COP26: What to watch

Professor Tim Benton

Hello, everybody. My name is Tim Benton and I’m Research Director in Emerging Risks and Director of the Environment and Society Programme here at Chatham House. Welcome to this event on COP26. COP26 is, of course, as – is really important because it’s the first ambition raising summit since Paris, looking to, kind of, ratchet up the ambition every five years or so, with new pledges towards NDCs and new pledges towards making net zero. And so far, 122 countries have submitted their carbon plans for the next five to ten years, and the real issues associated with COP26 are whether or not we can keep the Paris Agreement of well under 2°, preferably close to 1.5° of climate change in sight, can we do that? Our current policies are putting us on course for about 2.7° of change and as per the UNEP Emissions Gap Report this morning, the net zero pledges, if they all were followed through, would take us down to 2.2°. So, the immediate question to ask is, can we actually, through COP26, keep 1.5° in sight?

The other principal issues, in my mind, are the money that was pledged 11 years ago for $100 billion per year of climate finance to the developing world, that has not been met. It was supposed to have been met and it may not be met for another couple of years. There is also a set of important implementation things within the Paris Agreement rulebook that need to be sorted out, such as the rules for carbon markets and how to account for the greenhouse gas emissions in national inventories. So, what do we expect to happen over the next two weeks? Will we come out of COP in a couple of weeks’ time with some degree of cautious optimism, or will we come out thoroughly depressed? And that’s the points of discussion for this panel.

Just before I introduce the panel, a few brief housekeeping bits. This meeting is on the record and is being recorded. If you have questions, which we sincerely hope you will do, please put them in the Q&A box on the bottom of your Zoom screen, and I will probably pick questions and then ask you to open your microphone and ask the questions – them – ask the questions straight off into the microphone, live. But it will be very useful to have sight of your questions, so that we can pick the ones that are the most direct and have the most broad interests. So, if you feel that you agree with the question that’s in the Q&A box, feel free to upvote it, so that it goes to the top of the list.

Okay, so, that’s the housekeeping. So, quick introduction to the panel, three fantastic Chatham House staff. We’ve got, speaking first, Dr Dan Quiggin, who’s a Senior Fellow in the Environment and Society Programme. He will be followed by Anna Ăberg, whose birthday it is today. Happy birthday, Anna. She’s a Research Analyst in the Environment and Society Programme, as well. And then, coming up, last but not least, of course, is Bernice Lee, who’s Research Director in Futures at Chatham House. Each of the speakers will speak for about five minutes and then, we will open the floor to a Q&A. So, Dan, over to you for your five minutes.

Dr Daniel Quiggin

Thanks very much, Tim, and thanks for the opportunity to speak to you all today. I thought I’d start by just picking up on something that Tim’s already mentioned, which is the UNEP Emissions Gap Report that came out yesterday. Just to give a bit more detail on that. Tim mentions a rise of 2.2° by the end of century. That’s if net zero pledges are delivered. In terms of the NDCs themselves, they put us on track for 2.7° Celsius, and in terms of 2030, current NDCs, as submitted, put emissions coming down by around about 7.5% by 2030, compared to the previous round of commitments made at Paris. And what’s needed is around 55% reduction, in order to have some chance of meeting the 1.5° goal. So, as you can see, we’re very much off track.

And I think it’s really important to say that net zero pledges would bring that 2.7° Celsius rise down to 2.2, so an additional reduction of 0.5° by the end of Celsius – by the end of century. But as the report itself states, net zero pledges are still extremely vague, very incomplete and importantly, inconsistent with most NDC pledges for 2030. And the reason I highlight this is because we’ve had a couple of reports come out recently on Climate Change Risk Assessment and another one on what impacts, or potential impacts, in the near-term, should worry us most.

