The UN climate process remains indispensable

But it must evolve to account for an absent US, and to move from pledge-making to delivery.

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Published 9 September 2025 — 3 minute READ

Image — UN Climate Change Executive Secretary Simon Stiell delivers a statement next to Brazil's Ambassador and newly appointed COP30 president Andre Correa do Lago at Rio Branco Institute in Brasilia, on February 6, 2025.

Bernice Lee

Associate Fellow, Environment and Society Centre

In recent months, critics have renewed attacks claiming that the United Nations climate negotiations are broken beyond repair. Bjørn Lomborg has long dismissed the COP process as a ‘circus’ of non-binding pledges. Alex Epstein says restricting fossil fuel use in developing countries is ‘immoral’. Even insiders like Christiana Figueres and Mary Robinson warn that weak targets and unmet finance promises risk eroding the legitimacy of the process. 

Yet the paradox of multilateral climate diplomacy is that it only works when countries fear failure enough to stretch themselves. That pressure so evident in the run-up to 2015’s Paris Agreement, the only modern treaty adopted by nearly 200 countries remains essential today. While deeply flawed, the UN climate process remains a foundation the world cannot afford to discard.

Stubborn realities

Frustrations are real. The current consensus model for climate negotiations is slow, accountability is thin, and summits often end in lowest-common-denominator deals. But critics miss three stubborn realities. 

First, no other forum has the universality of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Even sceptical BRICS nations reaffirm it as the only legitimate global venue. Second, dismantling the regime would discard mechanisms and diplomacy that have been developed over decades to make coordinated climate action possible. Third, the Framework does not block progress elsewhere. Initiatives from the Global Methane Pledge to Just Energy Transition Partnerships flourished alongside it. 

Dismantling the UNFCCC would be folly: it is bigger than any one capital.

International pressures on the process are greater than ever. Energy shocks, inflation, and resurgent nationalism have tempted leaders to slow-walk net zero pledges. Many developing countries are pushing back against climate targets, with African nations such as Nigeria or Mozambique emphasizing gas development despite COP28’s agreement to ‘transition away from fossil fuels’. And Wars in Ukraine and the Middle East sap political attention.

In the US, Europe and elsewhere, climate, energy and trade policies are all caught up in culture wars. Right-wing factions frame decarbonization as elitist, while public resistance to ‘green mandates’ grows even as floods, wildfires, and heatwaves intensify. There is a real danger that climate cooperation becomes another proxy battlefield in wider ideological and geopolitical struggles.

The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency means the US has withdrawn from the process entirely. The Trump administration could even seek to sabotage it, crushing funding and stalling momentum on critical initiatives having stated that Paris and agreements like it ‘do not reflect our country’s values’. 

Yet the process has already proven it can survive US absence. When Washington failed to implement the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, and President Trump first announced a US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017, negotiations continued among other countries. In many ways, global resolve hardened. 

Today’s world is different again: climate leadership is more dispersed. The EU, China, India, Japan, and vulnerable states are all shaping the agenda. That resilience underlines why dismantling the UNFCCC would be folly: it is bigger than any one capital.

The need for evolution

The complex challenges the process faces make it easy to forget how much has already shifted. Against long odds, nations agreed in 2015 to act collectively on an issue that would affect the core of their economic models. Before Paris, the world was heading toward 4–5°C of warming. 

Today, thanks to successive rounds of diplomacy, current pledges though insufficient have bent the curve to around 2.5–3°C. COP28’s language on ‘transitioning away’ from fossil fuels, unthinkable just years ago, shows what leaders consider possible has changed.

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Replacing the process is not an option if any form of multilateralism is to remain. The real challenge is evolution. 

The system has adapted before. Kyoto provided a relatively rigid top-down model. Paris evolved into a more flexible approach that balanced collective ambition with national preferences. The system must adapt again. A three-pronged proposal offers a way that acknowledges the complexity of implementing policy.

First: link corporate and national action. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) remain abstract until they affect investment and boardroom decisions. Requiring corporate transition plans to align with host countries’ NDCs as the EU’s new disclosure rules already demand would create a transmission belt between international pledges and the real economy. Looking ahead, countries like Canada, South Korea or even China could realistically follow Europe’s lead in deploying similar regulation.

Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) remain abstract until they affect investment and boardroom decisions.

Second: create sectoral pathways. Transitions happen sector by sector, whether steel, cement, agriculture, or transport not through generic national targets. Just Transition Compacts, which pair fossil fuel phase-outs with investment in new industries and job creation, can anchor ambition in concrete deals. 

South Africa’s $8.5 billion partnership is a model. The US has not withdrawn from that partnership, underscoring how such initiatives can proceed despite political shifts in single countries.

Third: automate climate finance. Endless last-minute wrangling over pledges to the Green Climate Fund or the Loss and Damage Fund serves little purpose beyond eroding trust that has taken decades to build. 

Predictable revenue streams like levies on shipping, aviation or other major pollution sources would depoliticize solidarity and make finance reliable. Rather than encouraging a slower pace of decarbonization, they would enable investment in both cutting emissions and adaptive measures for building resilience.

These reforms would shift the UNFCCC from a stage for promises to a platform for accountability and delivery. They would not replace club-based initiatives such as the G7 Climate Club or BRICS financing experiments. 

Instead, they would make the UN a convening point for efforts that amplify each other. Civil society and frontline communities can help keep governments and corporations under scrutiny, ensuring the UN remains a space for accountability and collective action.