Policymakers seeking peace in Sudan must engage with how the region shapes the conflict. A robust international coalition is needed to advance regional solutions for ending the war, including factoring in gold as a vehicle for power in Sudan and beyond.
Understanding the relevance of the regional conflict ecosystem for effective policy
This paper argues that gold is a major driver of the war in Sudan and will continue to shape the evolution of the conflict. The multi-billion-dollar sector provides the most significant source of income for the SAF and the RSF, and it feeds an associated cross-border network of actors including other armed groups, producers, traders, smugglers and external governments. The political, military, economic, social and ideological linkages in this transnational conflict supply chain are frequently contested and in flux, which consequently fuels the war.
The Gulf states, notably the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as other regional powers such as Egypt, have had a significant influence on Sudan’s conflict in pursuit of their own interests. Sudan’s porous borders with neighbouring countries including Chad, Libya and South Sudan, have also further enabled war efforts through the smuggling of gold and the import of materials necessary to support both mining and continued fighting. Sudan’s gold sector links the country to distant geographies as part of a regional conflict ecosystem, in which authority and violence are not confined to nation-state borders. Such economic processes not only connect Sudan to its region, but they facilitate the supply chains that fuel and sustain the conflict.
This has three key implications for policymaking and development programming. First, Sudan’s gold sector and its intersecting networks – of military, economic and political authority – extend their influence beyond the nation-state. As a result, policy or programming responses cannot be merely country-specific, because the boundaries of the conflict are not. Policy solutions that are only focused on Sudan will struggle to navigate the broader ecosystem in which the conflict operates. Targeting only one part of this ecosystem, for instance by sanctioning a specific company trading in conflict gold, or a high-level individual from the SAF or RSF, will not fundamentally reform the supply chain, or the transnational ecosystem that gold traverses.
Understanding the conflict in Sudan as a product of overlapping and competing ‘outside-in’ and ‘inside-out’ dynamics and networks can improve policy and programming approaches, through mapping the regional conflict ecosystem to better guide interventions. Policymakers seeking to shape sustainable solutions to the war must factor in and navigate both the transnational actors who have a stake in the conflict and their varied interests.
Second, power is diffused across state and society, and this challenges the idea that there is a clear divide between state and non-state actors and institutions. Many elites with authority over the gold supply chain are not state actors, can operate at both state and non-state levels, and do not operate exclusively within the confines of national borders. In many cases, the facilitators of the trade are not the ultimate decision-makers. The breakdown of Sudan’s formal economy and state institutions, along with the fragmentation of territorial control in the country and increasing civilian militarization, indicates that the conflict ecosystem increasingly consists of multiple evolving subnational theatres – with intersecting networks of military, economic and political authority – which have connections across borders. Therefore, there is a need for policymakers to focus not only on those who claim to be state actors, but also on engaging with those at the subnational levels who are performing the conventional role of the state.
Third, the levers of economic power and authority – which contributed to the outbreak of Sudan’s war – are vital for engaging the warring parties and convincing them to engage in a sustainable ceasefire and political process. With contested regime transitions in dominant states including Sudan and Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa region is experiencing the most significant political change since the end of the Cold War. These changes are happening in parallel with wider shifts in the state systems of the Middle East, which are increasing inter-dependencies between Africa and the Middle East, in particular Egypt and the Gulf states.
Economic levers are also crucial for Gulf actors that are seeking to increase their influence, as well as neighbouring states – Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia and South Sudan – which are also seeking to assert their interests. Even a war as destructive as the current one in Sudan, will likely eventually produce a new political settlement. Any lasting settlement that engages with Sudan’s regional conflict ecosystem must consider the economic realities and incentives around Sudan’s conflict gold and other strategic commodities, ensuring that they contribute towards post-war reconstruction and economic resilience, as well as facilitating cross-border and regional interests.
Measures to control Sudan’s conflict gold
Gold is perhaps the most important contemporary vector for economic power and authority in Sudan and its region. It is also a significant contributor to the UAE’s post-carbon economic and security future. The UAE, and specifically Dubai, is one of the main global hubs for the gold trade, and the economic dependency of Sudanese conflict and civilian actors on gold exports and Emirati financial channels emphasizes the importance of this supply chain in sustaining Sudan’s civil war. Additionally, the UAE is also the key actor with agency to influence RSF decision-making and is closely aligned with its economic networks. Egypt is also an important destination for Sudanese gold, with the SAF, which controls the largest gold-producing areas, diverting the commodity through its northern neighbour and smuggling increasing since the war began. Through its economic linkages and substantial political and military backing Egypt has the potential to exercise significant leverage over SAF decision-making.