On that first report, the Climate Change Risk Assessment Report, we also found that by the century, based on a middle of the road mission scenario, which we think we’re broadly on, we will be reaching 2.7° worth of temperature rise by the end of century. Very similar, in fact, exactly the same as the UNEP report that came out yesterday. And I think some of the headline findings from that is most of the impacts under that emissions scenario go beyond what countries can adapt to. Obviously, adaptation to climate change, resilience, etc., is extremely important, but we shouldn’t place all of our eggs in that basket. Most of the impacts go far beyond what countries can adapt to and within the next decade, those impacts are going to be locked in and won’t be – we won’t be able to really avert them. In terms of the Paris Agreement, we find that there’s a 1% chance of staying within the 1.5° temperature rise and a 5% chance of staying below 2° worth of warming. So, you can see, again, that our report broadly corresponds to the UNEP findings, but we’re very much off track.

So, in terms of some of those impacts that are likely to occur under that emissions scenario, which is very similar, as I say and keep repeating, to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report, we found, and this is one of the impacts that I found most startling, is that heatwaves are already contributing to lost working hours, essentially job losses, in 2019, that are roughly equivalent to 50% of the COVID-19 lost working hours during 2020. So, we’re already seeing heatwaves having a big impact on the labour force and that’s only going to get worse. So, by 2040, we expect around 3.9 billion people to be exposed to major heatwaves. By 2030, so even sooner, 400 million people unable to work outside, due to extreme temperatures, and sadly, ten million deaths per year.

Food is a big, big one. To meet global demand, we’ll need 50% more food by 2050, but yields are likely to decline by 30% in the absence of much more emission – dramatic emissions reductions. By 2040 – sorry, I’m bombarding you here with stats, but I’m going to get to the end very soon. By 2040, the proportion of global clop roun – crop land affected by severe drought, equivalent to that experienced in Central Europe in 2018, which led to a 50% yield reduction, will likely rise to 32% each year, which is three times more than the historic average. And during the 2040s, the decade of, rather than in any individual year, there’s a 50% chance of a synchronous crop failure in the major maize exporting countries, as the US, China, Brazil and Argentina. And lastly, by 2040, almost 700 million people a year are likely to be exposed to droughts of at least six months in duration.

So, those are some of the big direct impacts that we’re likely to see, but we shouldn’t also forget that the cascading impacts that stem from these direct risks are going to be really severe. So, if we think about global supply chains, which have obviously been under stress recently, as workers are less able to get to work, unable to work outside, we see more storm damaged ports, more extreme weather events, those global supply chains are going to become even more strained. I think one of the big things that came out of the expert elicitation process that we did was that as people migrate and move away from flooding or areas where they can no longer live due to extreme temperatures, they’re going to interact with ecosystems in new ways. Because those ecosystems themselves are going to shift and habitats are going to move, and so, people start interacting with pests and diseases in new ways. So, emerging infectious diseases, combined with migration and food insecurity and very many cascading impacts that come out of that, are going to affect all of us across the globe very soon, within the next few decades. So, really, that big emissions gap really needs to be front and centre as we go into COP, and we need to ensure that countries are doing much more.

And one final point, and then I’ll hand over to Anna, I think we do need to remember in terms of COP, ‘cause these are international unenforceable targets, and what really, really counts as we come out of COP is what countries do, in terms of their domestic policies. They can go beyond NDCs, and I think what we should all be pushing for is domestic policies that go far beyond NDCs and ensure that decarbonisation is dramatic and very swift, indeed. And I’ll stop there, thanks very much.

Professor Tim Benton

Thank you very much, Dan, brilliant timekeeping. So, Anna, he’s passed you the baton. Over to you.

Anna Åberg

Thanks very much, Tim, and hello, everyone. It’s absolutely lovely to be here today. Dan has made it clear what kind of future that awaits us if we fail to address this monumental challenge and threat that climate change is. In building on what he has said, I will focus more specifically on COP26, which is just a few days away now and which is really important when it comes to addressing these risks and these impact that Dan pointed to in his presentation.

So, first of all, why is COP26 so important and what are the aims of this conference? Well, we know that we, essentially, need to halve global emissions by 2030 to have a decent chance of keeping the 1.5° target of the Paris Agreement within reach. There is a big difference between 2° and 1½°. It doesn’t sound like much, but every fraction degree really does make a big impact – a big difference. The Paris Agreement, which was adopted six years ago, has this bottom-up approach, where each country itself decides by how much it wants to, or aims to reduce its emissions by a certain year. But the targets that were submitted in 2015 are not ambitious enough to get us there and this is where COP26 comes in. Ahead of – governments are supposed to submit new targets every five years, and this is what they need to do ahead of Glasgow.

