Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Hello and welcome to our roundtable discussion today. I’m Leslie Vinjamuri. I direct the US and Americas Programme here at Chatham House and I’m Dean of our Academy. I am especially honoured to be able to welcome you, Richard Atwood, to Chatham House. Richard, you are Executive Vice President of Crisis Group. For our audience, I’m sure that most of you are very well aware of the really extraordinary research that Crisis Group has done over many years, now, on conflicts around the world. This particular report, 10 Conflicts to Watch, is an annual report. It’s very compelling. It’s also just tremendously useful for those of us who follow violent conflict. It, sort of, draws our eyes to what it is that some of the leading experts in the field think is most important to watch in a particular year, for a variety of reasons. It, sort of, moves us. It draws on deep knowledge of datasets and qualitative research and in-country research, but it draws our eyes to really important things.
I should also mention that Richard has a regular weekly podcast called “Hold Your Fire,” well worth listening to, as you will see. Richard’s based in Brussels. He’s been with Crisis Group for many years, in New York, as well, covering all sorts of geographies and is just deeply expert on the subject. So, Richard, welcome to Chatham House. We’re on the record today.
Let me start by just, you know, I guess, saying a couple of words about this year’s report and asking you a question. We’re going to talk with each other for about 20 minutes or so and then open up to all of you to ask questions, so please do. The report is great, because it starts out by reminding us that – two things. One is that conflict, that war, in particular, has declined, we know this, on a global – by any global standard. If you look at the major databases, international wars have declined, and you know, in particular, that since 2014, violent conflict has declined if you measure it according to deaths. But what I liked about the report is that it’s not Steven Pinker, the “Better Angels of our Nature.” You quickly pivot and you say, “Fewer people might be dying on the battlefield, but suffering continues,” and suffering is a much broader measure of what matters when it comes to violent conflict than a raw measure of death.
So, there’s a lot that’s not right in the world and you draw us to some of the big geopolitical conflicts, as well as to some of what maybe people think of as regional conflicts, with – you know, sometimes with smaller or broader consequences, as well as, you know, Islamic militancy across all of Africa, and so, it’s a really nice, very turn. And I did notice, since I run the US and the Americas Programme, that’s there’s always something on the – in the Western Hemisphere and series 80, but there’s usually not as much, which is interesting – is always quite interesting.
So, let me start by asking you, before we, sort of, move into, you know, concrete and very specific conflicts, how do you choose, when all of you presumably sit around a table this year on Zoom, how do you choose which are the ten conflicts that you’re going to bring our attention to in a given year?
Richard Atwood
It’s a great question. So – well, first of all, thank you very much, Leslie and thanks very much, Chatham House, for hosting this. We’ve done this now for a few years and we really value the opportunity to do this, value the exchange with people, so really, thank you.
You know, I think there’s probably a few criteria for the ones that we choose. I mean, overall, the goal is, as you say, exactly as you say, to sort of, raise the profile of some crises, put crises on policymakers’ radar, sort of, show what we’re particularly worried about, focus minds for the year ahead. Obviously, sadly, each year there’s stiff competition, certainly the case this year. I think there’s probably a few criteria. First of all, we look, very much, at the, sort of, the human toll, how many people are dying, what’s the humanitarian impact of the conflict? And there’s certainly a number and I’m sure we’ll talk about some of them in the discussion, where really a terrible, sort of, human cost that these conflicts are exacting. Second, I think we look at, sort of, geopolitical significance, what’s important for the world, what could send the world in a, you know, a really troubling direction.
Third, I think we try to highlight, always, some that are, kind of, off the radar, that maybe policymakers aren’t paying enough attention to, but we think they should. Sometimes we highlight those where there might be a peace-making opportunity, conflicts taking a turn that might open a window for renewed diplomatic effort to end it. And then, sometimes, I think, as you said, we highlighted this year Islamist militancy in Africa, the fact that, really, Africa has become, in some ways, the centre of gravity for fights against ISIS and Al-Qaeda linked groups. So, sometimes, like that, we identify that – a trend that we think is interesting and that people should be paying attention to.
So, I think there’s a few criteria. It’s not a very exact science, I’ll be the first to admit, but we’ve, sort of, canvassed our experts across the world. We talk with them about, sort of, why they think different conflicts should be on the list and then try to cut – kind of, make the cut like that.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Well, let me come to, I guess the first comment that you made, which is that you look at the degree of human suffering, and I guess there’s really – you’re in Brussels, I’m in London and the place that I think we must begin is Afghanistan. You say, in the report, that, correct me if I’m wrong, 23 million people in Afghanistan are now at risk of food insecurity and humanitarian suffering in this winter, so now, essentially. What’s interesting is, you know, the US and NATO intervention in Afghanistan has clearly been going on for 20 years. I don’t know if you’ve had Afghanistan in the report in past years. It’s interesting that it comes to the forum now, at a moment when, you know, the US feels like it’s not at war anymore. We saw how much grief and tension that caused for the alliance members, but really, now, you’re, sort of, saying this is very long from over and there are things that need to be done. So, maybe you could tell us a little bit about your thinking and when you’re trying to highlight. What do you think is at stake and what is it that you’re trying to achieve with the focus on Afghanistan? Just in concrete terms, what is it that you want from the international community, from the US, from the UK, from other international actors on this particular conflict?
Richard Atwood
Yeah, you know, I mean, Afghanistan went from – I think last year and the year before, it was the world’s deadliest violent conflict, in terms of the people who were dying in battle there, so the people who were dying in conflict. And again, the fighting, sort of, escalated in the beginning part of this year. Since the Taliban took over, actually, violence is down, but the humanitarian situation is the worst that – right now, I think, in the world. I think Afghanistan’s overtaken Yemen as the gravest humanitarian potential disaster in the world, and really, there’s a few things that have happened since the Taliban takeover that explain that.
In essence, I mean, at its core, it’s that the world has isolated the Taliban Government since it took over. They have, sort of, shut off aid and they have, you know, made it very, very difficult for the Afghan economy to survive. Now, the Taliban clearly shoulder a lot of responsibility for this. They’ve done very little since they captured power in August to endear themselves to donors. I mean, they’ve shown almost no sign of compromise since coming to power. The government that they appointed is purely – pretty much purely Taliban. It’s mostly Pashtun, the – sort of, their ethnic base. Very little representation, no women in the government. Obviously, they’ve closed down a lot of girls’ education. They’ve severely curtailed women’s rights. They’ve, you know, exacted, in some cases, you know, revenge on people who were fighting in the Afghan Security Forces before they took power,
So, the – you know, the Taliban themselves, clearly, have done very little to make decision-making in Western capitals easier. But I don’t think we can overlook that the lion’s share of responsibility for the policies and for the humanitarian situation now in Afghanistan, the lion’s share of that responsibility lies in decisions that Western leaders have taken since the Taliban took over. In particular, again, sort of, trying to isolate the government, cutting off all development aid, freezing Afghanistan’s assets. So, I think there’s 9.5 billion of Afghanistan’s money frozen in the US. Freezing the money in the World Bank that was pin – earmarked for Afghanistan, another 1.5 billion, not lifting any of the sanctions on the Taliban, which make it very, very difficult to deliver, not just humanitarian, but even economic aid, and generally, sort of, making things very, very difficult.
