The United States and Israel launched multiple air strikes across Iran on Saturday 28 February, striking multiple targets and killing the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Here is early analysis from Chatham House experts.
- Dr Sanam Vakil on Trump and Tehran.
- Bronwen Maddox on the stated objectives and risks.
- Rob Macaire on Iran’s preparations.
- Dr Marion Messmer on the risk of escalation.
- Laurel Rapp on Trump’s desire to project strength.
- Farea Al-Muslimi on how the Houthis may react.
Dr Sanam Vakil, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme:
There is no doubt that we are at a critical moment, one that will reshape the region and profoundly affect Iran itself. The Iranian people will bear the greatest cost.
For Tehran, this is not a short twelve-day war or a contained round of escalation that can be paused and reset. This new stage of conflict is existential and clearly about regime survival. It is also unlikely to end quickly.
President Donald Trump campaigned against regime change wars and was sharply critical of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As recently as his Gulf visit in May 2025 he promised that those days were over.
Yet what we are seeing now suggests something far more ambitious than coercive diplomacy. Trump has framed this confrontation as the culmination of a 47-year adversarial relationship between the US and Iran, dating back to 1979, arguing that the Islamic Republic has consistently undermined US interests and destabilized the region. These strikes are intended to do more than bring Tehran back to the negotiating table. Trump appears to be attempting to redefine the terms of that 47-year conflict and secure his place in history by trying to resolve it decisively.
The US and Israel have targeted nuclear facilities, ballistic missile infrastructure and radar installations, alongside specific strikes on leadership compounds and elements of Iran’s military command structure.
This is not limited to degrading capabilities at the margins. It is a direct blow to the state’s security architecture and governing apparatus. The parallel with the 2003 Iraq war is difficult to ignore. That war demonstrated that collapsing or attempting to collapse a regime is far easier than shaping what follows.
Khamenei’s death will be accompanied by temporary constitutional succession plans that are necessary to project continuity, even if continuity is anything but clear.
It is no surprise that people are cheering and celebrating the death of the longest-serving regional autocrat. He is single-handedly responsible for stubbornly clinging to his ideology and resistance, leading the regime into countless poor decisions. and choosing time and again to massacre his own people.
Trump has spoken about freedom for the Iranian people. That is a powerful message rhetorically, but it is difficult to see how genuine political transformation develops under conditions of sustained war, chaos and potential fragmentation.
External military pressure may weaken a regime, but it does not automatically build a viable alternative. Even if such an outcome benefits Israel strategically by removing a hostile government, it does not mean the immediate result for Iranians will be stability or something better. The space between regime collapse and democratic consolidation is historically the most dangerous phase.
Iran, moreover, is not Iraq in 2003. It has more cohesive state institutions, a deeply embedded ideological structure and regional networks that extend well beyond its borders.
Even if parts of its leadership and command structure are degraded, the Islamic Republic has experience regenerating under pressure. While talks were ongoing, Tehran was simultaneously preparing for this contingency. Its response came within four hours of the first strikes, suggesting pre-planning and coordination.
Strikes across Israel and against Gulf states indicate a deliberate decision to externalize the conflict rather than absorb the blows quietly.
From the regime’s perspective, if survival is at stake, there is little incentive to keep the confrontation geographically contained. Expanding the theatre raises costs for US partners, and signals that any attempt to dismantle the system will reverberate across the region. There is also a real possibility that Iran’s allies, including the Houthis and perhaps others within Iran’s broader network, will be drawn in more directly.
Bronwen Maddox, Director of Chatham House:
You don’t do regime change from the air.
The ayatollah was the main character of a theocratic, repressive and brutal regime that yearned for nuclear power, but he was not the only character. At best, there’s a very confused picture. There are many people still defending the regime.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are a real military-industrial complex running much of the economy, and one of them could end up in charge.
One thing I think that has become clear to us is that intelligence, probably Israeli intelligence, is right through the country.
It’s also a question of how many targeted assassinations there are taking out the whole leadership of the regime - and how much the regime is weakened at this point. But it’s very hard to get from where we are now to a vision of democracy or where Iranians can choose.
Risk of protest
I’m afraid we’re heading for a very messy picture which is of enormous risk to those who want to come out and protest.
President Trump talked about Iran’s protesters. But the protesters already feel betrayed. Tens of thousands were shot in the wave of demonstrations earlier this year, and they do not want to come out again. Trump saying weeks ago that ‘help is on its way’ was not enough to save them. And they still lack a leader.
The best-case scenario is that the protesters begin to come out again, on the streets, they find that they are not shot down, they begin to produce leaders or a leader and realise that they can actually change the regime.
The worst-case scenario is that the Revolutionary Guard still show themselves to be very much in control of the country, that they continue to hit other countries around, which not only destabilizes the region but encourages Arab countries to pull away from the US, and pull away from any talks about stabilizing Gaza and the West Bank.