But that is not all. Climate finance is another very important topic. In 2009, developed countries promised to mobilise US$100 billion per year for climate action in developing countries. Of course, this money is not a silver bullet. It will not solve everything, but it is really important for building and maintaining trust between countries and for unlocking progress in other areas. And failure to provide clarity on this target has been creating a lot of frustration in the runup to COP. Developed countries have now published an implement – or a delivery plan for how to mobilise these funds, which I can say a few words about later.

And in addition to this, there will also be more, kind of, technical negotiations at COP26, for instance around international carbon markets. And the UK Government is, as COP President, encouraging countries to make bold commitments in key sectors like coal and protecting nature, to really get implementation underway, because as Dan pointed to earlier, pledges themselves are not enough. They, of course, need to be implemented.

So, in a nutshell, COP26 is not about negotiating a new international climate change treaty. It’s about raising ambition and implementing the one that we have. So, where do we stand? Well, I don’t have time to go through all the areas, but I would point to two different aspects. The first is on NDCs, which colleagues have touched on before. As of this morning, 116 countries, plus the EU 27, have submitted a second NDC. Some of these have been relatively ambitious, but we still are far away from where we need to be. As Dan mentioned, we are on track for a 2.7° world.

So, what needs to happen? Well, there are a few governments, including G20 governments, which is the one we really should be focused on here, because they collectively account for 80% of global emissions, that have not yet submitted a second NDC, including China and India. And there are also governments which have, essentially, just resubmitted their own targets. Again, there are G20 countries in this group, like Australia, Brazil and Mexico. And I think it’s, you know, it’s reasonable to expect that some countries will either enhance their offer or come forward with a second target. But even in the most optimistic scenarios, it is unlikely that this gap between pledges and what is needed to align with the 1.5° will be closed completely by COP26. So, governments are currently discussing how to respond to this potential gap, so that we can ramp up action and ambition in the early 2020s to not let the 1.5° target slip away.

The other area is finance. As I mentioned before, this delivery plan has just been published, long awaited. Germany and Canada led the work. And kind of, the key messages are that there was, as was expected, a shortfall in 2020, and it is likely that this goal, unfortunately, will not be met until 2023. On the other hand, and what is positive, is that it is projected that the goal will be exceeded in the years after that and Sharma pointed to, during the press conference, that it is quite likely that 500 billion would be mobilised over five years. I have not seen as many reactions, actually, as I was expecting, from developing countries to date. I saw a statement from AOSIS yesterday saying that “This is a major blow to the developing world,” but I think it will be interesting to see how developing countries will respond in the next few days.

My five minutes is up. There is a lot more discuss and happy to answer questions later, but I’ll hand over the baton to Bernice now.

Professor Tim Benton

Thank you, Anna. Over to you, Bernice.

Bernice Lee

Thank you and, also, I am not promising five minutes, but I’m going to try my bestist to stick to it. Look, listening to my colleagues just now and I’m thinking that you know what? They’re younger than me and if they’re such doom and gloomers already, as the sort of – one of the older people so far, at the moment on this panel, I should try to be a little bit more optimistic.

So, I thought that I’m going to do something that I don’t usually do, which is that I’m not going to start with the doom and gloom and why everything is not enough. I’m going to try and look at why is it there that actually, we can afford to look at what’s – what we have today as an extremely solid background upon which to build on and that there is still a lot more to fight for, a lot more to do. And therefore, what we just had just now, while extraordinarily important setting, but actually, is only a starting point for more work and more mobilisation and that, most definitely, not all is lost.

