Leaders from across the Middle East gathered at an emergency summit in Doha on 15 September to condemn Israel’s 9 September strike against Hamas negotiators in Qatar. The summit’s joint communique called for all states to ‘review diplomatic and economic relations’ with Israel, and ‘initiate legal proceedings against it’.
At the summit, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi sharply escalated his rhetoric on Israel, seeming to describe the country as an ‘enemy’. That is the first time he has used such language since taking office in 2014.
Sisi warned Israeli voters that their government’s policies ‘erode opportunities for any new peace agreements and even aborts existing peace accords’. Sisi also raised concerns about the forcible displacement of Palestinians, speaking against ‘uprooting Palestinians from their land’.
His words reflect Egypt’s sense of threat, which has been entirely reshaped by the Israeli attack on Doha – and the subsequent warning by Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel may strike Hamas again – in Qatar and other countries ‘wherever they are’.
Despite the peace treaty between the two nations, Egypt takes seriously the prospect of Israel targeting Hamas leaders in Cairo. Egypt is also concerned, in the light of an expanded military assault on Gaza City, that Israel plans to force Palestinians out of Gaza into its bordering Sinai region.
Egypt will likely try to use its diplomacy, military, and role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas to fend off these threats. It may also seek to leverage Gulf states’ shifting perceptions of Israel to revive its proposals for an Arab, NATO-like military alliance under its leadership.
However, any such efforts will face significant challenges: Some Arab neighbours have different security priorities. And US interests may intervene.
From Naqab to Doha
2022’s Naqab meeting seemed to set the stage for a new security reality in the Middle East, where Israel was portrayed as an ally to some Arab nations, and Iran represented the biggest threat to regional stability. However, the strike on Qatar may well lead Arab states to conclude that Israel is now their primary threat, for two reasons.
First, the strike suggests to regional policymakers that Netanyahu’s government now prioritizes annexing lands to prevent a Palestinian State – over normalization with Saudi Arabia and others.
Annexation is not stated Israeli government policy, but Neytanyahu’s coalition contains far right members such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who set out a plan to annex 82 per cent of the West Bank on 3 September. And Netanyahu himself declared on 11 September that ‘There will never be a Palestinian state’ as he visited an expanded Israeli settlement east of Jerusalem.
Second, it raises serious questions about the US commitment to Gulf security. The US failed to prevent an attack by Israel on an important regional ally. And some reports indicate that the US was forewarned about the strike. (Air defences at the US al-Udeid airbase, which played a vital role defending Israel and Qatar from Iranian missiles in April 2024 and June 2025, were silent during the Doha attack).
Netanyahu may have viewed killing high-profile Hamas leaders as a domestic political victory. However, the main objective appears to have been to derail ceasefire negotiations, buying time for the new military operation in Gaza City to proceed – and compelling the mass displacement of Palestinians to the south of the Strip, closer to the Egyptian border.
Cairo fears this could be part of a broader plan to force Palestinians out of Gaza into its territory. Indeed, some Egyptian diplomats think Netanyahu may actively be seeking regional escalation in service of a ‘greater Israel’ project, which he appeared to express support for in an August interview.
As far back as 2023, Sisi warned the war in Gaza involved an attempt by Israel to ‘push the civilian inhabitants to…migrate to Egypt’.
A warning wrapped in angst
Egypt is deeply concerned that a mass expulsion of Palestinian refugees into Sinai would threaten its security and stability and end any hope for a Palestinian state. The prospect of a large-scale displacement would be a political nightmare for Sisi and create a security threat from expelled Hamas fighters that would attack Israel from Sinai and invite retaliation.
An Israeli strike on Cairo would also have a destabilizing effect. Cairo is hosting some Hamas leaders permanently as part of the mediating process and may conceivably be targeted. The Egyptians reportedly rushed to tighten security around Palestinian leaders following the Doha strike, and sent a warning to both Israel and the US that attacks on Egyptian soil would warrant a response.
But the Doha strike also endangers Israeli hostages’ lives by risking Hamas retaliation. That in turn would jeopardise Egypt’s role as a mediator and make a prolonged war more likely. And the longer the war goes on, the greater the risk that Egypt is dragged into it, an outcome Egyptians will try to avoid at all costs.
Such factors explain the gradual escalation in Cairo’s rhetoric against Netanyahu’s government. Reports in Arab media indicate that Egypt has also suspended certain aspects of security coordination mandated by the peace treaty with Israel.
This shift is attributed to Israel’s disregard for Egypt’s concerns regarding the military operation in Gaza City, the worsening humanitarian crisis, and widespread famine. (Israel denies there is famine). Netanyahu has also reportedly marginalized Egypt’s role in mediation efforts and threatened to suspend a $35 billion gas deal that provides 20 per cent of Egypt’s total consumption.
Leaks suggest that Egypt’s military is taking a hardline position on being forced to take Palestinian refugees while Israel occupies Gaza.
However, Egypt has not yet developed an effective deterrence strategy beyond deploying troops in Sinai, reducing bilateral cooperation and engaging in diplomatic efforts to end the war, while emphasizing the Egyptian plan for the day after.
Coalition of the (un)willing
The Qatar strike has altered the dynamics of negotiations on Gaza. With Qatar now unlikely to play a significant role, Egypt is positioned as the primary mediator between Israel and Hamas.
Cairo may hope to leverage that position, asking the US to increase pressure on Israel to terminate hostilities and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Strip. But, judging by the Trump administration’s backing of the Gaza City operation, and Marco Rubio’s statements of support during his visit to Israel, this seems unlikely.