Objectives
The risk is that the US already has multiple stated objectives – ending Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, missiles, and supporting Iranian protesters. That is a recipe for confusion.
Iran’s neighbours and the Gulf states will be very uncomfortable at the strikes on them, presumably from Iran, this morning. Iran is trying to make them look complicit with the US in the eyes of their populations.
I don’t think it’s realistic to see an all-out war, because so many countries don’t want it but a destabilization and the Gulf and Saudi Arabia pulling away from the US, I think that is likely.
This has the makings of the kind of enduring conflict that Trump said he didn’t want.
UK policy
The UK government is taking what is an inevitable position. and a defensible one. Which is to be arms-length from the US. To say: we, Britain, are going to stick to the rule of law. And this is very much what the UK did over Venezuela as well: to say that we might welcome the ends of what has been achieved, but we don’t embrace the means of that.
And this is part of the gradual distancing that you are beginning to see in parts of UK policy. I think, easily mocked as it is, to say: ‘come on, go on one side or the other’ – this is where the UK is going to have to find a path.
Rob Macaire, former UK Ambassador to Iran and Chatham House Council member:
We can’t tell what the next stage of this crisis will bring, but two facts are crucial to understand Iranian decisions.
First, the regime was ready for this. Plans for succession, delegation of command, and interim leadership were in place both in the military and in the political hierarchies. And second, that this is all about regime survival: indeed, given the way the conflict has been framed by both sides, survival equals victory.
Seen through that lens, lashing out at other regional states as well as Israel makes total sense.
Iran is seeking the pain points that drive a wedge between Gulf states and the US, and has realised that, perhaps even more than their traditional threat to hydrocarbon exports, destabilising those countries as investment, business and tourism destinations touches a crucial nerve. Iran’s recent rapprochement with Saudi and UAE as well as more longstanding partners like Qatar has been valuable - but is less so than regime survival.
Meanwhile, it seems from a number of sources that the Basij have been mobilised in force to prevent any major public demonstrations.
Unless we see any signs of defections from those loyalist security forces, there may be little scope for public pressure to seriously threaten the regime.
What we may see, though, now that Khamenei is dead, is an intensification of the jockeying for position that was happening even before these attacks. This depends somewhat on who from the top leadership is left alive when the dust settles.
There must be some attraction for the US in opening discreet channels to figures who might steer a post-Khamenei Islamic Republic towards less antagonistic and dangerous policies - in a parallel with Venezuela.
This would not be the complete transformation that many activists and monarchists are calling for. But it would allow the US to disengage, before bringing about a total collapse of state authority and power vacuum, with responsibility for all that would follow.
Dr Marion Messmer, Director of the International Security Programme:
President Trump has said these attacks are intended to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. After the US air strikes in June 2025, the US government said they had significantly degraded Iran’s nuclear programme.
The strikes also come at a time when several US officials have called for regime change in Iran.
The US seems to have targeted sites that either have a connection with Iran’s nuclear research, or are missile production and storage sites, seeking a further degradation of Iran’s military capabilities.
The Iranian government is already weakened after two years of on-and-off conflict escalation. But it is striking back. Israel and Qatar have reported intercepting incoming Iranian missiles. This means that even with a weakened Iranian government, there is a risk of this conflict escalating and drawing other states in.
Beyond the risk of war in the Middle East, the attack set a worrying precedent by continuing a pattern: striking when negotiations are not going as Washington would like them to. This reduces the likelihood that other states will be willing to enter into negotiations with the US in future, if there is always a risk of the US escalating to military attack.
Laurel Rapp, Director of the US and North America Programme
President Trump’s declaration of war against Iran to depose the regime is a high-risk break with decades of US policy towards Tehran.
The American strategy appears wholly predicated on the untested proposition that the Iranian people will quickly rise up – a huge gamble. Should a massive revolt fail to materialize, the Trump administration will face a fork in the road: fold or double down.
In abandoning negotiations for force, the US opens an uncertain and dangerous path ahead, with grave risks for US military personnel in the ballistic missile strike zone, and US partners vulnerable to retaliation from Iranian proxies.
It is undeniable that Iran’s nuclear ambitions, stockpile of ballistic missiles, and regional militia proxies pose a threat to the United States and its partners. The Iranian regime has cultivated these tools for decades, at great cost to the Iranian people. Multilateral sanctions and periodic US strikes against Iranian proxies sought to bind Iran’s hands.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) successfully cabined Iran’s nuclear problem until the US withdrew. It was a strategy to manage symptoms versus address root causes, and – though imperfect – it prevented a risky and grinding US military entanglement.
President Trump ran on a platform of ending forever wars and bringing US troops home.
The White House National security strategy (NSS), published just two months ago, affirms that the ‘days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy in both long-term planning and day-to-day execution are thankfully over.’ Both accurately reflect American public attitudes, with little appetite for a war of choice in the Middle East.