Now, if I start where Anna almost, kind of, left, which is the whole point about ambition in some ways. It is easy, obviously, to count them and we, kind of, knew, frankly, a while ago, that we – it wasn’t going to add up. So, in some ways, we can know that, but at the same time, I kept reminding myself that before Paris, we are talking about heading to a 4° world and yet, at the same time, and I know that Dan and Tim just now described it a little bit differently, in terms of the 2.7 versus 2.2° that we’re heading, but the reality is that what it tells us is that if we add the mid-century target, especially up by, you know, 2050, we are heading in the right direction, even the 2.7 around 2030, unless we do more, is firmly putting our focus, really, on why action now is the most important.

Now, to me, that is not – and not only important, but also, it’s an important change in focus that we’re not really – I mean, I think [inaudible – 19:30] and others have been saying that we are “a bit bored by listening to plans about plans and everything that’s about delivery, delivery, delivery.” And absolutely, it’s all about delivery, delivery, and it’s delivery now. And this is something we can still do, which is why I don’t think this is all doom and gloom, on the basis that if the mid-century alignment is roughly in the right path, at the same time, we need to do more today, this is something we can do today to try and mobilise the politics. So, obviously, I am trying to put a rather brave face in the face of something quite challenging and as Anna lined up, that indeed, there are many that are not yet ended up. And I will come back to China in a second on this, as well, ‘cause when you talk about ambition, almost every – immediately, someone like me get a question, “What about China, then?” So, anticipating that, I’ll come back to that in a second. So, that’s ambition.

Now, the second thing, which I think Tim and Anna, as well as Dan, have all alluded to, of course, is that for us to be moving into solid ground when it comes to delivery, delivery, delivery, it also means that we need to clean up some of the rules of the games, because if Paris only set a framework around which people come forward with their stuff, it’s a bit like filing a tax return, right? If we all file our tax return in a different currency, with a different timeframe, I start in April, you start in March, I end in June, you end in July, we have no way of comparing apples and apples. So, right now, which is why it is extraordinarily important that – and I know Alok Sharma said only this week that “The reason why they haven’t agreed is because it’s hard.” Sure, it is hard, but nonetheless, it has to be done because, otherwise, you really simply don’t have a fair basis upon which to compare apples to apples.

So, the rulebook, and this is as true for the transparency question about how do countries monitor and report all their targets, as it is true about the carbon market, which of course, is about how countries trade with each other, in terms of credit and how countries and the private sector also trade with each other as well, on that. Now, we have regulated government markets, as well as voluntary markets at the moment. Again, this is extremely important that like the rest of the pieces that was mentioned, we clean up the rule basis, so that we are having a fair basis for doing more stronger together.

Which brings me to the third part, which is about money, and to some extent, solidarity. Now, Anna already mentioned the money question and I already saw many people on the line there having different views on whether is enough or not. I would start by saying that it’s clearly the case that it could be earlier and more and now we do have a firm delivery plan around – you know, hopefully from 2023/2024 that will be delivered, and we probably don’t have it 2020/2021, but hopefully 2022. Now, I’d like to be positive. I’d like to think that in the context of how hard this is, and I know that some people may sneer at this and thought no, it’s not how do you find money for COVID, etc., etc., etc., but the reality is that the politics of delivering the finance was not easy and at the same time, that we are seeing lots of countries trying very hard to do it.

So, I definitely think that a B+ for effort, if not a- for effort in the last – if last ditch. And if indeed, they need to do more, and more importantly, they need to approach this with humility, knowing that most developing countries are going to feel hard done, and rightly so, by the fact that the amount mobilised isn’t enough to, a) close the gap that Dan mentioned, in terms of, obviously, between 1.5 and where we are today, and therefore, the damage is already locked in. And secondly, also to help finance the very important transition that some has barely begun on the basis of the economic basis and others have more starting point already started.

So, ambition, well, it’s – so, ambition, rule – name – rules of the game’s solidarity/money and last, but not least, of course, all the views that, you know, if implementation is about getting those things right, i.e., getting your money on the table, setting the right target, making sure that we are setting the rules in play. It is also, however, about having things in the real world happening, which is where the different pieces that we’re going to hear a lot about, whether it’s about, I don’t know, sustainable aviation, shipping, nature-based solutions, do you know? I think that Number 10 famously called it “cash, forest, coal,” etc., facing down, you know, obviously, coal and, as well as, hopefully, as well as internal combustion engine and date, etc. So, all of these real economy efforts are also important pieces of the puzzle that we’re going to see many more at.

