The Lee government looks to prioritize continuity over change, balancing alliance commitments, superpower rivalries and regional threats, while pursuing pragmatic diplomacy to strengthen deterrence, technological partnerships and its global role.
This research paper has argued that the first 100 days of the Lee Jae-myung government has signalled how, at least in the short term, South Korea’s foreign policy looks to emphasize continuity over radical divergence from that of the previous government. Lee’s rhetoric of pursuing ‘pragmatism’ has made clear that South Korea’s foreign policy will be driven by three principal factors: Seoul’s alliance with Washington, intensifying great power competition between the US and China, and the threat from North Korea. Even as the Lee government seems to prefer continuity over change – at least initially – these three interlinked factors will pose heightened challenges to South Korea’s foreign policy decision-making. Questions over the US’s commitment to its alliance with South Korea are being raised amid intensifying Sino-US economic and geopolitical competition, thereby placing Seoul in a difficult position as it seeks to navigate its ties with Washington and Beijing. At the same time, North Korea’s increasingly belligerent behaviour and lack of interest in reviving dialogue with South Korea and the US make it clear that the Lee government’s recent overtures to revive inter-Korean dialogue are unlikely to have a substantive impact in the longer term.
In the past, South Korea’s electoral cycles have led to swings in foreign policy across changes in administration. Yet, the Lee government’s current foreign policy portends a cautious approach that seeks to avoid confrontation with Washington, Beijing and Pyongyang. Nevertheless, while South Korea’s foreign policy postures towards the US and China look to face the ever-increasing constraints of great power politics, the most visible changes will likely be witnessed in the realm of inter-Korean relations. South Korea will thus continue to face the dilemmas of a middle power as it navigates regional challenges while seeking to bolster its engagement beyond its immediate region as a global economic and political actor.
Policy recommendations
Prioritize national interest over political partisanship
Despite South Korea’s enduring domestic political division, such polarization should not dictate the country’s foreign policy. The Lee government must not undermine stability and credibility by pushing for radical foreign policy change purely to satisfy domestic audiences. In this vein, South Korea should aim to establish bipartisan policies to address the most pressing concerns: the growing nuclear threat from North Korea; the challenges of cooperation with allies and partners; and Sino-US competition.
With respect to defending South Korea’s national interests, the Lee administration must draw clear red lines to insulate – as best as possible – its inter-Korean policy from domestic partisan swings, to which it is particularly susceptible, especially given escalating regional and global security threats from China and North Korea. Such red lines should comprise robust support for the continuation of the US’s extended deterrence over South Korea; the avoidance of granting North Korea unconditional concessions; and demonstrating clear resolve and a lack of tolerance for North Korean provocations.
Yet, for now, the likelihood of establishing bipartisan safeguards to prevent radical shifts in inter-Korean policy (such as with respect to opposing unconditional dialogue with North Korea), following any change in government, is slim. The stark differences in political leaning between the ruling Democratic Party – which commands a majority in the country’s legislature, the National Assembly – and opposition parties will make it harder to achieve such a consensus. Nevertheless, the current government must learn from, and not merely dismiss, the foreign policy strategies of past governments.
Strengthen regional deterrence through partnerships with the US and Japan against the common threats of China and North Korea
The security environment in East Asia has worsened significantly from that during the first Trump administration, especially in light of intensifying belligerence from North Korea, Pyongyang’s support for Russia in the Ukraine War and China’s escalating regional coercion and belligerence. Despite recent trade negotiations between the US and South Korea, following the US’s initial imposition of tariffs on South Korea, Seoul and Washington must work together to sustain the longevity of their alliance and strengthen military deterrence against mutual regional threats. South Korea must also bolster bilateral ties with Japan, even despite lingering bilateral disputes stemming from their shared history.
Although the election of the conservative Sanae Takaichi as Japan’s prime minister on 21 October may have catalysed some initial unease among the ruling progressive party in Seoul, the first meeting between Takaichi and Lee Jae-myung highlighted the readiness of both countries to pursue mutual cooperation. Seoul cannot afford any backsliding on bilateral and trilateral economic and security cooperation with Tokyo and Washington. At a time when both China and North Korea continue to destabilize regional security, such cooperation is warranted, especially with respect to planning in relation to possible contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and wider East Asian region.
Continue to ‘de-risk’ interactions with China and prioritize US–South Korea–Japan trilateralism over China–South Korea–Japan trilateralism
South Korea remains unwilling to decouple from China given the extent of Seoul’s economic ties with Beijing. Yet, the Lee government must prioritize US–South Korea–Japan trilateralism (centred around security cooperation) over that between China–South Korea–Japan (which remains largely economic), given China’s ongoing track record of assisting North Korea in sanctions evasion. Seoul must continue to ‘de-risk’ from Beijing through the diversification of supply chains while protecting sensitive technologies from China’s orbit. Given the risks of transferring sensitive technology from South Korea to China, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence and biotechnology, Seoul must not rule out decoupling from Beijing in this specific domain. While the Lee Jae-myung government has reiterated its desire not to antagonize China and Russia, South Korea must not allow its fears of Chinese and Russian retaliation, such as in the economic and cyber domains, to limit its commitment to strengthening ties with the US. With respect to Sino-South Korean relations, the Lee Jae-myung government must not allow so-called economic pragmatism to evolve into economic dependency.
