Phase Two of Gaza's ceasefire will fail without a political vision for Palestine

The core premise of a local technocratic committee supported by international and regional stakeholders is not unorthodox. But the undefined responsibilities don’t bode well.

Expert comment

Published 20 January 2026

Updated 21 January 2026 — 4 minute READ

Dr Julie Norman

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

As the US administration declares the launch of Phase Two of the Gaza ceasefire, the reality on the ground tells a different story.

More than 450 Gazans have been killed since the start of the ceasefire in October. Israel controls over half of the enclave, Hamas is still armed, and humanitarian conditions remain dire.

Meanwhile, across the Israeli-occupied West Bank, de facto annexation continues with the expansion of settlements, and extremist settler violence has wreaked havoc on daily life.

The key pillars of the ceasefire plan, as well as hopes for broader regional stability, will fail without a political vision

Across both territories, the urgent need for security is intertwined with the broader priority of determining a political vision for Palestine. Indeed, the key pillars of the ceasefire plan, as well as hopes for broader regional stability, will fail without a political vision and a credible pathway for Palestinian self-determination.

Who will do what?

Phase Two of the ceasefire so far consists of US President Donald Trump’s announcements regarding three tiers of institutions that will oversee Gaza’s administration: a Board of Peace, chaired by Trump, comprised of invited heads of state, and supported by an Executive Board; a Gaza-specific Executive Board, comprised of members of Trump’s inner circle, regional officials, international diplomats, and businessmen; and a technocratic committee of politically unaligned Palestinians to lead on Gaza’s transition, headed by Ali Shaath, a former deputy minister of planning, chosen for his background in economic development and reconstruction.

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Gaza: a ceasefire in ‘name only’ - Sanam Vakil

 

The core premise of a local technocratic committee supported by international and regional stakeholders is not in itself unorthodox. But the undefined responsibilities and ever-shifting relationships of the proposed bodies don’t bode well for facilitating Palestinian agency or addressing the hard issues.

Moreover, the proposed membership of the international committees – from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invitation to the Board of Peace, to former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair being tapped to serve on both Executive Boards – has most Palestinians fearing yet another cycle of external overreach with limited representation of their interests. Even Trump’s inclusion of Turkish and Qatari diplomats on the Gaza Executive Board – a decision causing a major rift with Netanyahu – is no consolation, implying that regional actors can speak for Palestine.

Despite the headlines around the Board of Peace, of the three tiers, it is the technocratic body  – officially the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG)  – that many Palestinians will be watching closely.

First and foremost, the committee will be tasked with restoring essential services for Gazans, like water, healthcare, electricity, and education. Moreover, as the only entity in the new arrangement to be comprised of Palestinian members, the NCAG will play a crucial role in re-centering Palestinian leadership in the enclave, even as questions remain regarding the extent of oversight from the other internationally-led bodies.

Hamas and Abbas

Indeed, although both Hamas and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas have endorsed the committee, it is unclear if it will enjoy widespread legitimacy, as many Palestinians remain sceptical of the NCAG’s autonomy. Others worry that the technocratic approach may prioritise economic development and external investment over key political questions regarding Palestinian self-determination.

Beyond international overreach, the NCAG’s potential will be severely constrained by the two major sticking points to Phase Two: Hamas’s refusal to disarm, and Israel’s refusal to withdraw from its current position along the ‘Yellow Line.’

Indeed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already dubbed the transition to the new phase ‘symbolic,’ stressing that it will not undermine the Israeli objective of demilitarising the enclave.

To date, that de-militarisation has included the destruction of over 2,500 structures in the Israeli-controlled area of Gaza, which Israel says were booby-trapped homes and tunnels. The Israeli military has also drawn up plans for another potential ground operation into the Palestinian-controlled area if Hamas does not disarm by March.

Other possibilities include Israel pushing the Yellow Line deeper into Gaza, which has already occurred in several locations.

According to Trump’s plan, the Israeli military would withdraw further upon the deployment of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF), but few countries have committed personnel, and any deployment is still far off. Furthermore, with or without the ISF, it is highly unlikely that Netanyahu will withdraw Israeli troops while Hamas remains armed, especially with Israeli elections slated for later this year.

Hamas meanwhile has taken a hard public stance on refusing to disarm unless there are serious talks for Palestinian statehood and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

Privately, Hamas has reportedly shown openness to decommissioning offensive weapons, including missiles, or freezing or storing parts of their arsenal, but Israel will likely reject any offer short of full disarmament.

Moreover, given that resistance is central to Hamas’s identity, it is difficult to imagine the group disarming in any meaningful way without major concessions from Israel, such as agreeing to a credible pathway for Palestinian self-determination – which no major Israeli party is currently willing to entertain.

Given this stalemate, it currently suits both Israel and Hamas to stall in an effort to maintain the status quo, even while paying lip service to their respective interlocutors.

Absent any real political horizon, the risk looms large for these allegedly temporary arrangements, borders, and governing bodies to become permanent.

West Bank settlement expansion

With most eyes on Gaza over the past two years, conditions in the West Bank have continued to deteriorate. Settlements, illegal under international law, have expanded rapidly, with 69 new settlements approved over the past three years, resulting in further land annexation, road closures, checkpoints, and resource diversion.

 Settler violence against Palestinians has skyrocketed

Meanwhile, settler violence against Palestinians has skyrocketed, with 260 attacks recorded in October 2025 alone (during the peak of the olive harvest), and only a handful of arrests or investigations.

The issue of settlements is nothing new, but the pace and scale of expansion has many Palestinians fearing de facto annexation of the West Bank. Indeed, Israeli officials driving the expansion, including far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, have been explicit that the moves are meant to block the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Combined with a deepening economic crisis, and overwhelming dissatisfaction with the PA, Palestinians in the West Bank are desperate for new leadership and a new political vision.

President Abbas has dubbed 2026 the “year of Palestinian democracy,” and indeed, local elections for municipalities and village councils are set to take place in April in the West Bank and Gaza.

Multiple Palestinian factions and civil society groups are already protesting a 2025 presidential decree issued by Abbas

But multiple Palestinian factions and civil society groups are already protesting a 2025 presidential decree issued by Abbas to regulate the elections; the decree would require candidates to adhere to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)’s programme and international commitments. And national elections — which last took place in 2006 — are not on the horizon.

Nevertheless, many are wasting no time in developing new frameworks for both reconstruction and political futures

For example, Gaza Phoenix, a consortium of Palestinian experts and professionals, has developed a comprehensive roadmap for reconstruction, while a technical working group has published a Palestine Armistice Plan for a rights-based transition to Palestinian-Israeli peace.

These types of initiatives offer foundational blueprints for new ways forward and underscore the necessity of centering Palestinians in discussions and decisions about their own future.

Palestinians who spoke with me are clear-eyed about current realities: the intransigence of the current Israeli government, the weakness of the PA, the unpredictability of regional events, and the interests of international actors.

But in the aftermath of Gaza, this year will be one in which Palestinians will be defining what security, reconstruction, and political horizons mean for their future — and the international community should listen.