So, then – and so, my expectation is that the first week we will see a lot of discussions about debt, a lot of upsetness around vaccines and, rightly so, about the world, but we will forget at that point that, actually, the COP isn’t about that, even though those are a very important backdrop in the first couple of days. And there’ll be quite a lot of fights, I think, about agendas and there’ll be quite a lot of discussion and probably halfway through, there will be a sort of, big crisis point about, you know, “Since we can’t meet it, what are we going to do?” And there’ll be more and more questions asked of developed countries about, “What are you going to do about adaptation and what are you going to do about loss and damage, given the gap?”

And then, I think from about, you know, midweek, second week onwards, we are going to be going to be looking at a lot of different – so, imagine, first week, very – a lot of rights have right – you know, rightly so, frustration about vaccine problems and debt problems in developing countries and the lack of solidarity. COP is in the place quite to sort some of that out in some ways. Moving into the second week, probably more and more frustration about how do we really pay for this? And then we’re – developed countries will be asked more and more about what they’re going to do about adaptation and to help with the loss and damage question.

And then, probably, as we move into the game, will be more and more question around, “Who are the outliers, who is doing enough, and who is hypocritical? Who’s” – and I think more and more spotlight, as well as more and more corporate commitments will come forward, probably, in the course of the two weeks. We’ll see more and more questions asked about the integrity and soli – you – and integrity and the concreteness of specific corporate commitments, as well, that should have more spotlight, no doubt.

So, last thing I’m going to say, China, what about China? So, I think that – about China and the politics around the – at the moment, that we will see run through, what is really quite easy to forget, which is, sort of, the glass half full person that I’ve decided to be today, want to say, is that first of all, we haven’t had the US properly for a while. So, we are now looking at the full power of the largest country in the world really hoping to crank up the intensity and pressure on global movements around – towards decarbonisation in a way that we haven’t seen for four years.

We also have a China that want to prove that it can do more, or if not as much, and certainly as much and more with the US on the basis of the, kind of, you know, comments that we’re hearing from Chinese stakeholders at the moment on Twitter and different places, are all asking, you know, questions about, “China has published their 1. – 1+ five – 1+N plan,” which I’m quickly going to say in one second about it in a second. “But what about the US?” So, you can see this dynamic around, you know, hopefully continue to be a race to the top kind of dynamic, cranking up the pressure on each other, asking both to be more accountable at the same time. No doubt they will both be pointing fingers at some point, but the reality is that we need to help harness that pressure into something that will deliver more for both of them.

And on – really ending on the shockingly positive note I feel that I would like to, to think that 16 months ago most of us who watch China and decarbonisation and climate for a long time genuinely believe that it would be possible to get the 2060 target or the mid-centuries target. And to think that 16 months on, we not only have the 2060 target with the peaking well before 2030, and actually an implementation plan. Now, don’t get me wrong, more needs to be done as a country with 27% of global emission. We need more from China; we need faster action. I think China knows that as well, that it – to stick to 1.5, it needs to do more. It has been, as many have argued, been doing this because of a self-interest and let’s hope that this is true that they are, indeed, doing a lot of their own self-interest and therefore, will continue moving on, as well. At the same time, to think that there is now a solid implementation plan, that hopefully will be finessed, in the meantime, so that when the NDC actually come, we will see more. I mean, this is when one lives in hope, and on that note.

Professor Tim Benton

Thank you very much, Bernice. You’re right, I couldn’t keep you to five minutes, but it was all a brilliant exposition on why the glass is both half full and half empty. So, thanks very much to our panellists. We now move into the Q&A session for the next half an hour, because we have a hard stop at 3 o’clock UK time. We have got two questions to start off with and I’ll take them in the order that they currently are. So, Dimitris, if you can unmute yourself and ask your question. I think Dan’s probably the best person to take that question. Please, everybody else, put questions in the chat – in the Q&A and we can get a good discussion going. If no-one else has questions, I can quite happily quiz my colleagues for hours. But please, I’d rather hear from you than from me. Dimitris, over to you [pause]. Silence; you’re on mute.

