce migrant smuggling and TIP is more likely to be accepted by the local population as it is providing a credible alternative to the citizens of Kufra, Sebha and Zawiya that does not currently exist. These efforts by no means present a silver bullet, but they do offer a means of placing conditions that enhance accountability and transparency in the spending of public funds – previous EU funds had no clear or enforceable conditions.
Address local concerns and perceptions in policy responses
There is also a crucial need to consider the societal views of migration when developing policies and programming aimed at addressing smuggling and human trafficking in conflict-affected states. Local perceptions of migration deeply influence the effectiveness of interventions. In some cases, anti-migration sentiments further embolden armed actors and traffickers and enable them to operate with impunity. Ignoring these views can undermine even the best-intentioned policies, especially as local communities increasingly feel European policies are more concerned with Europe’s interests than they are with Libya’s stability and security. The sentiment on the ground is that Libyans come third to European interests and migrant protection.
In this context, policy and programming must be grounded in an understanding of societal attitudes in order to succeed. International policymakers should seek to engage more deeply with communities to develop ‘everyday peace indicators’ to understand what peace means for the local population and how these indicators interact with migration in their cities. Migration control policies that fail to address local perceptions risk reinforcing negative stereotypes about migrants. Furthermore, they may inadvertently legitimize smuggling networks that are percieved locally as migration control agencies or service providers that assist migrants in their journey to Europe. Therefore, a key policy recommendation is to include community engagement and awareness campaigns as part of broader anti-trafficking and migration strategies. These campaigns should be designed to fit Libya’s unique context and aim to challenge how locals understand migration, emphasizing the rights and vulnerabilities of migrants and countering the perception of smuggling as a service.
This paper illustrates the primacy of local conflict contexts over national conflict dynamics. The prevailing international approach has sought to reach an accommodation among Libyan elites for a national settlement but has generally placed less emphasis on supporting local peacebuilding efforts. These include community-driven peace dialogues and projects designed to promote collaboration and reconciliation across gender, political, ethnic and generational divides. A sustainable and equitable accommodation must be agreed between the communities in each of the three case study areas in order to ensure local stability. To assist this, international support should seek to first understand local definitions of, and existing structures for, peace and power-sharing, and then mediate between the communities over the structure of local governance to reduce the role of security actors in economic activity. This may come in the form of support for projects that encourage rival groups to work together and boost fair representation. In addition, this approach could focus on key areas like new economic programmes (that are not reliant on the illicit sector), joint education and improved access to better services. This support could also focus on cooperation with ministries, municipal councils, civil society and private sector entities to design inclusive urban planning, as the physical segregation of communities in Kufra and Sebha remains an ongoing problem, as is the lack of opportunities for the communities to interact.