So, what’s, sort of, happened in Afghanistan, the economy has collapsed. There’s a liquidity crisis. There’s no money in the Central Bank. People can’t get money out; people can’t buy food. The Civil Servants are not being paid. You know, clearly, the Civil Service was a big source of income, a big source of revenue for many people. And, as you said, 23 million out of a population of 39 million, so that’s more than half peop – half the country, are reliant for their survival on humanitarian aid. I mean, the numbers are staggering, and I think the UN estimates now that perhaps as many as a million children are at risk – are already, sort of, acutely malnourished and at risk of famine over the coming months if the situation doesn’t change.
So, what we would like to see happen and, you know, again, we recognise that these are tough decisions, and the Taliban hasn’t made it any easier, but I think we would like to see some way of getting money into the Afghan economy. Now, if the US doesn’t want to release all of the 9.5 billion of Afghanistan’s money that it has – it’s a difficult decision for President Biden, we think he should release it, but it is a difficult issue. Some of that money is in Europe, perhaps that – some of that could go back. Certainly, the money, I think there’s 1.5 billion, in the World Bank that is earmarked for Afghanistan, that was frozen. The World Bank released 280 million, but that’s still far, far short of what’s needed, so they should release more of that. They should look at sanctions, easing some of the sanctions. They eased some to allow for humanitarian aid, but they haven’t eased enough of the sanctions. And, you know, they need, somehow, to work out ways of getting the Cen – the Afghan Central Bank or the financial system working.
So, there is humanitarian aid going in. The UN has just put out its – an enormous appeal, I think it’s one of the biggest ever, certainly the biggest appeal this coming year for humanitarian and economic support. There is some humanitarian aid going in, but it’s not enough, and even if it were enough, you know, Afghanistan is not going to survive. Afghans are not going to survive the winter on humanitarian aid alone. Somehow, you need to prop up the economy. Somehow, you need to prop up the healthcare system, the education system, and measures to protect against food insecurity. You need to get some parts of the state working again. Now, I don’t think that means – inevitably, to some degree, that means working with some ministries in the government. Doesn’t mean recognising the Taliban Government at the moment, that’s not on the table, but it does, potentially, mean working through some Taliban ministries. Again, politically very difficult, but the alternative, frankly, right now, the alternative is that, potentially, millions of people, millions of innocent Afghans starve over the coming months.
Now, it’s not the Taliban that is suffering because of this. I mean, this is punishment for the Taliban, but it’s ordinary Afghans that are bearing the brunt of this. The Haqqanis are not going to starve. It’s going to be ordinary Afghans that bear the brunt of this over the winter. And we’d really like to see – now, I think people recognise this in Western capitals, they see this, but there’s a – this decision-making is not moving quickly enough, and people don’t want to take the hard political decisions and sell it to their legislatures, sell it to populations that are, you know, understandably appalled by some of the Taliban’s behaviour. But I think we’re, you know, we’re really very, very worried by the months ahead in Afghanistan, unless – and unless there’s a much faster change of policy than appears on the cards at the moment, you know, Afghans are really in for a, you know, for a terrible few months ahead. I mean, some estimates – the UN estimates, I think, that over the coming months, more people could die through hunger, starvation, than have died in the last 20 years since the US ousted the Taliban in 2001. So, the figures are phenomenal, sort of, reinforces the point you made that battle deaths are only part of the story. The human toll of conflicts and the human toll of, sort of, these geopolitical standoffs is often much graver than the battle deaths suggest.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I mean, at the end, the thing I’ve always liked about Crisis Group and then, I guess, it comes through, both in your – in what you’re saying about Afghanistan, also Myanmar and other places, that there is a pragmatism. You know, you’ve clearly made the very strong humanitarian case, but in doing that, you’re also pushing back against some of the bright red lines that perhaps President Biden feels he has to abide by, or some who are more reluctant to engage with, and they see, you know, opening up the humanitarian gates as being – and wrongly in my view, but many people would say is, you know, kind of, giving the ghost away when it comes to the human rights question. But you have, as an organisation, I think, correct me if I’m wrong, been quite pragmatic in your approach, more so than say – and I don’t know if you conceive of yourself as being a human rights organisation or not, I’m sure it’s a debate internally, but it seems like you tend to take the pragmatic line on questions of engaging in conflict. But maybe you can answer that and take us, also, into the domain of, you know, how that question and those debates playout in another case about, which is Myanmar.
Richard Atwood
I can. I mean, I should say, first of all, that I think all the humanita – the human rights organisations are also saying that, you know, the West needs to pivot and change its policy to keep Afghans alive over the winter. I don’t think, necessarily, that pushing the Taliban to moderate their position to respect the rights of women, to do some of the other things that many Afghans, and that Western governments, would like them to do, I don’t think that’s necessarily inconsistent with the idea of giving the Taliban, you know – of easing the humanitarian plight of Afghan’s over the winter. I think – I don’t know, there was a podcast the other day on The Guardian daily podcast, where they interviewed some of the Afghan women parliamentarians that have had to flee the country. They’re now in Greece and they’re advocating very strongly for the rights of women in Afghanistan. I mean, they clearly – you know, they’re closer to it than almost anybody. But they’re also saying that the West should release the money, you know, that the West has to take action to stop people starving to death over the winter. So, I don’t think – you know, of course there’s going to be compromises and of course it will entail giving – working, in some cases, with the Taliban and hopefully, pushing them to compromise while you’re working with them to ease the humanitarian plight. But I don’t think the two are necessarily inconsistent with one another.
I mean, on the broader question, look, this is something we grapple with in many places. I mean, how do you get humanitarian aid into countries where, you know, there’s a government that you don’t want to work with, there’s a government where – that’s extremely repressive? How do you do it without strengthening the government or without putting the people that you’re trying to get aid to, or putting the local organisations that you’re trying to work with to deliver aid, how do you get that aid in? I mean, it’s a problem that we’re grappling with in Myanmar, as well.