Ensure that South Korea does not lose focus on the North Korean threat
The Lee government has highlighted how it seeks to strengthen inter-Korean relations through dialogue with North Korea, which remains the most immediate threat facing South Korea. These ambitions have already been evidenced in Seoul’s initial suspension of radio transmissions along the inter-Korean border, and restrictions on the broadcast of information to North Korea, the latter is a vital means for the North Korean people to access information about the outside world. While these actions – which have been tried in the past by both progressive and conservative administrations – might reduce inter-Korean friction in the short term, South Korea must not naively expect these actions to catalyse longer-term change in North Korean behaviour.
Given the strengthening of security and economic cooperation between North Korea and Russia, Pyongyang remains more emboldened than ever to violate nuclear and human rights norms. North Korea’s past actions, such as offering minimal concessions during both the first Trump administration and the Six-Party Talks (the latter of which comprised multiple rounds of talks from 2003 to 2009 with the aim of instigating the peaceful denuclearization of North Korea), have evinced how offering unconditional benefits risks rewarding delinquent behaviour and effecting minimal change in Pyongyang’s nuclear development. Moreover, downplaying Pyongyang’s violations of human rights and nuclear norms will only intensify North Korea’s transgressions. As such, Seoul should stress its commitment to working with allies and partners in sharing information, bolstering deterrence and holding North Korea to account for its continued violations of global norms.
In line with its increasingly prominent global role, South Korea and like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific and the West must strengthen cooperation across sectors, without diluting the US–South Korea alliance
In addition to positioning itself as a leading actor in security, the global economy and technology, South Korea must strengthen its ties with the US in order to combat local, regional and international threats. At the same time, to avoid the risks of overdependence on the US, South Korea must cooperate with other Western allies and partners. To achieve this, and in line with the Lee government’s aims of ‘pragmatism’, Seoul must demonstrate how its foreign policy is not simply reactive to changes in domestic politics and pressure from allies and competitors, but situated within a longer-term strategy with three main areas of focus: defending against an increasingly acute North Korean threat; prudent management of China’s rise; and strengthening South Korea’s role as a trusted partner in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Forming such a strategy in the long term, however, will be far from easy, especially given divergent viewpoints on addressing these challenges both within the ruling Democratic Party and across the bipartisan divide.
At a regional level, South Korea must deepen its engagement with minilateral initiatives, such as the Quad and AUKUS, even as a non-member, not least through maritime, security and technological cooperation. Despite the uncertain future of AUKUS, South Korea should leverage the strength of its shipbuilding sector given recent US–South Korean trade negotiations, wherein Seoul committed to invest $150 billion in the US shipbuilding industry. In this vein, South Korea should bolster cooperation with AUKUS members with respect to submarine design, maintenance and partnerships in research and development. The US’s recent agreement to assist South Korea in building nuclear-powered submarines in order to deter regional threats of North Korea and China offers one useful starting point for strengthened cooperation. Seoul must also proactively join Quad working groups and participate in regional maritime security initiatives, such as joint exercises with Quad member states as part of South Korea’s growing commitment to regional stability. Furthermore, Seoul’s role as a leading global producer of semiconductors offers an invaluable contribution to the Quad, not least given the South Korean government’s prioritization of emerging technologies on its foreign policy agenda.
- Globally, South Korea must build upon its ties with NATO at a time when the alliance is seeking to strengthen engagement with the ‘Indo-Pacific Four’ (South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand). Given the increasingly interconnected nature of security between Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic theatres, South Korea should strengthen intelligence and information sharing with NATO and the Indo-Pacific Four. In the realms of cyber defence and emerging technologies, Seoul can build upon its Individually Tailored Partnership Programme with NATO, established in 2023, wherein it was able to participate in NATO cyber defence exercises and collaborate with NATO member states in interoperability, developing new technologies and combating hybrid threats.
Seoul must also look to other Western democratic partners, such as in Europe, to strengthen its foreign policy engagement without weakening its ties with Washington. For instance, South Korea should leverage existing agreements with the EU and UK to deepen economic, technological and security ties. The EU–South Korea Digital Trade Agreement, concluded in March 2025, offers one such opportunity for South Korea to bolster its global role as a leader in digital infrastructure and the governance of digital trade norms.
Moreover, South Korea’s extant collaboration with the UK in defence and security will prove useful in bolstering South Korea’s ties with NATO. Possible South Korean collaboration with the UK Royal Navy with respect to freedom of navigation operations and joint exercises in the Indo-Pacific would be mutually beneficial to both countries. Doing so would both fulfil Seoul’s interests in developing its naval capabilities and compel greater commitment on the part of the UK to the Indo-Pacific. Such commitment remains questionable given the Starmer government’s lack of focus on the region, and reluctance to identify China as a systemic threat both to Britain and the West. The UK and South Korea’s co-hosting of the AI Seoul Summit in 2024 offers a useful springboard for further partnerships in artificial intelligence – a key priority for the Lee Jae-myung administration – and connecting Seoul’s advanced defence manufacturing sector with UK export channels.
