To address Iran’s evolving axis and its regional influence effectively, a new approach is needed – one that combines local and transnational efforts, while remaining attuned to the region’s complexities and a transforming global order.
The brief history of the axis of resistance reveals the evolution of organizations that have transcended their origins as armed groups to become political, social and economic actors wielding real public authority in several Middle Eastern countries. Iran and its allies have endured numerous shocks throughout the axis’s existence, including Israeli and US invasions, military strikes, assassinations and sanctions from the US, the UK and the EU. In Lebanon and Iraq, the US, the UK and European governments have even attempted to create alternatives to Iran-affiliated groups as a way of countering their influence, such as by funding and training formal national militaries such as the LAF in Lebanon or by establishing the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) in Iraq.
While these initiatives have occasionally succeeded in degrading and reshaping the axis, they have not fundamentally altered its behaviour. This research paper argues that a key reason for this resilience is the dualism of domestic public authority and transnational connectivity.
This concluding chapter examines the three main US, UK and European policy responses to the axis – namely, military strikes, sanctions and supporting alternative institutions. It argues that these initiatives have failed to meaningfully impact on Iran and its allies, because policymakers in these countries have been unable to navigate the intricate web of local institutions and political practices that connect with the transnational ecosystem, which extends far beyond the more narrow constructs of current Western policy and programming. The chapter then proposes a more realistic, and potentially more effective, alternative approach of mapping, brokering and pursuing accountability.
The limited impact of Western policy responses
Military strikes
The most hard-line approach to eliminating axis members has been direct military action. This includes assassinations of Iranian General Qassim Soleimani and PMF leader Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis by the US, as well as Israeli assassinations of senior members of Hezbollah, such as general secretaries Abbas al-Mousawi in 1992 and Hassan Nasrallah in 2024. The Israeli military campaign after the events of 7 October 2023 is the most aggressive example of this policy, with the Israel Defence Forces targeting Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, while the US and allies also targeted PMF groups in Iraq and Syria and the Houthis in Yemen.
The rationale behind the use of military strikes is that such actions disrupt the leadership of individual axis groups or even severely disrupt the axis as a whole. However, military solutions, including the elimination of leaders (such as the killing of al-Mousawi), have previously failed to dismantle networks that still enjoy domestic and transnational power or to significantly reform the structures through which these groups produce leaders.
Direct military action has proved more effective against armed groups that have weak or non-existent domestic power (for example, an insurgent group like ISIS), or groups that lack transnational connectivity. However, military interventions against Iran and groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis or the PMF have often resulted in only temporary setbacks. In an interview for this paper, a UK policymaker admitted that ‘we know that strikes on the Houthis have not damaged their military capabilities to date.’
Unlike insurgencies like ISIS that can be more easily degraded and disrupted by targeted strikes and local uprisings, Iran and the axis have demonstrated the ability to regroup, rearm and continue their operations. This is because many of them possess connections to social bases, access to domestic and transnational funding sources, and the ability to leverage regional and global networks of support. These networks are diversified and span political, social and economic connections, as demonstrated throughout this paper. Even if high-level and significant parts of the axis are targeted, the axis as a whole has proven its ability to shape-shift and, in some cases, become even more resistant to outside attempts to force reform. Consequently, military strikes alone have proven insufficient in eliminating these entities, underscoring the need for comprehensive approaches that address the underlying political, social and economic factors sustaining them.
Moreover, military attacks have immediate repercussions both in the countries directly affected and for those carrying out the attacks. These effects can range from violent retaliatory attacks and broader targeting of those in civil society perceived to be aligned with the US or Israel, to cutting off avenues for engagement and the general weakening of domestic stakeholders who might seek to limit or hold Iran-aligned groups to account.
Economic sanctions
The axis’s well-developed practice of blending formal and informal economics – including measures such as corruption, smuggling and embezzlement – suggest to some policymakers that legal penalties could be an effective tool against it. However, much of the literature on sanctions questions their efficacy. Numerous leaders and groups within the axis have been designated as terrorist organizations or subject to individual sanctions by the US and other governments. Such measures are intended to be punitive. But to be effective, they must impose significant costs on those targeted. This paper has shown, to the contrary, how easily axis groups and senior members have been able to overcome sanctions through their connections with their respective states and with each other.
