A new international order is forming. Will China make it ‘green’?

China’s new climate plan announced at the UN General Assembly has a disappointing headline target – but Beijing is likely to over-deliver, and it’s in its interest to place low-carbon development at the centre of its push for a new international order.

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Published 25 September 2025 — 4 minute READ

Image — Farmers work beside solar panels in Huai'an, Jiangsu Province of China, on 6 August 2025. Photo by VCG via Getty Images.

Anna Åberg

Research Fellow, Environment and Society Centre

Chris Aylett

Research Fellow, Environment and Society Centre

International climate politics is in flux. The United States is, once again, withdrawing from global climate efforts. In his address to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 23 September, President Donald Trump called climate change the greatest ‘con job ever perpetrated on the world’ while advising the world leaders watching that ‘if you don’t get away from this green scam, your country is going to fail.’ 

Meanwhile, the EU has managed to erode its own diplomatic influence in the run-up to COP30 by failing to submit its national climate plan (Nationally Determined Contribution, NDC) on time, as member states were unable to agree on the extent of emissions reductions. 

Instead, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, presented a non-binding ‘statement of intent’ at a special High-Level Event on NDCs hosted by the UN Secretary General on 24 September. This only provided an indication of what emission reduction target the EU might eventually adopt, rather than the done deal. 

It was in this context – with the US out and the EU divided – that President Xi Jinping announced China’s new NDC via video at UNGA. 

Under-promise and over-deliver

The headline target of China’s new climate plan is to reduce economy-wide net greenhouse gas emissions by 7–10 per cent by 2035 compared to ‘peak levels’. This is concerning. To align with the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement, assessments suggest China needed to target cutting emissions by at least 30 per cent by 2035.  

China is the world’s largest emitter, accounting for nearly a third of global greenhouse gas emissions. The yawning gap between what its government is willing to commit to, and what the Paris Agreement requires, therefore adds to widespread fears that the world is irrevocably headed for catastrophic climate change.  

However, China has a track record of under-promising and over-delivering on its international climate targets. In much of the rest of the world, the opposite is true. The emissions reduction pledge should be understood as a floor, and not a ceiling.

Arguably more important than the target, which constitutes a political signal as much as a scientific forecast, is what is happening on the ground. China is rapidly increasing renewable energy supply and replacing products and services which use fossil fuels with electric alternatives.  

As of 2024, about one in two new cars sold in China is electric, compared to about one in five in Europe. Wind and solar generating capacity almost doubled between 2022 and 2024. As of July 2025, three in every four wind and solar projects under construction across the world are in China. 

The ongoing boom gives legitimate hope that China will continue to outperform its targets and play a defining role in steering the world away from the worst ravages of climate change. 

Towards a ‘green’ international order?

It’s not just climate politics that’s in flux: the entire international order is being reshaped.

While many shifts predate the second Trump administration, its erratic and coercive behaviour is accelerating the demise of the order the US itself was essential in creating and leading. 

The photos and announcements emerging from the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit are emblematic of Chinese ambitions to shape a new and multipolar world order with itself in a prime position. 

A crucial issue is the extent to which China is placing, and will place, low-carbon development at the heart of such efforts.

Climate change – and how major powers respond to it – is likely to be one of the central factors shaping the new order.

It is in its interest to do so. China is the leading manufacturer across the clean technology spectrum globally, producing about 80 per cent of all solar panels and more than 70 per cent of all electric vehicles in 2024, with Europe and the United States lagging far behind. 

China’s solar panel exports have tripled in five years, hitting 242 GW in 2024, only slightly under the total electricity generating capacity of Germany. Half of this is destined for non-OECD countries, where clean tech products are expanding energy access, as seen across sub-Saharan Africa, and providing protection against surging prices, as in Pakistan. 

Sharp increases in imports of electric vehicles manufactured in China have also been seen in high-income and upper-middle income countries.  

China is not just sending clean tech products abroad; it is also building clean tech factories in other countries. Since 2022, investments from Chinese clean tech firms have spanned 54 countries in every world region, totalling at least $227 billion.     

Though media coverage on the topic was limited, climate change featured in a non-trivial way at the recent SCO summit. For instance, China committed to working with other SCO members to expand renewable energy capacity in those countries. ‘Major platforms’ for China-SCO cooperation on energy and green industry were also announced.

The global low-carbon transition means demand for Chinese exports is likely to increase, to the benefit of China’s economy – and its geopolitical leverage. Indeed, others have argued China is deploying green industrial policy not only to decarbonize and grow its domestic economy, but also to position itself at the centre of a future ‘green world order’. 

In addition to pursuing leadership in the manufacturing of clean technologies, China is increasingly seeking to shape and define international standards related to the green economy. It has, for example, expanded its engagement in international bodies such as the International Organization for Standardization, and it is promoting Chinese standards via initiatives such as the Belt and Road. Designing the rules and norms governing the emerging green economy is likely to embed China’s leading position.

Anxieties over Chinese green hegemony

Placing low-carbon development at the centre of the future international order could, for obvious reasons, be hugely beneficial for climate change mitigation. 

But China’s dominance in green supply chains has raised valid concerns – not least in Europe – about overdependence, threats to economic competitiveness, and the security of critical infrastructure. 

These anxieties are likely to intensify going forward, compelling governments to carefully balance decarbonization, economic competitiveness, and national security priorities.

China’s dominance in green supply chains has raised valid concerns.

China should continue to support other countries in their green transitions through bilateral cooperation and its engagement with international organizations, as well as by exporting low-cost green technologies. 

However, to gain and maintain support from others in the long-term, China will need to act in a way that enables other nations – not least those in the Global South – to have a slice of the green industrial pie, and to upgrade in green value chains. 

It would also be important for China to place emphasis on climate resilience in its dealings with other countries, given that climate change impacts are becoming ever more severe. It has already begun to do so through its commitment to share its early warning systems technology with vulnerable countries.

It will take many years for a new international order to settle. Climate change – and how major powers respond to it – is likely to be one of the central factors shaping the new order. A key challenge going forward is to prevent industrial and geopolitical competition from obstructing the cooperation necessary to avert global warming’s most catastrophic impacts.