Foreign policy rarely decides US elections. Conventional wisdom is that voters know little, and care less, about international affairs. Instead, they are driven by pocketbook issues, like the price of gas and groceries. As James Carville, an adviser to Bill Clinton, once observed: ‘it’s the economy, stupid’. But this year, the economy is foreign policy.
There are two important exceptions to the rule that US voters don’t care about foreign policy – and they both apply this year. One, voters care about foreign affairs when an administration’s choices directly affect their daily lives. Two, voters care about what foreign policy choices reveal about a president’s competence as commander-in-chief.
The upcoming midterms could therefore be a rare foreign policy election – of a kind not seen since 2006 when a backlash to George W. Bush’s handling of the Iraq war handed Republicans a ‘thumping’ defeat.
With voters now feeling the pain of yet another war in the Middle East and Trump’s tariffs, history could repeat itself. The president seems aware of this risk, sending mixed signals about whether the elections will shape his handling of the war in Iran and striking a deal on diesel exports with Russia to ease the pain at the pump for voters.
But perhaps the bigger question is what Trump does after the midterms, the last major electoral check on his presidency.
War on the ballot
War has always been the clearest example of when foreign policy directly affects the daily lives of voters.
But this is not always reflected in polls about the importance of individual issues – and this year is no different. Voters cite economic issues as the key drivers of their vote. In a recent survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, pluralities of voters across the political spectrum cite inflation and the cost of living as most important to their vote (37 per cent overall). By contrast, only 2 per cent single out the war in Iran as the most important issue, possibly due to the relatively low number of US casualties.
But that does not mean it is not having an impact. Voters are linking the pain in their pocketbooks with the foreign policy choices of this administration. According to a recent survey by the Institute for Global Affairs, 81 per cent of Americans say the war in Iran has increased the cost of living. The Chicago Council survey puts the number even higher, at 86 per cent.
And then there are the trade wars. According to the Chicago Council survey, 81 per cent of respondents say tariffs have been bad for the cost of living. It is unsurprising, therefore, that 75 per cent of Americans say tariffs will be important to their midterm vote, according to a survey by the Cato Institute.
Importantly, these findings cannot be written off as partisanship. Across a whole range of issues, support for Trump’s policies lags well behind his overall approval rating – which continues to hover around a historic low of 37 per cent. This suggests voters are not just instinctively opposing anything the president does but that large numbers of Americans, including many who otherwise support him, do not like his policy choices.
Affordability concerns will still dominate these elections. But large numbers of Americans blame the administration’s foreign policy choices for the perilous state of their household finances. And that’s bad news for Republicans.
From a strong leader to a reckless one
The second exception is when prominent foreign policy missteps tarnish the image of the sitting president in ways that cause voters to take note.
For example, how the Biden administration handled the 2021 US withdrawal from Afghanistan severely damaged perceptions of Joe Biden. His approval rating dropped almost overnight and never recovered.
In 2024, Trump was able to turn this into an advantage on the campaign trail by presenting himself as a strong leader who would stand up against America’s adversaries – and with a commitment to peace.
Today, Trump’s reputation is suffering from both his inability to resolve foreign policy challenges he inherited and the abandonment of his pledge to avoid entangling the US in costly conflicts overseas.
In a CNN/SSRS survey, just 29 per cent of US adults said they approved of Trump’s handling of foreign affairs, down from 42 per cent shortly after he returned to office. Only one in four respondents believed he had a clear strategy for handling Tehran, down from 40 per cent in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the war.
These dynamics also appear to be feeding into broader perceptions of Trump’s leadership. In a YouGov survey fielded at the outset of the war, 56 per cent of respondents said the word ‘reckless’ applied ‘a lot’ to Trump – up five points from a year ago – while the proportion who described him as a ‘strong leader’ dropped four percentage points.
To what degree will foreign policy shape the results – and how will Trump respond?
Republicans were already likely to fare poorly. The midterms are traditionally seen as a referendum on the performance of the incumbent president, and with Trump’s overall approval ratings at a near-record low, history is not on his side.
Even though foreign policy may not dominate any given race, it is likely to matter at the margins. And in a tight race, that could make all the difference.
In some swing states Republican candidates are distancing themselves from the president’s policies. In Michigan, Senate nominee Mike Rogers has said the war ‘needs to end, and end quickly’, to provide relief for American families. In Iowa, meanwhile, Senate nominee Ashley Hinson similarly said that Iowans ‘shouldn’t have to foot the bill at the pump or the checkout line for the war in Iran’.
Trump’s diesel deal with Russia indicates some sensitivity to the electoral risks of high gas prices. But achieving this by accommodating Vladimir Putin – rather than an embargo on US diesel exports, for example – has only highlighted another foreign policy weakness: Trump’s inability to end the war in Ukraine.
But will an electoral rebuke result in more foreign policy restraint? Perhaps the most important question is not the degree to which foreign policy will shape the results, but how the president will respond.
And here, history offers a warning. After his 2006 midterm defeat, President Bush did not change course. Instead, he defied the mandate voters had given by escalating an unpopular war in the Middle East.
President Trump recently pledged not to attack Iran before the midterms, having previously expressed a desire to help his party in the elections. Whether he too will try to end the war through a dramatic escalation once the ballots are counted remains to be seen.
But he would not be the first president to double down on an unpopular policy once unshackled from electoral constraints. The ‘lame duck’ phase of Trump’s presidency may therefore prove even more disruptive on the international stage.