Axis groups have adeptly evaded sanctions by collaborating with other leaders or groups domestically and transnationally, and via both formal and informal channels.
Some proponents of targeted sanctions argue that the true aim of these measures is not necessarily the individual but rather the network in which they operate. In this scenario, the personal ambitions of those individuals for power in formal politics, which requires access to international travel and legal financial systems, might compel these members to sever ties with a targeted leader. For instance, sanctions imposed on high-ranking officials in Hezbollah might pressure lower-ranking members to distance themselves to maintain their own political aspirations and access to global systems. However, in many instances, the connections within the network remain unchanged. Despite the sanctions, these individuals continued to operate, finding alternative ways to circumvent the restrictions. For example, Hezbollah long ago mitigated the impact of US financial measures against it by avoiding any direct association with the Lebanese banking sector, and by dealing in cash and intermediaries wherever possible.
The effectiveness of sanctions is often undermined when those imposing them lack sufficient information about the nature of transnational networks or the ability to navigate them. Axis groups have adeptly evaded sanctions by collaborating with other leaders or groups domestically and transnationally, and via both formal and informal channels. It has therefore become increasingly challenging to create effective disincentives or punishments. One sanctioned leader has even boasted about his continued use of a private plane to travel inside Iraq and even elsewhere in the region. Meanwhile, in another example, reports indicated that Iran Air continues to operate flights to several regional destinations, as well as some in Asia, despite being subject to US, UK and EU sanctions. Shortly after EU sanctions were announced on 14 October 2024, Iran Air established a daily route to Istanbul to facilitate travel to Europe and alleviate travellers’ concerns. Another Iranian airline, Mahan Air, regularly flies to China and Russia, despite being under sanction.
In a multi-aligned global order, the efficacy of sanctions is further diminishing. As more states find themselves subject to sanctions, other countries are increasingly reluctant systematically to align with the US and its allies. Instead, many often assist the axis and its supporters in circumventing these measures. For instance, despite extensive sanctions against it following its invasion of Ukraine, Russians are reported to have significantly increased their investments and business activities in Gulf Arab states such as the UAE. Similarly, Iran has strengthened its economic ties with China, which remains its largest energy market, allowing Iran to sustain its oil exports despite international restrictions. These examples highlight how sanctioned states, along with supportive allies, are adept at navigating and mitigating sanctions, thereby diminishing the intended punitive effects. More nuanced and comprehensive strategies are therefore needed to address the underlying political and economic factors that enable resilience.
Sanctions have even, at times, inadvertently bolstered smuggling networks. For example, the smuggling networks that ISIS later commandeered to become ‘the world’s richest terror group’ were originally developed by the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq to circumvent sanctions imposed in the 1990s. These informal economies, shaped by those sanctions, continue to operate across the region today. Similarly, sanctions on countries like Iran and Russia have led to the development of specific, clandestine supply chains, which are likely to persist into the future. These networks and supply chains – born out of those actors’ need to survive – have become deeply entrenched, demonstrating the unintended consequences of sanctions in fostering resilient and adaptive illicit economies.
As this paper has discussed, sanctions also have significant repercussions for ordinary people in the affected countries. These negative impacts are felt by reform-minded political leaders and civil society activists who become perceived as favouring the outside powers imposing sanctions. These individuals face threats of intimidation, potential assassination and dwindling job opportunities, while their families may be subjected to harassment and other forms of social pressure. Given that one of the primary strategies for countering Iran’s axis involves supporting and strengthening alternative state and societal actors, poorly targeted sanctions are likely to fail in deterring or punishing the network. Indeed, they risk provoking a backlash that could further restrict other avenues for reform.
National institutions as alternatives
Another Western policy aimed at establishing a centralized governing command structure that takes authority away from axis members has been the building of competitors or alternative national military institutions. The theory behind this policy asserts that if they are trained and equipped with foreign support, national institutions can both protect the public and diminish the influence and relevance of armed groups outside the formal government. Examples include US support for the CTS in Iraq and for the LAF in Lebanon. The goal of these interventions has been to erode the control of the PMF and Hezbollah within their respective state structures. However, the policy has had limited success to date. It has instead led to the creation of isolated entities that are detached from centres of power or from key brokers in local or transnational networks. These isolated entities have proven incapable of defending themselves against larger challenges.