You know, I think, in Myanmar, again, there’s, you know, the focus, we argue, at the moment, of diplomacy on Myanmar. I think we think it – for now, the political crisis is going to be very difficult to resolve. Both sides really dug in. The way to resolve it is through ASEAN. It’s reinforcing ASEAN, it’s – we’re working with them to, sort of, reinforce their diplomacy. But the focus at the moment has to be, you know, getting aid in and, you know, trying to prop up some of the state functions that have completely collapsed since the military seized power, and then crackdown on the resultant protests. So, that should un – you know, that should definitely be the focus for now in Myanmar.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I want to bring you to the Iran deal and the Iran negotiations, which again, you’ve put right front and centre in your report. It’s something that our Middle East Programme does quite a lot of work on. Sanam Vakil has a piece published on our website today on this and has done remarkable research over the course of many years. There seems to be a lot of scepticism about whether there, you know, whether there’s any way to get a new deal, to keep a deal alive. Where do you come out on this and, you know, what is – what pressure are you trying to – again, by putting it in the report this year, at this point in time, what is it that you are hoping for, hoping to achieve?
Richard Atwood
Yeah, it’s interesting. I mean, you know, I think the Iran nuclear deal and the, sort of, the crunch time that’s arrived in – and the parties are in Vienna as we speak, so they’re negotiating the deal. I mean, I think it is getting some attention, but it’s probably not getting the attention that it merits. Now, as you know, President Biden came to office, sort of, promising to get back to the deal. They wasted quite a bit of time at the beginning, but their pro – talks were making progress, sort of, over the spring and summer of 2021. Then, in Iran, President Ebrahim Raisi was elected, there was a hiatus in talks and then, I think in late November, the Iranians came back to the table, but were driving a much harder bargain.
Now, in essence, what Iran wants are guarantees that if they, sort of, rollback their nuclear programme, that the sanctions relief is actually going to come and it’s going to come, you know, more than it did in 2015, when the nuclear deal was first signed, and that it – the sanctions relief would survive a change of administration in the US. They want hard guarantees that if, you know, somebody else is elected, if Trump comes back or someone else is elected, a Republican is elected in 2024, that they don’t walk – the US doesn’t walk out of the deal again and Iran gets none of the benefits that they’ve been promised. Obviously, the US can’t guarantee that.
The other thing that I think is extremely important is that Iran’s nuclear programme has advanced, you know, extremely quickly. You know, in response to President Trump pulling out of the deal, after a while, I mean, it didn’t happen immediately, but by, sort of, 2020, Iran has really put on – put its foot on the gas in its nuclear programme. The breakout time, so the amount of time it takes to develop enough fissile material for a weapon, the breakout time in 2015, when the JCPOA, the nuclear deal, was signed, was, I think, 12 months. It’s now estimated to be about three weeks and decreasing fast. So, Iran’s breakout time is now much, much shorter, Iran’s nuclear weapons programme – nuclear programme has really come on leaps and bounds, and so, you know, I think that’s the challenge.
Now, whether, again, whether the Europeans, Russia, China and the US can, sort of, give Iran enough guarantees about the sanctions, whether they can be more creative in thinking through sanctions relief and whether they can work out the sequencing between sanctions relief and Iran rolling back its nuclear programme, allowing, you know, for compliance with the Inspectors and others, you know, that’s, sort of, what they’re grappling with. I think we do still see space for that. I think, although the debate – you know, the different factions, different debate, debate different things in Iran, I think we do think that the system itself, President Raisi himself, does want to get back to the deal. Very difficult for Iran to overcome all the economic challenges and other challenges its facing without sanctions relief, but they do need to work out a way, you know, to reassure Iran that this sanctions relief is actually going to be forthcoming if Iran, you know, rolls back its nuclear programme.
Now, what we’re particularly worried about is if – you know, again, we’re reaching crunch time, if talks in Vienna collapse, if the nuclear deal collapses, there may an option they could get – have some sort of plan B option, a sort of, less for less deal that would at least freeze Iran’s nuclear programme where it is, in return for some sanctions relief. Maybe that would be an option. If they can’t do that, then really, you know, I think you’re in this very, very worrying situation where Iran’s nuclear programme is moving ahead apace and the US and its allies are going to have to decide can they live with a nuclear threshold Iran, you know, an Iran that has the capacity to develop a bomb, even if it hasn’t done so, or will they try to take action to stop that? And how you could – you know, there’s different action that the US and its allies could take, sabotage, cyberattacks, other things. But in reality, the only way to set the programme back by – you know, significantly, would be military strikes.
So, I think we’re really very worried that if the talks in Vienna collapse, you would be, sort of, stuck – West – the West would be stuck with this dilemma. We’d feel forced to strike Iran militarily. If that happens, Iran, I think, might be tempted either to race towards nuclear weaponization or to escalate across the region, through its allies, through its own forces, all these flashpoints across the region, you know, where it’s – it has influence: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. You know, all these places, all these potential flashpoints in Iran could potentially escalate across the region, leading to this, sort of, escalatory cycle that, you know, we – in some – to some degree, we were worried about under Trump, but much more extreme, because now the nuclear weapons clock is – the nuclear clock is ticking in a completely different way.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
And in part, you know, because of the actions that the US took under the leadership of President Trump. One of the really interesting things about, you know, where we’ve travelled so far in your – I mean, it is a – you know, one hates to be glib, ‘cause it’s so extraordinarily difficult for the people who suffer in these conflicts, but it is a, sort of, tour of, really, some deeply grave conflicts. But the first that we’ve talked about are, sort of, you know, in one sense, localised conflicts, obviously with regional implications, where we – where the external powers or, you know, the great powers, have considerable influence. But this year, in your report, there is such a strong sense of major power tension and conflict and the geopolitical overlay, you talk about the US and China, but of course, where I want to take you, because it’s what we’re all watching minute-to-minute right now, before we open it up to the audience, which we’re going to do in just a couple of minutes, is Ukraine. And, you know, just before I logged on to speak with you, I was – you know, a whole other round of debates about, you know, what will the US do and what will the so-called West do, if Russia makes a move?
We saw what President Biden said last night. You and I spoke about that this morning, and correct me if I’m wrong, I think you said, “There aren’t very many good alternatives,” but there do need to be some alternatives. So, you’ve put it on – you’ve put it, again, right there on the map. It’s the obvious one to put on the map. How significant – when you anticipate what is – do you have a unified position on what you’re, sort of, calling for in this case?
