For the third time, the UK government has reportedly delayed its decision over whether to approve a controversial new Chinese embassy in central London. The government was expected to approve the plans for the vast ‘mega-embassy’ by the deadline of 10 December, but the decision has now reportedly been pushed back to 20 January.
The embassy decision has become a flashpoint for the wider debate over how the UK should approach potential national security risks from China.
Critics have raised a range of concerns, including that China could use the embassy to conduct espionage. They have argued that the site’s location directly above fibre optic networks that support London’s financial infrastructure could provide China with potential access to sensitive communications traffic.
On the other hand, Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s spokesperson has argued that consolidating China’s current multiple sites in London could bring ‘security advantages.’ China has condemned ‘despicable slandering by anti-China elements against the new Chinese Embassy project.’
Regardless of any real risks posed by the embassy, the surrounding controversy raises the question of whether the UK is prepared to adequately prevent and disrupt Chinese intelligence activities.
Starmer warned this week that China poses ‘national security threats’ but said not engaging with China would be a ‘dereliction of duty’ given its economic importance, arguing that stronger business ties could be fostered without jeopardizing security.
His speech came after Security Minister Dan Jarvis pledged to strengthen national security measures, in response to an MI5 espionage alert that said two online profiles linked to Chinese intelligence had been targeting individuals with access to government information.
Episodes such as this underscore an emerging pattern: UK policy responses to Chinese espionage appear to be largely reactive, driven by scandal and media scrutiny rather than sustained strategic planning.
This reactive posture has broader implications for the UK’s strategic interests. It weakens the UK’s capacity to deter hostile state activity at home and creates policy fragmentation across Whitehall. It also risks leaving the UK without a coherent strategic direction on China at a time when Beijing’s intelligence activities are expanding in scope, sophistication and assertiveness.
Some progress but gaps remain
Beijing’s efforts to target officials, acquire sensitive data and interfere in democratic processes are well documented. They have only increased in recent years. Parliamentary committees and the intelligence community have repeatedly called for a unified and robust national strategy.
However, these warnings have not been sufficiently translated into policy planning. Starmer’s government, seeking to stabilise bilateral relations after years of strained diplomacy, has rejected a ‘binary choice’ on China. The prime minister has insisted that ‘protecting our security is non-negotiable’ while emphasizing the importance of economic engagement with China.
In practice, the UK still faces a genuine dilemma: how to balance China’s vast economic opportunities with potential national security risks that could be exacerbated by further engaging with Beijing. While increased economic ties may help drive growth, integration creates strategic dependencies and access points that Beijing may later seek to leverage unless they are assertively and transparently managed by Whitehall.
This tension has produced a hedging strategy characterized by inconsistent signalling and unclear prioritisation of interests across government. The government’s ‘China Audit’, completed in June, was intended to deliver cross-Whitehall coherence and inform policies ranging from national security to trade. Yet the findings remain classified, making it impossible to assess its conclusions or whether it will anchor meaningful policy direction.
The UK has undoubtedly made meaningful progress to address state threats in recent years. The 2023 National Security Act (NSA), which replaced the outdated Official Secrets Acts with modern offences that reflect contemporary state threats, is a particularly welcome addition to the UK’s ability to deter and disrupt hostile intelligence activity.
However, persistent gaps remain. While the NSA marks important progress, the UK still lacks the institutional machinery needed to enforce it effectively.
Unlike countries such as Australia, the UK lacks a specialized operational unit dedicated to investigating and prosecuting espionage and foreign interference from start to finish. In practice, UK police and prosecutors face substantial challenges converting classified intelligence into admissible evidence that can be used in court. Law enforcement, acting in parallel rather than jointly with intelligence, would benefit from fostering the expertise, structures and institutional memory needed to handle complex foreign state-linked cases.
The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme
Perhaps the clearest policy gap is the government’s reluctance to put China on the ’enhanced tier’ of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS).
FIRS, which came into force on 1 July 2025, aims to provide greater transparency around foreign influence in the UK. It requires people and businesses to register if they are instructed by foreign states or state-controlled organizations to carry out or arrange certain activities in the UK.
The legislation has two tiers – the standard ‘political influence’ tier and the ‘enhanced tier’ for countries deemed higher security risks.
Only Russia and Iran are currently listed on the ‘enhanced tier’, which increases the scope of activities that are required to be registered, including commercial, academic and research activities.
China remains on the lower ‘political influence tier’ along with most other countries, which only applies to a narrower set of ‘political influence activities.’
Yet China clearly meets – and arguably exceeds – the criteria used to justify designation on the ‘enhanced tier’. In its 2023 China report, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament assessed that Chinese intelligence ‘target[s] the UK and its interests prolifically and aggressively’.
Failing to place China on the ‘enhanced tier’ therefore leaves a conspicuous gap in the UK’s defences.