Dimitris

[Pause] Good afternoon. Thank you very much for a very interesting panel. My question was a bit more specific on the future, as far as decarbonisation and getting away from fossil fuels. We – at the moment, we’re talking about a multi-fuel future producing – creating a network or production and distribution for possibly ammonia, hydrogen, electrofuels, biomethanol, a whole list of them, which I don’t think is going to be practical to set up in the timeframe that we require. Wouldn’t it have been – wouldn’t it make sense for a global agreement on what one or two best routes are – should be pursued from now on? Thank you.

Dr Daniel Quiggin

Yeah, sorry, I’ll take that. I think what you’re asking has some validity. I think most governments, rightly or wrongly, have been influenced by the sort of, historic progression of renewables within the electricity system, where a, kind of, pursuing a diverse range of different renewable technologies has, sort of, played out reasonably well. They’ve been entered into a competitive marketplace. They’ve reduced their costs. You’ve had learning curves that meant their costs have been dragged down over time. And so, therefore, I think governments are broadly of the view that pursuing a sort of, similar agenda for the rest of the energy system is probably good and that the market will work out, through a competitive marketplace, which technology wins out.

But I think the difference is that solar wind, etc., have been developed over many, many, many, many decades, actually. You know, like, you think, when was the first satellite launch with a solar panel? You know, we’re talking 40/50 years ago. We don’t have that time anymore, so I think there is an argument for governments picking winners, but that’s a fairly tricky thing to do, because, you know, you then have industry kicking back. You know, if you’re on the wrong side of the government picking winners, you know, is that a state intervention that can be challenged in the courts? How do you also build a global coalition around picking particular winners?

But I think the general thrust of your question is right, we don’t really have time for these dynamics to playout in the marketplace, so I think there has to be a level of support for these new technologies that goes far beyond that given to solar and wind in the past, because we really need to accelerate to the point where those winners really emerge. And I’ll leave it there.

Professor Tim Benton

Thanks, Dan. Bernice, you wanted to say something?

Bernice Lee

I do. It’s my favourite topic, looking at how the hell did we get solar and wind out into the scale that we do today, which is such a great combination of public investment in our friend, research? You know, technology development in Australia solar is my favourite example, right? Technology in California and Australia, among others, you know, all the different kind of energy families. With venture capital from California, you know, really, frankly, takes government targets in Europe where there is no sunshine, Germany and elsewhere, to drive the investments in manufacturing in China, where there is a manufacturing prowess, which then ended up actually getting scaled production.

So, one, my recommendation would be that I think the time that they would take to negotiate what the next fuel source should be would take too long. But the second point is that is not to say that government support is not important, and it obviously is, and we always forget about that. So, the not – my second part is that, that being the case, investing in the, you know, investing in the multiple fuel future is, indeed, what is needed, but nonetheless, we also need a multiple public-private strategy in order to make sure that both the public investment and the private scalability are developing hand-in-hand. None of which will be easy, but nonetheless, I don’t see any other option than to hedge widely and broadly. And, also, ultimately, technology is wonderful because you never know what it end up with. I mean, technology for solar, partly as Dan said, comes from, you know, satellite technology, but also from cameras and all sorts of amazing things that happen. So, I’d like to think that if we invest enough in science on the public sector, then we will have enough solutions in different ways that we will be surprised by how much easier it would be. And that, you see, my glass half full person is still here.

Professor Tim Benton

Good. Before going to Nozomi, who’s the next person on the list, there’s another question that is related a little bit to the first, that – from Saleh Kamil Saleh, who asked me to ask on their behalf. “Whilst China is a global leader in EV research and technology and its transformation will impact the world, what about India and its disparity between being a high-tech hub on one hand and a country that has no apparent short-term plans to shift away from coal?” So, who would like to take that? Any comments on India and scaleup of its sector? Bernice?