Richard Atwood
Well, I think – I mean, it’s good alternatives. I mean, there are – I don’t think there are good options in the face of what President Putin is asking for and what he, by all accounts, is hoping to get out of this recent escalation. So, what – tomorrow, Secretary of State, Tony Blinken, will meet with his Iranian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Geneva and let’s see what comes from that. But, you know, President Putin has made his demands fairly clear. He wants two things. One is the implementation, as Russia understands it, of the Minsk Agreements, in Ukraine, which as Russia understands it, means a much greater degree of autonomy to separatist held areas, which would, effectively, give them and effectively, therefore, give Russia a veto over Ukraine foreign security policy. He wants an end to any military relationship or involvement of NATO member states in Ukraine, so no training of the Ukrainian Army or deployment of Advisors’ role and things. So, that’s first, and then, the second thing he wants are these guarantees on NATO. This is what he’s put forward in the draft treaty that they presented to the US. So, hard guarantees that NATO is not going to expand any further, so not to include Ukraine and Georgia, in particular, but presumably also countries like Sweden and Finland.
And I think it’s very hard – first of all, on the first part of that, you know, I think it’s very hard to see any Ukrainian President, you know, Volodymyr Zelensky, the current Ukrainian President, came to power promising to make peace with Russia. He initially entered talks, made quite a few concessions, but now he’s really fallen out with Putin. But it’s hard to see a Ukrainian President, you know, giving more than Zelensky has given, because one thing that Putin has managed to do since 2014 is, really, unite Ukrainians in opposition to Russia. He’s really fuelled Ukrainian nationalism and anger at Moscow. So, very difficult to see how Ukraine makes those kind of concessions.
And on NATO, you know, again, the open door policy, the – you know, the rights of – obviously, NATO can decide who joins, but they – NATO is, sort of, determined not to rule out different countries joining. The reality, of course, is that Ukraine and Georgia are not going to join NATO at any time soon, but NATO itself doesn’t want to rule that out. Certainly, doesn’t want to rule out that countries like Sweden and Finland might join at some point in the future.
So, I think it’s very hard to see how President Putin gets enough of what he wants to step back, so I think we really do see – certainly this is – you know, we don’t see this as a bluff. Certainly, we do see – you know, the Russians have been mixed in their signalling, but we really think it a, you know, real – a real potential that in the coming weeks, Russia escalates. Russia’s already militarily involved in Ukraine, of course, but escalates its military involvement in Ukraine, to either, sort of, heap more pressure on Zelensky or pres – and pressure, as you say, the so-called West, or to simply try and get some of what he wants.
Now, what that would look like is – you know, there’s different options. The military build-up of, what, more than 100,000 troops or – near the Ukraine border, plus, now, these military exercises in Belarus, gives President Putin lots of different options. So, what the military intervention would look like, I think, is unclear. Whether it’s just more back into separatists, so that they put pressure on frontlines, try to move frontlines in Donbas forward, or whether it’s something bigger, you know, I think is unclear. I think what makes the danger even graver is that President Putin, and many around him, I think, underestimate this sense of Ukrainian hostility outside separatist held areas to Moscow, I think he genuinely underestimates that. He doesn’t realise how fierce – the Ukrainian military is certainly no match for the Russian military, especially once you factor in Russian airpower, but you know, there’s going to be enormous resistance from the Ukrainians to – enormous hostility to any, sort of, bigger Russian – form of Russian intervention. So, I think, you know, the – we are, you know, extremely worried about that.
In terms of no good options, no, I think, broadly speaking, you know, President Biden unfortunately sent some slightly mixed signals, which were walked back last night, but I think broadly speaking, that his – the administration, Western powers, have largely done the right thing, which is to make – you know, not continue with strategic ambiguity, in essence, but be very, very clear this is what we’re going to do. Not pretend that they’re going to start a war over Ukraine, which they’re not going to do, but be very clear with Putin that this is what we are prepared to do, and that means ratcheting up, enormously, the sanctions, so much more biting sanctions on Russia’s economy. Means, potentially, a build-up of NATO troops on NATO’s eastern flank, which, you know, Putin really doesn’t want.
So, it’s those type of threats, but in reality, whether that’s enough to deter Russia, I think is unclear. I mean, clearly, this is the flashpoint that we’re most worried about as things stand today.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you, Richard. I’m going to come and take a few questions from the audience. We will carry on our conversation, but it is very interesting and what – I appreciated what you said. It’s clearly a very dramatic and immediate situation and yet, and I think this tells you something about, you know, the summer and the trauma that it’s caused, not only for people in Afghanistan, but for all of those who feel responsible or aware of, or just deeply disconcerted by what’s happened. There are a lot of questions here about Afghanistan, so let me start by asking Sunita to ask her question. Sunita, are you able to ask your question?
Sunita
Yes, thank you for holding this talk. I’d like to ask what happens if the US does release the money? How can Washington to be sure it goes to the Afghan people and is not used by the Taliban for its own nefarious purposes?
Richard Atwood
Leslie, shall I come in straightaway or should we…?
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Yeah, I’ll let you go ahead and take that and then I’ll…
Richard Atwood
So, Sun…
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
…come back to you with a few more.
Richard Atwood
Sunita, I mean, that’s exactly the right question. I mean, there’s no doubt at all that that is exactly the right question and, you know, you have to also think of the optics of some of this for Western leaders. You know, in essence, it’s delivering cash. I mean, what Afghanistan needs is cash on crates to the Taliban, well, to the Central Bank, but presumably the Taliban will have some hand in that. You know, I think the answer is to not release it all at once, first of all, clearly. Put in place the sort of, you know, the sort of protections that traditionally, the US has used. I mean, we outline a whole, sort of, series of ways that this could be tested in the report, I think in November last year, that outlines some of these things. But I mean, clearly, you’re not talking about releasing all the money at once and giving it straight to the Taliban. You’re putting in place, potentially, some sort of supervision of the Central Bank, potentially some sort of signoff authority. You know, you’re really looking at how it’s going in and how it’s being spent.
So, I think, certainly, you know, the – part of the answer is to give it partially and test the waters. You know, and I’m not pretending there’s easy or clean answers and I’m also not pretending that, you know, the – a side effect of it may be to, you know, to entrench the Taliban. But I think we should also be clear that, you know, the Taliban at the moment are not suffering the humanitar – the Taliban leaders are certainly not suffering the humanitarian crisis. Their grip on power has not been threatened by this humanitarian crisis. They – there’s no challenge at the moment to their hold on Afghanistan, at the moment, that may change. I mean, certainly, there’s plenty of resistance, plenty of anger brewing, but at the moment there’s no challenge. So, I don’t think, you know, you’re potentially, sort of, you know, empowering a movement that otherwise would be about to fall. I mean, that’s not the reality at the moment. The Taliban is there, and little suggests that its hold over Afghanistan is going to change.