Several UK advisors suggest that, to the contrary, the LAF example is a successful case of intervention. The UK has been a steadfast supporter of the LAF for more than a decade, providing extensive assistance to bolster Lebanon’s security and stability, particularly along the Lebanon–Syria border. Since 2009, the UK has committed over £106 million to the LAF, funding the training of more than 34,000 personnel and the provision of essential equipment. This support has enabled the deployment of four land-border regiments and the construction of nearly 80 border-observation posts and forward-operation bases. These efforts aimed to reinforce the authority of the Lebanese government along the border with Syria, counter threats from extremists and smugglers, and diminish the authority of Hezbollah and the Assad regime. The election of Joseph Aoun, the former commander of the LAF, as Lebanon’s president in January 2025 indicated that such support could translate into political success.
However, while the project enabled the LAF to combat ISIS and the smuggling operations of other Sunni Muslim groups, it failed to curb the transnational activities of Iran and the axis, as this paper’s section on financial flows has revealed. On either side of the Lebanon–Syria border, Hezbollah and the Assad regime continued their lucrative trade through alternative means. After interviewing dozens of LAF leaders, Simone Tholens concluded that ‘the LAF is largely content with targeting radical Sunni and Palestinian militias, viewing Hezbollah as a complementary military force’. Consequently, the LAF collaborated with Hezbollah to combat mutual threats such as ISIS or other Sunni extremist groups opposed to the Assad regime in Syria, while refraining from confrontation with Iran’s axis partners. In short, the limited success in strengthening the LAF and securing the Lebanese border in fact relied on the axis’s cooperation and alignment of interests against Sunni extremist adversaries.
The fall of the Assad regime in late 2024 can be seen as a counter-argument, suggesting that the regime’s collapse was partly due to sanctions, military strikes and the presence of externally supported alternatives to Assad. Some observers argue that these international measures weakened the regime’s ability to govern, thereby empowering Syrians to overthrow Assad. However, similar sanctions and actions in other contexts – for example, in Iran or Yemen – have failed to yield the same result. What helps to explain Assad’s downfall is the loss of both domestic and transnational authority, which this paper argues is the key to the resilience of these networks.
This paper has argued that the resilience of Iran’s networks and their capacity to withstand external shocks lies in the combination of domestic public authority and transnational connectivity. In the case of Syria, while international measures played a role in weakening the Assad regime, its excessive reliance on violent repression in response to challenges to its domestic authority, coupled with its failure to undertake post-conflict reconstruction, ultimately eroded the regime’s support base both internally and externally. This loss of internal legitimacy better explains why the Syrian military failed to defend the regime when HTS launched its offensive in late 2024. Meanwhile, Assad’s relationship with Iran and the axis was always transactional in nature, rather than ideologically driven. For instance, following the events of 7 October 2023, Assad refrained from joining Iran’s campaign against Israel, opting instead to keep Syria out of the conflict. Partly as a result of this lack of support, Iran deemed that the Assad regime unworthy of significant sacrifice when it came under serious threat. Ultimately, it was the Syrian public, united across the nation, that rose up and dismantled the regime that had endured for over five decades.
A new approach
Academic and policy approaches to date have not fully understood the axis of resistance. As this paper shows, the latter embodies a complex web of state and non-state, formal and informal, and domestic and transnational dynamics.
The policy options outlined above have struggled to dismantle this web or to fundamentally reform the behaviour of the axis, because policymakers lack a clear and coherent strategy that treats Iran and its allies as a complex network operating in a transnational ecosystem and increasingly multi-aligned world. At times, these policies have harmed ordinary citizens more than axis members, who have been able to use a variety of mechanisms to shape-shift and recover.
This paper proposes that a more realistic approach to dealing with the axis should instead be developed, and that it should be informed by three interlinked processes: mapping; brokering; and supporting accountability.
First, policymakers aiming to diminish the negative influence of the axis on its populations, and establish more accountable governments in the countries under its control, must begin by thoroughly and accurately mapping its connections, and understanding their specific mechanisms. Such an approach would provide valuable insights into the network’s boundaries, which often extend across borders into unexpected places. Additionally, mapping the network would reveal its strategies and capabilities in full, enabling Western policymakers to better anticipate the likely reactions to any policy intervention taken across multiple jurisdictions. For instance, network mapping was instrumental in identifying insurgent networks in Iraq. This included identifying key leaders, supply routes and safe houses.
