In recent weeks there has been considerable speculation that the US would carry out new attacks on Iran once the US midterm elections were concluded. But with the vote complete, Washington’s next move remains unclear.
In a recent 60 minutes interview US President Donald Trump said he did not see ‘any reason’ to escalate the war. It is possible that the president chooses not to resume military operations against Iran and settles for continuing the current policy of economic strangulation. But even in that case, a return to armed conflict cannot be ruled out. Tehran is unlikely to absorb US pressure quietly while its economy further deteriorates. This is the irony of the US naval blockade of Iran. There’s evidence to suggest it has effectively hurt the regime’s finances. Iran loaded no oil onto tankers in September according to some analyses.
But the blockade is unlikely to succeed in achieving the strategic objective of forcing the regime to make significant concessions at the bargaining table. Instead, it might push Tehran to lash out, which would take all parties back to square one in this conflict.
Stalemate
The blockade of Iranian oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz has evolved over the past few months. Washington launched the operation back in April; eased it after agreeing to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran in June (which allowed for the reopening of the Strait); then reinstated it on 14 July as the deal unravelled.
Iran wants the blockade lifted and its conditions met before it reopens and stops its attacks in the Strait. Washington wants concessions on Iran’s nuclear programme before resuming any talks on maritime security.
It’s a stalemate. But it may not last long. The deep distrust between the two sides will make Iran doubt that US concessions will be durable enough to bring it lasting economic relief. Some in the regime will believe it is better for Iran to fight on its own terms than collapse from within as the economy is throttled.
It will not necessarily require a new US military strike on its territory for Iran to lash out at its neighbours. In 2019, Iran responded to Trump’s economic ‘maximum pressure’ tactics with a series of attacks. In May and June of that year, it struck tankers near Fujairah and in the Gulf of Oman and shot down a US surveillance drone.
Then on 14 September, drones and missiles hit Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq processing facility and the Khurais oil field. The Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen claimed responsibility, but the US and Saudi blamed Iran. The message from Tehran was clear: We will respond to extreme economic pressure by attacking Gulf energy infrastructure.
Defending a founding narrative
There are two main reasons why Iran responded this way to economic pressure before – and why it may do so again.
The first is ideological. Iran isn’t just defending its shipping lanes and oil exports in this war. It is protecting its founding narrative of sacrifice and endurance. This is what Washington still doesn’t seem to get.
Since its founding, the Islamic Republic has staked its reputation on not just resisting outside pressure but also defying it. Sanctions, isolation, and military threats won’t coerce or bring down the regime: that’s the message Tehran keeps telling its constituencies and adversaries. The war with Iraq of 1980 to 1988 provides the clearest illustration of the regime’s commitment to that principle. Iran fought the war almost on its own, against an adversary backed by the US and Gulf states, and it survived. A difficult year or two as a result of a blockade is hardly comparable to what the regime endured at that time.
The second reason is practical: Iranian defiance, unlike during the Iraq war, is now aided by outsiders. The biggest source of support is China, through its purchasing of Iranian oil. No wonder US officials have reportedly urged Beijing to play a more constructive role in ending the conflict. They understand that without China, the regime’s staying power will drastically diminish.
Tehran also knows that the Gulf states want the blockade to end. The status quo is causing them tremendous economic pain. The Iranian leadership is betting that if it holds out long enough, those with the most to lose from this economic crisis – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait – will press Washington harder to find an exit.
There are limits to Iranian resilience, of course. In 1988, after Operation Praying Mantis (a one-off US strike against Iranian naval resources ordered by President Ronald Reagan) and months of mounting losses, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini accepted a ceasefire with Iraq. He famously likened it to drinking poison. Yet it showed that when its survival was at stake, Iran could concede (if not surrender).
But the blockade is not the same situation at all. In 1988, there was no way Iran could have won the war. Continuing would have probably led to military collapse.
Today Iran believes it has the upper hand. Listen to statements by Iranian officials, and it is clear they believe they have already won this contest. That’s partly true. The Iranian regime will, most likely, survive this conflict and possibly avert a new major US attack, which it would define as victory.
But it still has to address the blockade. If history is any guide, Iran will at some point resort to violence to try to force Washington to reconsider. That, in turn, is unlikely to succeed: the US has its pride, too, and its interests. US officials are convinced that the blockade is working, so giving it up won’t be easy. If anything, Washington is doubling down by giving US Central Command the green light to establish a new task force meant to ‘prevent Iran from using ground routes to transport advanced weapons and other materials.’
There’s only one way out of this stalemate: phased diplomacy, which the two sides are apparently considering. The basic sequencing is clear: In the first phase, Washington would need to partially lift the blockade in exchange for Iran reopening the Strait and ceasing all attacks against shipping. In the second, nuclear talks could take place, including the gradual lifting of sanctions and the release of frozen Iranian funds.
The two sides are keen to end the conflict. But they appear equally determined to avoid any perceived humiliation and Israel remains an unpredictable factor. Even now, it is not clear that sense will prevail.