So, again, you know, I’m not going to pretend there are easy answers to that, and part of it does need to be, sort of, see as you go and test it as you go, and also seeing, you know, if you do release some of the money, if you do, sort of, put some money into the Central Bank or, indeed, sort of, think of internationally supervised currency exchanges, which is another option, you know, to, sort of, test what that means and to think through the conditions on how that money goes in and how it’s spent. But at the moment, those sorts of – the, sort of, thinking that would be required to do that, at the moment, in Western capitals, it’s just too slow. It’s not happening fast enough, and so, what we really urge is, you know, that some of this – you know, some – that the policy needs to move much, much more quickly than it’s moving at the moment.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thank you, Richard, that was great. Just so you know, there were a few people. John Osman asked a similar question about “What structure you could distribute money through in Afghanistan, presuming” – and he says, “I presume existing NGOs, if they still exist?” but I – that doesn’t seem to be the answer, based on what you’ve said.
But let me come to a question, a really astute question, from Mark Morley. “What role do you see for Pakistan in stabilising Afghanistan? We understand a nuanced role, complex interests in Afghanistan for Pakistan. Could Pakistan act” – I mean, “Could Pakistan act as a guarantor of security for aid agencies and CSOs and might the Taliban find that acceptable?”
Richard Atwood
And it’s a great question. I mean, Pakistan is obviously in an interesting position at the moment. I mean, in principle, the Pakistanis wanted a settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan Government that, sort of, legitimised the Taliban as part of the power structure in Kabul. You know, I don’t think, you know, at least formally, the government’s top levels of the military wanted the Taliban to take power by force and then be ostracised and, sort of, cut out of the international system, isolated in the way they have been. That doesn’t serve Pakistan’s interest. It serves Pakistan’s interest to have the Taliban in power, as an ally in Afghanistan, but not ostracised and isolated in the way that that’s happened.
Now, Pakistan has a few interests with Afghanistan. Obviously, it has an interest in a reasonably stable Afghanistan, that – which many Afghans don’t want to leave into Pakistan. Already millions of refugees in Pakistan, already. Pakistan would likely bear the brunt if Afghans start leaving in even larger numbers than they have already. Pakistan wants Afghanistan to crackdown on Pakistani militants, so the Pakistani Taliban, which is, you know, ideologically akin to the Taliban, so the Deobandi, even if the links between the – you know, they’re connected, but they’re not the same movement. So, Pakistan wants the Taliban’s help in, you know, trying to prevent, sort of, cross-border militant attacks. They don’t want Pakistani militants sheltering in Afghanistan and then using that as a base.
Militant attacks have gone up in the Pakistani tribal areas since the Taliban took over, so I think that’s going to be a source of intense worry for Pakistan. I think what we would urge is that – you know, for Pakistan to use the influence that it has with the Taliban to, you know, to try to get the Taliban to move on some of the things that Western power – the Western governments, the outside world, wanted to move on, to make some of these decisions easier in Western and other capitals. And again, we’re not just talking about the West. I mean, around the region, no-one at the moment is – wants to take the step and recognise the Afghan Government and I don’t think Pakistan wants to do it by itself. So, for the region, the region, essentially, in essence, is calling for the Taliban to adopt what they call a more inclusive government, so a government that’s more representative of the various different constituencies in different parts of Afghan society, different parts of the Afghan body politic and what, obviously, Western countries want is, not just the co-operation on counterterrorism for the Taliban, which is very important, but some of these, you know, greater steps toward recognising and protecting the rights of women, minorities, girls’ education and some of these other things.
So, I think what we would urge is for Pakistan to use its influence. Some of these decisions in Western capitals about frozen Afghan assets, about sanctions on the Taliban, about putting in development aid, instead of just humanitarian aid, you know, these would be easier decisions to take if there was some sign of movement from the Taliban, or at least more signs than there have been already. So, I think, in that sense, Pakistan’s role is, you know, in pushing the Taliban in that direction, is extremely important. It’s not easy. At the moment, the Taliban, really, their main constituency at the moment, as far as we can tell, the Taliban’s main constituency is the Taliban itself. They’re focused on keeping the movement together and for now, that means that the pace of some of the changes is, you know, is – some of the changes and some of the things that people would like them to do, the pace is very, very slow, as well.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Richard, I’m going to come to a question that’s about silences in the report, and I’m sure you get this all the time, you know, “Why wasn’t this there?” “Why wasn’t that there?” Before I turn to Philip Chenery, I would say this is a conflict that, you know, when I have listened to those who have negotiated, worked on this conflict over many years, they’ve said, “This is the one that keeps” them “awake at night, because if it didn’t go well, it could go very, very badly, with grave consequences.” So, Philip, with that lead in, let’s hear your question.
Philip Chenery
Hello, thank you very much for the discussions so far. They’ve been absolutely fantastic. I just had a question, yeah, why did the North Korea-South Korea conflict, US is obviously there, as well, not make the cut in the list this year? What would it take to get there?
Richard Atwood
Ooh, it’s a great question and, I mean, the short answer, Philip, is that we, sort of, talked to a lot of people and then – you know, within the – within our team, and we, sort of, weigh the dangers, you know, compared with us, and the short answer, it didn’t make it in because we only had ten. I mean, it – you could – we could easily have added it and there’s lots of others we could’ve added as well. Lebanon, a country we’re extremely worried about, but didn’t make it in. Parts of Latin America that have felt the impact of the pandemic, you know, where social orders are really under strain, also didn’t make it in. Iraq itself wasn’t in. So, I mean, there’s a lot that didn’t make it into the list.
North Korea was, or the standoff between, I should say, between Pyongyang and Washington, was in our list in previous years, when Trump – President Trump first came in and was, sort of, escalating against North Korea, the, sort of, Fire – the Fire and Fury era. There we felt, you know, that it was in and there really was a danger that things could escalate. You know, I think it’s not – you know, we didn’t put it in this year. I – you know, I dread – I don’t want to rule out that something happens this year, but I think we feel that things are not quite where they were back then, but it’s a – I mean…
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I mean, I…
Richard Atwood
Yeah.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I find myself wanting to ask you, Richard, whether – you know, on this question, whether there’s some part of you and your colleagues who feel like deterrence is working, like North Korea’s achieved its ambitions and it, you know, has, sort of, got its nuclear arsenal and everybody’s in check. Or maybe it is just that it’s not hot at the moment, but it’s always going to be there, but maybe it hasn’t, sort of, pushed itself right up to the front pages because there’s no real diplomacy around it, in the same way, at the moment?
Richard Atwood
I think that’s right, yeah.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Let me come to Mariot Leslie. I don’t know whether you can ask your question, it’s a terrific question. If not, I will.