As such, tougher action is possible by the US, UK and EU and other international partners and institutions, such as the African Union and the UN, which could target the illicit gold trade and establish greater consequences and deterrents for the UAE and other states involved in propagating Sudan’s conflict gold. Sanctions provide one option, which are often used as a tool to discourage conflict actors. However, as has been visible in relation to Sudan, without a coordinated political strategy, individual sanctions by themselves will not produce change. The warring parties’ economic networks are already the subject of sanctions, with the US, the UK and the EU targeting firms that buy and sell conflict gold from Sudan – including those linked to the SAF and RSF. Targeted sanctions can be effective in disrupting the shifting network of companies and individuals involved in smuggling gold from Sudan, but sanctions and prosecutions are tools of disruption, not of systemic change. They impact individuals and companies for a time, but those affected can adapt, as well as circumvent sanctions because they operate across borders.
Collective sanctioning of high-level individuals, refineries and the companies involved in the smuggling and laundering of conflict gold, including through major hubs such as Dubai, could make a difference, if the necessary political appetite can be mustered. Specifically, the G7 and G20 countries could adopt targeted sanctions like the US Global Magnitsky Sanctions programme – targeting military and government officials, armed group leaders, and other individuals and companies involved in smuggling and laundering Sudanese conflict gold. However, the necessary political will for such action has been undermined by the rapidly shifting global political climate in 2025, resulting in growing divisions between the US and G7 members in Europe and Canada, which holds the presidency of the group in 2025.
The UAE has demonstrated some will to bring its standards into alignment with international best practices. The US, UK and the EU (which already cooperate with the UAE) could intensify dialogue in areas such as international governance and standards setting and encourage the UAE’s involvement in frameworks that seek to close the regulatory and enforcement loopholes that allow the trade in conflict gold. There is also a need to strengthen policies and enforcement towards midstream and downstream entities in Dubai. High risk or even outright illegal ASGM material could not move the way it does without a system in the gold supply chain to support it. Change would require consolidators, refineries, and the jewellery, banking and technology sectors to willingly and fundamentally change the way they source gold through the supply chain. Ultimately, that would require cooperation with the UAE government and closure of the regulatory and enforcement loopholes that allow for trade in conflict gold, including better oversight for cash and barter transactions for gold, which take place in Dubai’s gold souks (marketplaces). Such a process would require all gold refiners in the UAE to undergo an independent third-party audit – in line with OECD and other international frameworks.
Finally, policymakers should be mindful that within Sudan’s war economy, the production and trade of gold remains a vital lifeline for millions of Sudanese citizens who have little alternative livelihood opportunities. It also provides the currency required to bring in commodities to the country during a period of prolonged war. ASGM is often seen as an activity to be eradicated through its formalization and mechanization. The priority should be to implement policies that empower communities engaged in ASGM and enhance their resilience. This can be achieved primarily by promoting and subsidizing the adoption of safe extraction techniques that eliminate the severe long-term health risks associated with mercury and cyanide use, as well as mitigating the large-scale environmental damage caused by these substances.
In a post-conflict, reform-oriented Sudan, authorities should adopt the Code of Risk mitigation for Artisanal and small-scale miners engaging in Formal Trade (CRAFT Code) to improve working conditions in the ASGM sector and facilitate partnerships for refining conflict-free gold. Accredited refiners, such as those meeting the standards of the London Bullion Market Association, should establish responsible sourcing partnerships with Sudanese ASGM miners. Additionally, multinational enterprises sourcing gold from Sudan, directly or indirectly, must adhere to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas to ensure ethical practices.
To further reinforce these reforms, Sudan should work with regional partners towards establishing legal and licit trade channels through neighbouring countries, particularly Egypt and the UAE, to curb smuggling and support the growth of conflict-free gold markets. The UAE government, in particular, must address gaps in its anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing frameworks, including improving access to beneficial ownership information and addressing weaknesses in its oversight of foreign crime proceeds. Regulatory loopholes enabling the trade of conflict and high-risk gold, including gold from Sudan, should be closed by implementing internationally recognized best standards and practices.
