Border controls in Europe undermine the Schengen Area and the EU itself

Despite pressure from the far-right, European countries should prioritize a common approach over narrow national interests, or risk the EU’s core principles being undermined.

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Published 16 September 2025 — 4 minute READ

Image — Border Control and passport control signs at Dusseldorf International Airport, Germany, August 2025. Photo by Nicolas Economou/NurPhoto via Getty Images.

Michelle Pace

Former Associate Fellow, Europe Programme

During the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015, Germany’s then-Chancellor Angela Merkel championed a ‘welcome culture’ with her famous slogan: ‘Wir schaffen das’ (‘We can do this’). But her approach, through which Germany welcomed approximately 1.1 million asylum seekers across its borders that year, sparked significant divisions within Europe and presented challenges to Germany’s societal structures with mixed economic results. 

Fast forward to 2025, and Germany has shifted to a stricter approach to refugees under the new government led by Chancellor Friedrich Merz. This shift, driven by what the government has said are its concerns over ‘security’ and ‘integration’, features tightened asylum laws, more deportations, and a focus on limiting ‘irregular’ migration. 

As part of this approach, the German government has also extended border controls with neighbouring countries until March 2026. These controls had been imposed by the previous government in September 2024 but were due to expire in September this year.

As the EU’s largest economy, Germany should ideally lead a common EU approach.

Germany’s extension of controls reflects a broader European-wide push to curb ‘illegal’ immigration and a response to public sentiment. Amid pressure from the far-right, various European governments have imposed border checks, citing concerns over public ‘security’.  

Alongside concerns over the impact on migrants’ rights, this shift towards internal border checks across European countries also threatens to undermine core EU principles, especially freedom of movement within the bloc, and could even damage the credibility of shared EU law.

Undermining the Schengen area

The imposition of border checks threatens the EU’s Schengen system, which allows the free movement of people and goods between countries without internal border controls.

The Schengen system was put in place on 14 June 1985, with the signing of the Schengen Agreement by Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. This agreement was followed by the Schengen Implementing Convention in 1990, which detailed the measures for applying the agreement, and the creation of the Schengen Area – with no internal borders – in 1995. The entire system was then incorporated into the EU’s legal framework through the Schengen Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. 

The Schengen Area now includes 29 countries: 25 EU Member States and four non-EU countries (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein). Schengen is the largest cross-country free travel area in the world, and is considered to be one of the main achievements and success stories of the European integration project.

But the Schengen Area and its underlying principles are facing a serious challenge. Since the ‘refugee crisis’ of September 2015, countries have reintroduced border checks at the EU’s internal borders more than 400 times. These checks have been justified on the grounds of the increased movement of refugees and migrants into Europe, counter terrorism, and the COVID-19 pandemic. 

This shift towards internal border checks across European countries also threatens to undermine core EU principles.

The internal border checks are lawful under amendments made to the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) – the EU’s single set of rules governing border management for the Schengen Area. These amendments – the latest of which was in July 2024 – were aimed at increasing the resilience of the Schengen Area to crises such as public health emergencies, security threats, and the instrumentalization of migrants by third countries. 

But the checks are only legal under specific circumstances. The SBC allows ‘temporary’ reintroductions of border controls but ‘only’ as ‘a measure of last resort’ in ‘exceptional situations,’ such as a serious threat to public policy or security. These include terrorist incidents, large-scale organized crime, public health emergencies, or an exceptional situation with sudden large-scale unauthorized movements of non-EU nationals. The code does not allow EU countries to unilaterally close their internal Schengen borders. 

The risks to the EU

At the time of writing, the Schengen Area is experiencing continued border controls and stricter EU migration policies. Countries like Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden, have extended border checks due to perceived threats from ‘irregular migration’. 

The extension of border checks by EU states risks setting a problematic precedent by undermining the principle of free movement within the Schengen Area. This comes ahead of a significant change in how the bloc processes short-stay visitors: from 12 October 2025, the EU will start operating and implementing its Entry-Exit System (EES) at major airports, which replaces passport stamps with biometric digital records for non-EU short-stay travellers. This move, along with a push for stricter rules on migrant returns and the potential establishment of deportation centres, indicates a shift towards more controls on freedom of movement. 

If European countries can’t succeed in prioritizing an EU-wide policy, the very principles of the bloc are at risk.

Repeated or unwarranted border closures also risk undermining the authority and enforcement of EU law. This fosters a situation in which member states prioritize their own national interests over agreed-upon EU regulations. Members consistently closing their borders could lead to a breakdown of the Schengen Area itself, as it relies on mutual trust and adherence to shared rules. 

This is, in effect, a real challenge to the principle of solidarity and shared responsibility within the EU. It could also lead to instability within the EU, damage the overall credibility of EU law and the Schengen Agreement, and set a precedent for other member states to ignore regulations, potentially leading to the disintegration of the Schengen Area.

In such cases, the European Commission can take action against member states that violate EU law, but the process can be slow and may not prevent the immediate effects of border closures. 

Article second half

There is furthermore a real risk that the latest amendments to the Schengen code may lead to more frequent reintroductions of internal border controls due to expanded definitions of ‘threat’ and the potential misuse of new tools, despite the code being intended to curb such practices and position them as a last resort. 

While the amendments introduced safeguards, time limits, and promoted alternatives like enhanced police cooperation, concerns remain that they may legitimize practices such as ethnic profiling and mass surveillance. 

The need for a common strategy

Although, in principle, European member countries are willing to cooperate on Schengen monitoring, serious challenges remain. The Schengen evaluation and monitoring framework relies on shared responsibility and mutual trust: the latest amendments to the Schengen code – adopted in 2024 – provide such a mechanism to strengthen this collaborative system. 

However, and in practice, there are persistent issues with inconsistent implementation and varying national governance approaches. This requires a strong recommitment to high common standards and effective coordination. As long as some member states adopt more centralized strategic units for border management, while others maintain a more decentralized approach, strategic coordination will remain hindered. 

The European Commission and the Schengen Council are responsible for driving such a common approach. But individual countries can also contribute. The success of a common approach requires member states to strengthen their national governance and strategic planning for border controls and to address existing loopholes. 

While Germany has no formal responsibilities to lead, its recent actions in maintaining border controls have played into the shift away from a common approach towards the prioritization of national measures. As the EU’s largest economy, Germany should ideally lead a common EU approach, including by championing stronger political commitment, promoting mutual trust through shared accountability, and investing strategically in EU-funded reforms. 

Much is at stake. If European countries can’t succeed in prioritizing an EU-wide policy, the very principles of the bloc are at risk.