Mariot Leslie
Yeah, thank you very much. I was wondering, Richard, what you think China might do in Afghanistan. Do they have any influence over the Taliban? Do they have any influence via contacts with Pakistan? Where do you think their interests lie and what might they do?
Richard Atwood
So, a very Afghanistan heavy discussion, which is good. I should say that, Mariot, I’m really not an expert on China and Afghanistan. You know, as China, you know, you probably remember some of the pictures, was very quick to host Taliban leaders. It was Mullah Baradar who was there fairly early on, after the Taliban seized power. But at the moment, China, you know, like every other power in the region, is not recognising the Taliban. I think China is certainly very concerned that the Taliban takes action against Chinese militants on Afghan soil, so, Uyghur militants. I think the Taliban would argue that some of those people have been there for a long, long time. The Taliban – I don’t think the Taliban are going to, sort of, lock them up or anything like this. I think what the Taliban’s hoping to do is that they will ensure that they don’t – or what the Taliban will present to the outside world is that they will ensure that foreign militants that are based in Afghanistan, some of whom have been based there for a long time, some of them have quite close relations with the Taliban – the Taliban hopes to guarantee to the outside world that they won’t allow those militants to plot attacks abroad to US-Afghan soil for plotting attacks abroad. So, I think that’s one concern of China.
And the other thing that China has been pushing for, like Russia, like other countries in the region, is what they call a more inclusive government. Now, more inclusive from the region probably doesn’t mean representation of women. It probably simply means that more of, again, sort of, the Afghan body politic is represented in the government. So, some of – whether it’s former government officials, not necessarily, but perhaps some of these other figures that have been, you know, been around the government or were, not necessarily connected with the Northern Alliance, but certainly from other parts of Afghan politics. I mean, for the Taliban, at the moment, again, they’re keeping the movement itself happy and, you know, they are acting as though they won the war, which they did in terms of how much power they’re sharing, which is very little. So, let’s – you know, at the moment, I don’t see enormous signs of compromise on the inclusive government by the Taliban.
What else China might do, you know, I think, again, ideally, for – China is not going to – has a lot of money, of course, but it’s not going to prop up the economy in the way that Western governments can, or that the frozen assets of Afghanistan or the World Bank, you know, Trust Fund, could reinject liquidity into the Afghan economy. So, China’s not going to be able to do that, and so, for China, as well, it has an interest in, you know, pushing the Taliban to at least act in ways that make some of those decisions easier on Western capitals. I’d say, now, precisely how much influence the Taliban – the – China has to do that, hard to say, but that’s – you know, that is the direction I think China also should be pushing.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
It is Afghan heavy and it – I’m quite curious, Richard, whether when you speak about this report in other locations, via Zoom, whether that’s different. I mean, I would say that the, you know, the reaction, the engagement, the passion and intensity around Afghanistan is extraordinary. That’s certainly the case in the US, but I don’t think it’s been – I don’t think if you were – and correct me, and you will know, if you were giving this kind of conversation in Washington, would the questions be about Afghanistan?
Richard Atwood
No, I’m not sure. I mean, this – we’ve – I’ve given a couple of these presentations and some of my colleagues have given similar presentations and they haven’t been quite so Afghanistan heavy. You know, I think this is – I imagine a lot of people are speaking from the UK and obviously, for the UK, you know, years of involvement in Afghanistan, and, you know, I think that’s probably part of it. I mean, other people, other presentations people, have been interested in other crises, Middle East, Africa.
Now, I mean, maybe I would say on Afghanistan, again, you know, I think, clearly, there was a lot that happened in Afghanistan in 2021. I mean, Afghanistan was top of our list for the conflicts to watch last year, in 2021, and you know, I think, you know, there’s obviously a lot of debate about the decision to pull out by President Biden, you know, and I think you can argue that either way. I mean, you – there are strong arguments to make that the US could’ve stayed and, sort of, propped up a status quo, and the US would never have defeated the Taliban, and I think we should recognise that that war that the US was fighting wasn’t even losing that many soldiers, but there were many Afghans dying in fighting across Southern Afghanistan. I mean, it was – there was horrible violence for many, many years. So, the status quo was not a, sort of, peaceful, you know, Afghanistan and it wasn’t headed that way. It was a protracted conflict, with the US propping up a – the government.
Now, were there – you know, had Afghanistan made enormous gains in the last 20 years? Yeah, for sure. I mean, the – you know, the ed – children’s education, healthcare, you know, especially in – a whole generation of Afghans that benefitted, especially in the cities, but not only in the cities, in rural areas, as well. But I don’t think we should pretend that there was a, sort of, fix that would’ve allowed for, you know, a dramatic change in the status quo. The US could’ve propped up the status quo and I think, at some point, it was very likely that the US was going to leave. But whatever you think of that decision, you know, whether you think, you know, that it was time that the US pulled out, or whether you think the US should’ve stayed and just kept things going for longer, whatever you think of that decision, you know, I think there should be – you – and again, you can defend that either way. What I think you can’t – is much more difficult to defend, is, you know, first of all, the planning for the decision, the Taliban takeover. You know, it wasn’t maybe the most – that quickly, wasn’t maybe the most likely scenario, but it was certainly a scenario, and the fact that there wasn’t better planning for, you know, getting Afghans who are vulnerable out, for helping Afghans that needed to leave, for a more, you know, a more orderly handover of Kabul and transition, the fact that those plans weren’t made, I think is much harder to defend.
And what’s even harder to defend is the policy now, that having created, over the last 20 years, a state that’s entirely aid dependent, 75%, I think, of the Afghan Government’s budget, before the Taliban took over, was dependent on development aid, having created an aid development – an aid dependent state, you can’t then, you know, because the Taliban take over, cut off all aid and, you know, leave it like this. I mean, somehow, that transition has to be managed better and I think, you know, at the moment, the focus of Biden’s mistake in Afghanistan was the pull out and the messy pull out and the way it was done, and I think that’s right. He’s taken a big hit for that, politically, but over time, over this – over the coming months, if millions of Afghans die of starvation because of policies taken, and largely because of policies taken in Western capitals, that’s going to be the stain on Biden’s legacy, on other Western capitals, as well, as much as the pull out. So, you know, again, this is – this should be something that’s getting more attention than it is at the moment, and I think I’m very happy that we’ve got the opportunity to talk about this in this discussion.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
I mean, is it you have a difficult role, ten extraordinary conflicts? Many of our members want to ask you about conflicts that aren’t on the list, but it – and it – but it is really nice to be able to hear you engaged so deeply on conflict that’s so important and where the crisis looms from a humanitarian perspective.
We have a question from Kieran O’Meara, who I believe will speak, and if not, Lauren’s going to ask the question for Kieran. Let’s hear from Lauren.