At the same time, due diligence requirements must be carefully balanced to avoid marginalizing civilians working in the gold sector. Overly restrictive measures could inadvertently drive these communities further into illicit activities, deepening their vulnerabilities. A nuanced approach is essential to achieve both ethical supply chains and sustainable livelihoods for ASGM miners.
Towards a regional solution
Understanding Sudan’s war as part of a complex regional ecosystem, while essential, does not necessarily signpost a simple path to its resolution. And coercive or regulatory approaches, though important, are unlikely to bring peace while the major regional players – notably Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia – remain in competition, both for resources and influence. The war in Sudan is a stark example of how external actors can simultaneously be allies and adversaries, depending on the issue. Broader regional relations, alignments and contestations in the Middle East, such as the UAE’s substantial investments in the Egyptian economy, or its growing regional contestation with Saudi Arabia, are critical when seeking to understand regional countries’ interests and how they impact on Sudan’s war. Despite being allies, Egypt and the UAE have broadly supported opposing sides in Sudan, and also diverge on other regional issues, notably Ethiopia and its interest in securing ‘access to the Red Sea’ via a naval port on the Somaliland coast. As such, Egypt has sought to balance its dependence on the UAE by seeking greater partnership and investment from Saudi Arabia. Such regional complexities pose a challenge to US, UK or EU policies and complicate efforts to respond to the conflict in Sudan.
The involvement of Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia in mediation efforts remains crucial to reaching a sustainable ceasefire and ensuring a viable political process. But this will require an accommodation to be found that allows each country to compromise on some of their existing interests. Convincing the UAE that its strategic, economic and reputational interests are better served through the pursuit of peace will be key to sustainable change in the regional conflict ecosystem. Furthermore, it is crucial to persuade Egypt that long-term influence in Sudan will best be secured by encouraging an even-handed political settlement rather than seeking to return General Burhan and an Islamist-influenced SAF to power.
As allies, Egypt and the UAE should be encouraged to find common ground over their divergent regional policies, particularly as they relate to Sudan. Ultimately, the warring parties’ political, military and economic reliance on Egypt and the UAE puts these external actors in a unique position to persuade the SAF and the RSF to agree a sustainable ceasefire. For example, Egypt is well placed to soften the existing enmity between the SAF and the UAE.
An effective coalition of actors, including the UK, US, Norway, EU and other like-minded partners, such as Canada, is required to engage in a robust process with regional partners – including Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia – on practical steps towards compromise and the reduction of hostilities required to reach a ceasefire.
A high-level UK conference on Sudan, planned for 15 April 2025 (marking the two-year anniversary of the war), could provide an opportune moment to take this forward. However, establishing an international coalition on Sudan has not been straightforward to date. It may realistically have to be done without much support from the US, given the Trump administration’s increasing focus on its own sphere of influence, and a weakening of traditional alliances in the West. The US position on Sudan under Trump remains unclear, but it is unlikely to be elevated in priority, or receive sustained high-level attention. Thus, a new coalition, or ‘minilateral’ agreement, could present an opportunity for other countries to lead, and ensure that any transactional agreements also guarantee the advancement of civilian-centred outcomes.
However, the US’s Sudan policy is likely to be influenced by interests and calculations around wider geopolitics in the Middle East. The Abraham Accords are a notable factor – both the UAE and Sudan are signatories – and the US would like Saudi Arabia to have a similar agreement. This is connected to a resolution of the Gaza conflict and future reconstruction, which the Gulf states and Egypt have an important stake in. Saudi Arabia, already the host of the unsuccessful Jeddah mediation platform, has grown in diplomatic stature given its hosting of the US’s mediation of the Russia–Ukraine conflict in 2025. These factors again reinforce the likely prominence of a regional vision for resolving Sudan’s conflict – which will likely include a stronger role for military actors in shaping Sudan’s future transition.
These regional interests cannot be wished away – Sudan’s neighbours and wider region will remain part of its future, and gold will continue to be a valuable and sought after commodity. But these regional dynamics and contestations can be brought into alignment with a common vision that articulates and underlines the shared benefits that all – especially Sudan’s long-suffering civilians – would gain from sustainable peace in Sudan. It is increasingly clear that the long-term strategic interests of Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Sudan and the broader Horn of Africa and Red Sea regions will not benefit from Sudan’s fragmentation. The most critical task for international diplomacy is to ensure that this long-term vision is not obscured by a short-term scramble for profit or profile.