The initial US military campaign appears limited to air strikes but – if the lessons from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya are instructive – aerial bombardment alone is unlikely to topple a regime absent mass defections from Iran’s deeply entrenched military command.
Requirements typically include a significant commitment of ground troops, relentless diplomatic coordination among partners, and careful planning and stewardship of successor structures. These are the ingredients of nation-building that the American public has rightfully rejected.
If the past year of US foreign policy decision-making is predictive of the days ahead, Trump’s desire to project strength and ‘win’ may quickly supplant the popular mandate that brought him back to power – as well as his own strategy.
Every recent US president has tried to, finally, redirect US attention beyond the Middle East. To Asia. To the Western Hemisphere. None has succeeded.
Farea Al-Muslimi, Research Fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme:
While the Houthis are widely viewed as one of Iran’s closest remaining regional allies – particularly after the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon – it is far from certain that they will intervene militarily.
The Yemeni militia, formally known as Ansar Allah, has for years benefited from Iranian financial and military support, including assistance from elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Iran has helped develop the Houthis’ ballistic missile and drone capabilities, and Yemen has at times served as an arena through which Tehran could pressure its regional adversaries indirectly while claiming deniability.
However unlike Hezbollah, which openly embraces its ideological and organizational ties to Tehran, the Houthis have historically been sensitive to accusations that they are merely an Iranian proxy even if that – throughout the years – proved to be true.
Yemen does not offer Iran the same theological, social, or political depth that exists in parts of Lebanon or Iraq. On the contrary, suspicion of ‘Persian’ influence has deep historical roots in Yemen. With the exception of a limited ideological circle within the Houthis, overt identification with Iran remains unpopular. This explains why Houthi leaders have often denied or downplayed the extent of their relationship with Tehran, and have reacted sharply when they are labeled an Iranian tool.
Domestic calculation therefore remains central to any decision to escalate. The Houthis cannot afford to frame a war as one fought simply on behalf of Iran.
Previous attacks on Israel and on Red Sea shipping were justified internally through the lens of solidarity with the Palestinian cause – an issue that commands broad sympathy among Yemenis, including among the Houthis’ rivals. That domestic narrative provided political cover. A direct intervention in defence of Tehran would not carry the same unifying legitimacy.
Moreover, the movement is still recovering from significant US strikes last year that degraded parts of its military infrastructure. Entering a new confrontation at a moment of relative fragility would carry serious risks, particularly as the Houthis attempt to consolidate governance over territories under their control and to preserve fragile understandings with regional actors, including Saudi Arabia.
At the same time, the Houthis are not inherently risk-averse. The group has historically thrived in wartime conditions, using conflict to sustain mobilization, reinforce ideological cohesion, and postpone difficult political compromises.
War can serve its internal logic. This does not mean it will automatically intervene, but it does mean that controlled escalation remains an available instrument, especially if it can be framed as self-defence rather than solidarity.
Two factors could significantly shift the calculation. The first, and more likely, would be direct military strikes against Houthi targets. In that scenario, intervention would become less a matter of choice and more one of perceived survival.
The second concerns the residual presence of Iranian and Hezbollah-linked operatives in Yemen. In the past, personnel affiliated with the IRGC and Hezbollah have reportedly assisted in launches toward Saudi Arabia, at times pushing escalation beyond what Houthis preferred.
That footprint appears to have diminished following Hezbollah’s regional setbacks, but if those external actors retain operational influence, the risk of entanglement increases.
Should the Houthis decide to escalate, they possess meaningful leverage. They can threaten shipping through the Bab al-Mandab strait, a critical chokepoint linking the Red Sea to global trade routes. They can resume drone and missile attacks against Israel, as well as target US military facilities or Western-linked infrastructure within range.
Such actions would not fundamentally alter the balance between Washington and Tehran, but they would expand the theatre of conflict and raise economic and security costs for the US and its partners.
For now, however, it remains doubtful that the Houthis will initiate a campaign solely on Iran’s behalf. Their decision-making is shaped as much by domestic legitimacy and strategic self-preservation as by regional alignment. Unless directly drawn in, they are more likely to calibrate their involvement carefully rather than commit to open-ended escalation.
Read full analysis and commentary here:
’Iran is operating from the principle that if it goes down, it will bring down others with it.’ Bilal Y. Saab on the contest of will between Trump and Iran.
‘President Trump is making the use of force the new normal – and casting aside international law.’ Professor Marc Weller of Chatham House’s International Law Programme on how the attacks – and the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – create precedents for other countries seeking to resort to force without consideration for the rule of law.
’Depending on the war’s outcome, the Kremlin might see its already wobbly strategic architecture in the Middle East so badly undermined that it is compelled to reassess its regional calculus.’ Grégoire Roos on how the Iran war exposes the limits of Russia’s leverage in a fragmenting regional order.
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