Lauren
Thank you, Leslie, I think I’ll jump in quickly. So, Kieran’s question is, “In the past two or three annual 10 Conflicts to Watch reports, climate change has featured as the tenth. In the year of COP26, what made this year different, so as to be excluded, given that its inclusion was always a point of query?”
Richard Atwood
Yeah, it’s a great question. I mean, actually, the – it was in this year’s article, I mean it was in this year’s list. We just put it in the intro as one of the thematic issues that overshadowed a lot of the others. It was in last year’s list as a dedicated entry. It’s the first time we’d used – we’d put a, sort of, thematic issue in an entry and that was just to give the issue, sort of, emphasis. But we did mention it this year in the – in our intro and I think, you know, the reasons for that are clear. As you say, part of it’s COP26. But also, last year, you know, for all the terrible geopolitics and the difficult humanitarian situations we talked about, perhaps the most worrying trend of the past year was the, you know, was the weather. It was a year of storms and flooding and heatwaves and fires and droughts. I mean, there was just – it’s, sort of, ever starker illustration of what the climate crisis means.
Now, sort of, what it means for conflicts is complicated. There’s pretty robust modelling that suggests that every ½°C rise in temperature increases the risk of conflict in a country by 10-20%. Now, that may even underestimate it, because you imagine that rise in temperature across the – all the world at the same time and the potential for one country going into conflict and that spilling over into neighbouring countries. The other, sort of, particularly worrying statistic is that of the, you know, of the countries that are most vulnerable already and will be most vulnerable over the next five years, to changing weather patterns, at least half of them are already conflict affected or conflict prone. So, it’s the most vulnerable countries that are going to be on the sharp end of this and, you know, we’re seeing already how changing weather patterns – how climate change has worsened some of the humanitarian suffering that we talked about.
We’ve also seen, directly, how it’s fuelled population movement. I mean, in the years ahead, I mean, things may change in decades, but in the years ahead, the main link between climate change and conflict will be related to population movement and obviously, it’s quite difficult to predict what population movement means for instability in areas where people go to. It can have very different impacts, depending on how governments, how politics are able to absorb new people. But we’ve already seen, I mean, as people probably know, apart – across parts of the Sahel, across parts of this belt of Africa, we’ve already seen, sort of, rising tensions between people grazing livestock and people who are settled. Just – what, just a couple of years ago in South Sudan, people fleeing flooding to Equatorious. Many people went and worsened the, sort of, instability in Equatorious region, this, sort of, holed out region of the conflict in – or what was, at the time, a holed out region of the conflict in South Sudan.
So, I think we’re already seeing the potential impacts of this. So, the fact that it wasn’t an entry in itself and we, instead, highlighted it in the intro, wasn’t, sort of, any reflection of the fact that we’re not extremely concerned about it and we are. Actually, one of the things – I think, maybe potentially, one of the – if there is any, sort of, good news, it’s that it is becoming – more accurate forecasts of what changing weather patterns are likely to mean for different parts of the world, are now available. So it is, in principle, possible for governments to better prepare, but of course, you know, governments need to be able to do that. They need to be able to manage, again, population movements, conflict management systems, resource sharing systems. They need to be – they need to have the capability to do that, and unfortunately, in parts of the world that are most affected, that’s where governments most struggle to do those sorts of things. So, again, it’s certainly not a reflection of the fact that we’re less worried. I mean, arguably, we’re more worried this year about the potential implications than we were a year ago.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
And thank you for saying the word ‘politics’, because of course, it’s not just simply about capacity and capability. It’s so often about politics in the situations. Lauren’s going to read out one more question and then I’ll come to you with a final question. Lauren, let me turn it to you.
Lauren
Thank you, Leslie. I’m reading out the question from Kathryn Korchak. Oh, sorry, it’s, “Do you see a change or weakening in the Russian power position versus China as a result of the Ukraine standoff?”
Richard Atwood
I mean, I think it’s early to say. I mean, Russia, in any case, is – you know, China is a behemoth. I mean, China is a – its geopolitical weight, you know, I think, is far, far greater than that of Russia. I mean, Russia is more interventionist. Putin plays his – you know, he plays a different game. You know, he’s, sort of, nimble in his interventions and I think people – what people say is that “he plays a weak hand well.” I’m not sure that’s completely accurate and I think, you know, a power that Russia is, to some degree, in decline, but it’s still extremely important and can do, you know, a lot of – can cause a lot of problems. So, no-one should underestimate Russia’s influence, but I think to compare, you know, China is a power of a completely different proportion. I mean, China is a power that can genuinely compete in terms of its economy. Still, the US is preponderant, of course. I mean, the US power, US alliances, its military might, you know, the US is still, by far, the most powerful, militarily and through its alliances, country in the world, but China, you know, is fast becoming more powerful.
Whether the – whether – you know, I think it’s too early to say what the implications of the Ukraine standoff will be for Russian power. I think, you know, we just don’t know. I mean, we could be looking at something very, very different in a month’s time, related to the Ukraine crisis. I think it’s quite hard to foresee that, as things stand now.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Richard, there’s so many questions and there was a very good question on Israel and Palestine. There are questions on Taiwan, even though it’s not in your report. Israel-Palestine, of course, is. But since we are just at time, I do want to ask you, and I feel it’s not – you know, it’s a tough question to ask, but I know it’s important one to you and to all of us, are there any good news stories as you’ve – and I’m sure that you and your colleagues talk about this. I know that we talk about this at Chatham House. It doesn’t grab news headlines, the good news stories, but what are the, you know, what are the good news stories, either in trends in conflict and political violence, or you know, specific conflicts? What – we, kind of, have to close with that, even though – with all due respect to people who really are suffering in these places.
Richard Atwood
Yeah, sure, and again, having – we only have an hour, so I feel that we could’ve continued this discussion for another hour. So, thanks, really, to everyone for all the, you know, really, all the great questions. I think good news stories, I think we should be honest. I mean, we are, and maybe I’ll come back to this at the end, I think we’re living through quite a, you know, a gloomy moment of history. The – Leslie, the Steven Pinker theory of the ‘world getting better,’ you know, I think that’s increasingly hard to defend. I think the undercurrents at the moment, that underpin some of the conflicts and some of the geopolitical tensions I talked about, those undercurrents are, first of all, very, very deep and very hard to course correct on and they’re mostly, I think, mostly negative. So, I think we are living – you know, there’s a lot more to worry about, I think, than there is to celebrate, and maybe that – I’ll come back to that, maybe at the end.
