As the West engages Beijing and New Delhi, it needs to develop a better understanding of their relationship and its implications for both countries. Western policymakers do not generally frame their China policies through the prism of their relationship with New Delhi, but the West’s India policies are driven in large part by the former’s relationship with Beijing. The US in particular needs to recognize the nature and nuances of the Sino-Indian relationship in order to develop more realistic expectations of India in the context of Washington’s own strategic competition with China. One of the key pillars of the India–US relationship is the US perception of India as a bulwark against the rise of China. This narrative has strengthened as both New Delhi and Washington have experienced a downturn in their relations with Beijing. As India–US relations have deepened, both countries have voiced common concerns about China’s behaviour. On its part, India has become more willing to call out acts of Chinese assertiveness, from the South China Sea to the Taiwan Strait.
India has also become less apprehensive about participating in US-led regional and global initiatives that New Delhi previously perceived as potentially offensive to Beijing. For instance, following the 2020 border clashes, New Delhi reinvigorated its engagement with the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US), with the first leader-level summit held in 2021. India has also stepped up its participation in bilateral and multilateral initiatives led by the US, from the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (renamed the TRUST Initiative by the Trump administration) to the Mineral Security Partnership and the Artemis Accords.
However, a potential challenge for the India–US relationship may emerge from India’s economic dependence on China as the former continues to develop its prominence in global supply chains. In August 2023, for example, it was reported that the US Customs and Border Protection Agency had impounded Indian-made solar panels, worth more than $40 million, on the grounds that the goods contravened the US’s Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. New Delhi has incentivized the domestic production of solar panels through its Production-Linked Incentive scheme with the aim of facilitating self-sufficiency. However, Indian companies continue to rely on Chinese suppliers for key components and raw materials, including photovoltaic cells and polysilicon. Short of negotiating sector-specific exemptions, this dependence on China will become a growing point of friction in the India–US relationship. It also has broader strategic implications. If China has leverage over core areas of India’s long-term economic strategy, that will limit New Delhi’s willingness and capacity to align with Washington during periods of Sino-US hostility.
Trump’s second term will open up more space for China and India in the international system, but it will also likely fuel their rivalry as they compete for control of that space.
Another dimension affecting the India–US relationship is India’s long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy. This makes New Delhi reluctant to be part of any US-led initiative that resembles a military alliance. The effect is to create ambiguity over the role that India would play in a potential China–US conflict – over Taiwan, for example. Beijing has sought to encourage India’s strategic autonomy. As one Chinese scholar notes, ‘if the EU and India can uphold their respective autonomy, they will play a bigger role in international affairs, and the world will be highly likely to transfer into a multipolar reality, as a result’. Members of India’s strategic elite – particularly those on the far left – also continue to hold views that China and India should be partners rather than rivals. While these tend to be fringe views, the vagaries of Indian coalition politics make it possible for such voices to gain ground over time.
Exacerbating these fault lines in the India–US relationship is an underlying mistrust of the US among Indian foreign policy elites. Tensions between India and the West have continued to flare up, notably linked to concerns about the state of Indian democracy, allegations of ‘crony capitalism’ and alleged Indian complicity in assassination plots against political opponents living in Western countries. In India, such tensions have prompted claims that the West is seeking to ‘keep India down’. According to a former Indian foreign policy official, the ‘existential threat to India will come from the West, not from China’. A scholar of China–India ties noted how ‘vested interests in the West’ were keen to keep ‘China–India tensions boiling’. Another former official judged that India’s difficult relations with the West had been a factor in the de-escalation of tensions with China – noting that the ‘current state of India’s relations with the US has been a catalyst for resolving the border dispute with China’.
Given this context, the likelihood of strategic misperception in the India–US relationship could grow. For instance, limited overtures by both New Delhi and Washington towards China could trigger concerns of strategic abandonment in both capitals – New Delhi would fear a return of a Great Power condominium between the US and China, while Washington would dislike the emergence of an ‘Asia for Asians’ concept that has been proposed by Beijing.