Second, policymakers must engage with Iran and its allies, rather than ignore or seek to contain or sideline them. This approach is especially crucial during periods when Iran is experiencing significant upheaval and is in the process of reconfiguring its networks. As detailed in this paper, axis members are not mere insurgent groups, but actors deeply embedded in the political economy of their country and the region. Neither ignoring the axis, containing it or attempting to foster alternatives have fundamentally altered the power it wields. At a moment when Tehran and its allies are weakened, Western policymakers have an opportunity to leverage Iran’s networks to broker deals focused on mutual economic benefits, regional stability and curbing informal economic activity. Any agreement with Iran should offer graduated sanctions relief in exchange for verifiable limits on nuclear enrichment, and regional military and economic activities.
One example of successful engagement can be seen in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015. This agreement between Iran and the P5+1 countries (China, France, Russia, the US and the UK, plus Germany) demonstrated the effectiveness of diplomatic engagement over isolation. By engaging directly with Iran and its allies, the JCPOA successfully curtailed Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. This approach not only addressed the immediate nuclear threat, but opened channels for further diplomatic dialogue and cooperation. Although the deal faced challenges and was later abandoned by the Trump administration in 2018, it remains a significant example of how engagement can yield positive outcomes.
A crucial part of any strategy for engagement must involve engaging with brokers who can effectively represent and influence axis decision-makers. In a multi-aligned context, there are individuals who maintain strong ties to both Western countries and senior decision-makers in Iran. This dual access enables them to facilitate communication, negotiate agreements and provide insights, making them indispensable in shaping and implementing effective policy strategies.
Iraq’s national security advisor, Qassim al-Araji, is a good example of such an individual. Having emerged from the Iranian-allied Badr Organization and the PMF, al-Araji has, in recent years, cultivated relationships with the US, the UK, NATO and Gulf Arab countries, while maintaining ties with Iran and its allies. Individuals like this exist in each of the countries where the axis operates. By creating sufficient incentives, such brokers can be encouraged to support reform within the axis, while trying to push back against its capacity to resist or disrupt.
Political settlements should develop robust accountability mechanisms to mitigate negative impacts on populations. The role of external actors in supporting local reform networks must be carefully considered to avoid undermining their legitimacy. It is crucial for these networks to develop organically, with local participants identifying their own needs and strategies. While targeted and discreet external support can be beneficial, overt or controlling interventions risk portraying reformers as proxies for foreign powers, which could erode public trust and support. Safely and indirectly supporting civil society, independent journalists and reformists where these networks have operated can provide better checks on their domestic power in each country than a sole reliance on punitive sanctions. Policy interventions should aim to develop robust accountability mechanisms to mitigate the negative impacts of these networks on their populations, who have, at various times, attempted to call for reform – such as protests in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen or Iran. The axis may not be disrupted immediately, but as the fall of the Assad regime shows, they remain vulnerable to the demands of their social base.
Strengthening the connective tissues between civil society and government reformists provides Western policymakers with a strategy to check the axis’s power while bolstering the position of the local population. For instance, in 2022 Iraqi teenager Haider al-Zaidi was sentenced to three years in prison for a social media post criticizing Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis, the former PMF leader. But a pressure campaign from civil society, including journalists and social media influencers, along with efforts from reform-minded government officials, led the PMF to withdrawing its case. Al-Zaidi’s sentence was then overturned and he was freed. This case demonstrates how accountability mechanisms, supported by a network of civil society, lawyers and reformists, can hold powerful groups like the PMF to account and push back against repression.
To more effectively drive accountability, it must also be addressed at the transnational level, mirroring the regional connectivity of Iran’s axis. Tackling accountability issues in one part of a system can have significant ripple effects throughout the entire network. For example, curbing corruption within a government sector can enhance public trust and attract foreign investment, thereby boosting the formal economy and improving overall governance, which reduces the space for the informal economies outlined in this paper. The Syrian people’s push to end the Assad regime was, in essence, a demand for accountability that has had cascading effects on the axis’s economic networks, forcing them to reconfigure. This approach ensures that initiatives to promote transparency and justice transcend national borders, creating a ripple effect that extends to other regions where Iran and its axis compete for domestic and transnational economic power.
