Since the 2020 border clashes, much of the global discussion about the China–India relationship has centred on the border issue as the core source of tensions between both countries. However, this perception overlooks the fact that the border issue is merely a symptom of a much broader geopolitical rivalry between two self-perceived ‘civilization-states’ that are competing for more prominence in the international system. The fact that China has stabilized land borders with 14 of the countries it adjoins – with the notable exception of India (and, to a lesser extent, Bhutan) – suggests that something other than boundary claims are driving tensions. For example, Beijing has accepted the McMahon Line as the boundary between China and Myanmar, and yet it challenges the validity of the same line where it demarcates the border between China and India on the grounds that it is a colonial legacy.
The rivalry between both countries has deep roots in their quest for civilizational supremacy. Since their emergence as independent nation states in the 1940s, China and India have maintained a competition for regional and global leadership. In the view of one former Indian policymaker, India and China ‘can never be friends’ as they ‘represent two different civilizations’; furthermore, the ‘border issue is not the cause’ but merely the ‘symptom of conflict’ between the two countries. Another former Indian diplomat echoes these views, noting that ‘if by some magic the border issue is resolved tomorrow, relations will still remain difficult’.
Both countries regard themselves as leading powers in Asia and in the Global South. Both accuse the other of failing to acknowledge or accommodate their own position. New Delhi favours a multipolar regional order, but sees Beijing’s actions as supporting a Sino-centric vision of the regional order. This divergence became apparent during the meeting between Xi and Modi on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in October 2024. While the Indian side noted the need for both countries to ‘contribute to a multi-polar Asia and multi-polar world’ [italics added for emphasis], the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to the need for both to ‘contribute to promoting a multipolar world and greater democracy in international relations’, with no reference to the regional order. These differing read-outs of the same meeting allude to differing perceptions of both countries’ roles in the regional and global order.
Neither country is willing to recognize the other’s claim to civilizational greatness. New Delhi sees itself as the rightful heir to the Asian order. In a speech in 2017, M. J. Akbar, the Indian minister of state for external affairs, said that ‘if Asia is the east, then it is India that is the true middle of the east…. Geopolitically, and for many other reasons, India is the pivotal nation of Asia’. This echoes the position of India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who noted that India is the ‘natural leader’ of Asia. At the same time, India is unwilling to acknowledge China’s centrality in Asia. Shyam Saran, the former Indian foreign secretary, has written that ‘there is little in history to support the proposition that China was indeed the centre of the Asian universe’, alluding to China’s self-perceived status as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ within a Sino-centric regional order. Saran added that ‘an imagined history is being put forward to seek legitimacy for China’s claim to Asian hegemony’.
China has propagated its own civilizational identity through its ‘Global Civilization Initiative’. Questions have also been raised among some Chinese analysts about the Modi government’s efforts to promote India as a civilizational state amid alleged linkages between the rise of Hindu nationalism and the pursuit of a more assertive Indian foreign policy.
During more cordial periods in the bilateral relationship, leaders have sometimes used more conciliatory and cooperative language. For example, in 2009 Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh (2004–14) stated that ‘there is ample space in the world to accommodate the growth ambitions of both India and China’. However, such periods have been few and far between, with rhetoric about cooperation mostly outweighed by the reality of competition.
Seeking influence in regional and global forums
In practical terms, civilizational rivalry has manifested in the form of both countries’ opposition to the other’s expanded role in regional and global forums. India has maintained a long-standing aversion to China-led regional and global initiatives. Chief among these is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – India is the only South Asian country not to endorse it. India’s decision in 2019 to exit negotiations to join Asia’s largest multilateral free trade agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), was also triggered in part by New Delhi’s concern that the RCEP would offer a means for Chinese products to flood the Indian market, undermining the competitiveness of Indian companies. India’s relatively low-key chairmanship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2023 – in the form of a virtual summit – and Modi’s absence from the SCO summit in 2024, signalled that New Delhi may be deprioritizing engagement with the regional forum that China established.
While both countries may adopt similar positions on issues of global governance – such as reform of international institutions – these are pursued in parallel rather than in collaboration.
Meanwhile, China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) not to endorse India’s candidacy for a permanent UNSC seat. China has also derailed India’s efforts to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. President Xi did not attend the G20 summit in 2023, held under India’s chairmanship. At a regional level, Beijing has resisted New Delhi’s efforts to join forums such as the East Asia Summit, reflecting its aversion to seeing India as part of the broader Asian architecture. One of the reasons that Beijing has been apprehensive about embracing the ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategic geography is that it prefers to see India as a South Asian power rather than a broader Asian power. A former Indian diplomat notes: ‘China is not supporting our rise; in fact, they are actively thwarting our rise.’ The same diplomat characterizes China’s position as a ‘mix of a “status quo-ist” country’ while also ‘creating a parallel universe of institutions, which are China-centric’.
This broader geopolitical rivalry can have an impact on the effective functioning of regional and global institutions. For example, in 2009 China attempted to block an Asian Development Bank loan to India on the grounds that it included funding for the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as ‘South Tibet’. More recently, delays in the release of the second tranche of an IMF loan to Sri Lanka were attributed in part to China’s preference to conduct separate bilateral negotiations with Colombo that were out of sync with the Official Creditor Committee, which is co-chaired by India (alongside France and Japan).
Convergences and divergences over global governance
In principle, China and India have similar positions on various issues of global governance. Although both countries challenge each other’s bid to lead the global order, they largely agree on the need to reform that order. Both countries support a more equitable distribution of power in a multipolar international system. This has been reflected in both countries’ participation in the BRICS grouping and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). An Indian national was appointed the first president of the BRICS New Development Bank, in which India holds a one-fifth share, and India is the second-largest equity holder in the AIIB after China. Plus, a large proportion of the loans from these institutions go to India. Their participation in BRICS and AIIB reflect that both China and India have a common stake in the success of these initiatives.
While India supports the principles of state sovereignty, international law, the peaceful resolution of international disputes and an open international economy, it also seeks to scale back emphasis on such areas as human rights, liberalism and interventionism – much like China. Evidence of this can be seen in New Delhi’s position on several legal principles and issues of global governance – including freedom of navigation, climate change, the right to development and the responsibility to protect – where India often aligns more closely with China than with Western countries (Table 3). An analysis of India’s voting in the UN General Assembly in 2022–23 revealed that it aligned with China 81 per cent of the time, compared to 38 per cent with the US, for example. Jaishankar has openly acknowledged this pattern: ‘For all their issues with each other, India or China have at the back of their mind a feeling that they are also contesting an established Western order’.
