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Indian views of China |
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Chinese views of India |
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Pew Research Center (2023) | Percentage of Indians who hold an unfavourable view of China | 67% of Indians vs median average of 33% among other middle-income countries |
India Today ‘Mood of the Nation’ (2020) | Can China be trusted? | No (84%) |
Are you in favour of boycotting Chinese products in India? | Yes (90%) |
Observer Research Foundation Foreign Policy Survey (2023) | India’s trust in China has severely depleted following Galwan clashes in 2020 | Agree (80%) |
China uses its influence in multilateral institutions to restrict India from promoting its interests | Agree (79%) |
India and China should boost their economic engagement | Agree (58%) |
Global Times survey (2024) | In what areas do you most hope that India and China will cooperate in the future? | - Industry/manufacturing – China (31%) vs India (24%)
- Internet and digital economy – China (21%) vs India (16%)
- Climate change/environmental protection – China (21%) vs India (16%)
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Tsinghua University (2024) | How influential India is in world politics? | - 1.8% – Very influential
- 13.9% – Substantively influential
- 40.9% – Indifference/neutral
- 30.7% – Less influential
- 12.7% – Irrelevant
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Sources: Huang, Fagan and Gubbala (2023), Views of India Lean Positive Across 23 Countries; India Today (2020), ‘Mood of the Nation: China’; Pant, Shivamurthy, Shekhawat and Deo (2024), The ORF Foreign Policy Survey 2023; Global Times (2024), ‘Nearly 70% Indian respondents believe close and cooperative relationship with China beneficial for India: GT survey’; Tsinghua University (2024), Chinese outlook on international security.
Economic interdependence
Viewed from New Delhi, the economic relationship between China and India is both a source of grievance and a necessity. On the one hand, the most recent trade data from the World Bank reveals a growing trade imbalance. Chinese exports to India surpassed $100 billion, while Indian exports to China amounted to just over $15 billion. New Delhi has attributed this difference to Beijing’s use of non-tariff barriers, prompting India to launch the highest number of anti-dumping investigations against China by any single country – more than 30 in 2024 alone and over 300 in total between 1995 and 2023.
On the other hand – and despite their difficult political relationship – China remains India’s leading trade partner. In sectors ranging from pharmaceuticals to renewable energy, India maintains a heavy reliance on China. For example, more than 40 per cent of India’s pharmaceutical imports come from China. India’s largest supplier of generic drugs to the US receives more than half of its active ingredients from China. This reliance on Chinese supply chains continues despite restrictions on investment in strategically important sectors and a ban on several Chinese-owned apps, including TikTok and WeChat, which was implemented after the Galwan Valley clashes in 2020.
Recognition is growing in New Delhi that India cannot meet its ambitions to become a global manufacturing hub without components and raw materials sourced from China. The Indian finance ministry acknowledges this. Its Economic Survey 2023–24 notes that ‘it may not be the most prudent approach to think that India can take up the slack from China vacating certain spaces in manufacturing.’ The survey goes on:
Indian corporate interests have lobbied the government to relax visa rules and investment restrictions on China. They are seeking ways to help Chinese companies to enter the Indian market, including by forming joint ventures.
Examples of recent Sino-Indian business ventures include:
- The Chinese fashion retailer Shein, which was banned in 2020, re-entering the Indian market after licensing its brand to Reliance Retail;
- Bhagwati Products forming a joint venture with the Chinese company Huaqin Technology for smartphone manufacturing in India; and
- India’s JSW Group acquiring a stake in MG Motors from China’s state-controlled SAIC Motor.
Such deals are likely to be approved on a case-by-case basis – and with conditions, such as Chinese companies being allowed only a minority shareholding in any joint venture with an Indian counterpart. Decisions will also be driven by a focus on supporting India’s broader strategic objectives, such as facilitating technology transfers, building up the country’s manufacturing potential and limiting Chinese access to strategically important sectors. Since investment rules for Chinese companies were tightened in 2020, 40 per cent of investment applications have been rejected and only 15 per cent approved. Indian finance minister Nirmala Sitaraman has stated that there are no imminent plans to relax those restrictions, noting that ‘we want business, we want investment, but we also need some safeguards, because India is located in a neighbourhood which is very, very sensitive.’
India’s economic dependence on China has clear implications for the West’s engagement with New Delhi, as Western policymakers often hold the view that India will be a beneficiary of de-risking or diversifying supply chains away from China.
This economic dependence on the part of India has clear implications for the West’s engagement with New Delhi, as Western policymakers often hold the view that India will be a beneficiary of de-risking or diversifying supply chains away from China. While an argument can be made that economic interdependence between China and India reduces the likelihood of a major conflict, this does not prevent a possible broader geopolitical rivalry.