But, you know, I think I can give you one good news story. So, there’s certainly a few. You know, I think the fact that President Biden, you know, has come in and has struck a, at least at different tone. I think that his scorecard after a year is decidedly mixed, particularly in light of the Afghanistan stuff I talked about, but I think, you know, he’s struck a different tone, repaired some of the alliances, notwithstanding the snafu with AUKUS, and he’s gone back into the Paris Accord. And I know you do have a different leadership on climate and to some degree, on COVID, although, certainly, the vaccine rollout in the glo – in, you know, in parts of the world has been much too slow. But I think that’s certainly good news.
I think, perhaps, the most significant, in terms of international peace and security is the fact that two – these two, sort of, very destructive rivalries in the Middle East, that really overshadowed a lot of the Middle East’s conflicts. So, the first one, you know, between Saudi Arabia-Emirates on the one hand, and Iran on the other, and the second one between the Emirates and Egypt on one hand, and Turkey and Qatar on the other, this second, sort of, intra-Sunni division, both those, sort of, fault lines, both those rivalries very destructive over recent years for conflicts in the Middle East. Both those calmed, somewhat, in the past year and I think, in Riyadh, in Abu Dhabi, you know, there was a, sort of, a strategic recalculation that, particularly as relates to Iran, the – sort of, Trump’s – President Trump’s maximum pressure strategy, trying to squeeze Iran and trying to push Iran, pulling out of the nuclear deal, had really backfired. And that both those countries, Saudi and Emirates, could be, you know, right in the firing line if there was an escalation between the US and Iran, and after the Aramco attack, I think the Saudis realised that the US – you know, it’s – the support it was going to give it, even under Trump and despite all the noise he was making on Iran, you know, that the US was not, even under Trump – even in coming to Saudi’s aid against Iran, the US could not be relied upon.
So, I think there was that – that was a, you know, a strategic recalculation and whether that will survive the nuclear – the collapse of the talks over the JCPOA, I think remains to be seen. You know, that could threaten those small signs of rapprochement, but just last year, what, there were four or five meetings between top Iranian and Saudi officials, which, given where things stood three years ago, you know, if you remember, sort of, the sort of, bitter rivalry, really, then, I think that definitely qualifies as good news. Now, it hasn’t brought an end to the Yemen conflict, of course, and I know, we speak just as the Houthis have struck at the UAE, but it is good news.
Libya, you know, partly, that relates to the second geopolitical division that I talked about, on which there were some improvements. There was a peace deal in Libya. You know, UN Diplomats managed, you know, despite very difficult politics in the Security Council, managed to forge a, you know, a deal between the competing parties, the warring parties in Libya. Now, that deal is coming under a lot of strain, but it’s still surviving and, certainly, that’s good news. Honduras, an election that could’ve been, you know, quite difficult, in the end, was won by an opposition candidate. The incumbent accepted his defeat and, you know, that’s certainly good news. Potentially a reform by coming to power in Honduras, we can see.
Syria is a strange place to look for good news, when it’s still one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, but at least the, sort of, fragile, uneasy ceasefire of the past couple of years has held. The Syrian regime, with Iranian and Russian support, hasn’t gone into the North-West, into Idlib, which would create an even worse humanitarian situation. Hasn’t gone up into the North-East, the Kurdish held areas. So, there is this fragile ceasefire that’s holding in Syria. Now, it’s certainly not a sustainable piece. The country is not on a road to recovery, nothing like that, but at least the astronomical numbers of people that were dying a few years ago in Syria are not dying.
Maybe just the one – oh, the – I should – the – I think the one – for Crisis Group, the one wonderful piece of news was that our colleague, Michael Kovrig, of course, was released, who’d been detained by the Chinese for approaching three years, December 2018. So, he was released, which was, I think, you know, the best news that Crisis Group could possibly have hoped for last year, just wonderful.
I mean, maybe, Leslie, to end on the point you made at the beginning when you talked about battle deaths. You know, and I think most people here who, sort of, follow this, will be aware that the number of people that were dying – that were killed directly in conflicts, in battle deaths, did decline quite dramatically between – after the end of the Cold War, ‘til the late 2000s. It then, sort of, started ticking up after the Arab uprisings, sort of, collapsed into chaos and war and it ticked up, in particular, because of Syria. That lasted ‘til about 2013/2014 and it then started decreasing again, mostly because of Syria’s war killing fewer people.
Now, the figures – the latest figures are only from 2020, so, you know, the source that most people use is the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, they don’t have yet, their figures for 2021, so we don’t know yet what battle deaths in 2021 actually look like. I think, you know, I think there’s fair reason to think they may well increase, compared with 2020, and that’s because Afghanistan battle deaths went up until the Taliban took over. Yemen deaths were up, I think. But the one we haven’t talked about is Ethiopia, which, you know, I think probably will come in as the deadliest conflict of 2021, a new conflict, and at least tens of thousands people killed. And again, the human cost much, much higher because of the strangulation of Tigray by the federal government and the difficulty for humanitarian organisations to access Tigray.
So, I think we – you know, just for qualification, that the battle deaths are – in 2020 were down from where they were in 2014. They may tick up again last year, but I think the important point you made at the beginning, Leslie, was that it’s important that we keep battle deaths in mind, you know, it’s important that – you know, the UCDP data is extremely important for us – to us to understand battlefield dynamics, but the human suffering, you know, this is really just a part of the story. And the UN report that came out, I think, just a couple of days ago, I mean, the numbers are staggering, 274 million people. You know, it’s the highest – it’s up from 235 million last year and that was the highest in decades, rely on UN aid to survive. 82 million people displaced, many because of wars and conflict, highest – that’s the highest it’s been since the sec – end of the Second World War. And, you know, millions at risk of famine because of – not just because of war, but often because of decisions that people are taking, either deliberately, or just because they haven’t been prepared to face up to the political consequences of different decisions, you know. But millions at risk of famine because of, you know, decisions that people are taking.
And so, the cost at the moment, you know, again, to come back to the, sort of, Steven Pinker, “The world is getting better,” you know, I think there’s really – you know, some of these statistics I think fly in the face of that idea. And again, unfortunately, as our list this year shows, there’s really a lot to worry about, I think, in 2022.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
And of course, all of this in the last two years has taken place in the context of the pandemic, which has infiltrated all of these corners of the globe. Richard, that was tremendous, the research behind it. It’s a very readable, very succinct, very powerful short report, with a tremendous amount of research and expertise over many, many years. So, thank you for your leadership. Thank you for sharing with us. Thank you for giving me the opportunity, and all of us, to talk with you tonight, and good luck, and I’m sure that we will continue the conversation next year and before that, as well. I encourage everybody to take a look at the report, if you haven’t already. Thanks so much.
Richard Atwood
Thank you, Leslie.
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
Thanks.
