The China–US relationship is often regarded as the defining geopolitical relationship of the 21st century. However, the relationship between China and India arguably holds greater long-term significance, as these two self-perceived ‘civilization-states’ compete for influence and leadership in a world of relative US decline.
There is a tendency in the West to view the Sino-Indian relationship largely through the narrow prism of the unresolved territorial dispute between the two countries. Yet this narrow view fails to capture the geopolitical weight of the relations between the world’s most populous countries (which together account for almost 40 per cent of the world’s population). China and India are the world’s second and fifth largest economies, respectively, with India on course to become the third largest by the end of this decade. Together, China and India are projected to account for approximately one-third of global GDP by 2050. They also have the world’s largest militaries – both are nuclear weapons states and have the largest numbers of active-duty military personnel, although China’s defence budget and military capabilities are much larger than India’s.
Xi and Modi acknowledged the strategic significance of the bilateral relationship during their October 2024 meeting. The read-out from the Indian side was that ‘stable, predictable and amicable relations between India and China, as two neighbours and the two largest nations on Earth, will have a positive impact on regional and global peace and prosperity’. The Chinese side echoed these views, adding that as:
The structural challenges facing the bilateral relationship – rooted in their power imbalance and mutual mistrust – will not be easily overcome. The inherent asymmetry of the relationship is a particular barrier, with New Delhi resentful of Beijing’s refusal to judge it as a peer and an equal, as is China’s tendency to be dismissive of Indian regional and global ambitions and its long-standing view of India as pawn of the West. Recurring border standoffs and skirmishes indicate that a lasting rapprochement between the countries is unlikely in the near term. But the 2024 border agreement also indicates that an imminent large-scale conflict is also unlikely (assuming neither country crosses the other’s red lines on issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity).
Evidence is growing that their bilateral relationship will nonetheless have global ramifications as both countries engage, compete and – on occasion – confront each other in global forums and on issues of global governance. Both countries maintain common ambitions to be a voice of the Global South and an independent pole of influence in an emerging multipolar global order. But they seek to do so from different vantage points. India seeks to leverage its democratic credentials and offer a more benign, non-western (not an anti-Western) worldview. This contrasts with China, which seeks to utilize its enormous financial resources to shape the existing global governance system according to its own preferences. Beijing’s introduction of its three global initiatives – on global development, security and civilization – is seen as adding justification to its ambitions to lead global governance reform.
The emergence of a multipolar global order will require the West to acknowledge both countries’ worldviews. To do so effectively, it will need to develop a better understanding of the intertwining dynamics of the China–India relationship.
If the West is serious about seeing India emerge as a bulwark against a rising China, it must take a more realistic view of what is achievable and what is not. The West can do more to support India to reduce its economic dependence on China, notably in areas of critical and emerging technologies. But at the same time, Western policymakers must also recognize the significance of India’s commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy. That stance, which entails New Delhi maintaining ties to countries with which the West has difficult relations, will necessarily limit how deeply India can be embedded in Western technology architecture – and how closely it will align with the West on issues of global governance.