Bernice Lee

Sure. I mean, in fact, I haven’t looked at the Indian numbers for a long time and we are waiting for, obviously, more coming from, you know, the government on this. And I understood that there was a Cabinet level meeting last week on what it would like to put on the table. Now, like many countries, the road to phase down coal comes in – that include China, as well, comes with much larger investment in renewables and certainly, India has pegged that route above others, that it is actually increasing investment in renewables. And at the same time, it is worth remembering that there were also developments in India around, sort of, modular EVs that were supposed to be, sort of, smaller and more suitable for the market.

And I mean, look, I mean, it is obviously the case that we need to move together if we’re going to solve this problem and therefore, making sure that India is part of it is part of it. But nonetheless, I mean, at the moment, without necessarily seeing more signal from different governments, whether or not it’s a question of more partnerships around getting next generation of solutions together, developing technology together and, also, moving more of the solution space into a developing country collaborative space, it is really difficult to not feel, even on this occasion, when I’m trying to be glass half full, that we need to spend a bit more time on this than we did before.

Having said all of this, I think the sign is that India is interested in more renewable energy, it is interested in more high-tech development, and this is, indeed, therefore, the space for us to harness that collaborative space that we have been discussing and looking at for a long time, in order to make sure that it isn’t singled out. Like no country at the moment would like to be blamed for falling behind and I’m pretty sure that India is one of them.

Professor Tim Benton

Okay, thank you very much, Bernice. Nozomi can’t unmute, so I’ll ask the question from Nozomi Oka. “Do we expect any new commitments or ambitions at a worldwide level that will come out during COP26, particularly for coal and EV, which are some of the topics that the UK has been focusing on under the kind of, the broad campaigns?” Anna first.

Anna Åberg

Yes, good question and yeah, just to follow-up from what Bernice said earlier, I didn’t mean to sound overly gloomy either. I mean, there is a lot of progress that has been made. A lot of countries have enhanced their pledges, for instance, and we are seeing that the Paris Agreement is working, and the economics of climate action are improving and there is a lot of public support now for this issue and a lot of public engagement. So, yes, it’s not all gloom, definitely not, and COP26 also needs to serve, as I mention in my remark, as a launchpad for increasing action and emission in the early 2020s. So, it’s not an endpoint. It’s a place where we need to stop and reflect and we need to get as much as we can out of COP26, but then, this is a journey that will continue, and which need to be accelerated.

But to your question, you know, as Bernice said in a podcast I interviewed her for a few weeks ago, “I cannot read tealeaves, but I think we can probably expect more governments to come forward with commitments in these areas at the COP26 Leaders’ Summit, for instance, at the start of the COP26 Summit.” And the issue of coal is, of course, very high on the agenda, also, for the G20 Leaders’ Summit, which is taking place right ahead of COP26. You know, the discussions are difficult and of course, Australia just committed to net zero emissions by 2050, but saying that they will continue producing coal and so on. So, where it will land, I’m not sure, but I – you know, I think it’s not unreasonable to think that more governments will make these kind of commitments and not just in the areas that the UK has singled out, but there are also now interesting discussions internally about phasing out oil and gas production. Denmark and Costa Rica are leading – they’re forming an alliance that they’re seeking to launch at COP26, focused on this particular issue. So, it’s an ambition COP, but it’s also an implementation COP, so, yeah, I’d watch this space.

Professor Tim Benton

Thank you, Anna. Dan.

Dr Daniel Quiggin

Yeah, I mean, I think, you know, if you go back six months/nine months, the sort of, fossil fuel phaseout element of COP26 is really quite high up on the UK’s political agenda and I think the UK was burnt. It, sort of, damaged its own reputation, shot itself in the foot, really, over the Cumbrian coalmine. And I think a lot of countries caught onto that and therefore, the kind of, political will or coalition consensus has slightly fallen apart. And I think, you know, the leaks around Australia, Japan and Saudi Arabia, last week, kind of, indicate the level to which net zero really is becoming more and more so a bit of a greenwashing exercise.

So, not only are we unlikely to see fossil fuel phaseout commitments at COP26, I think this forms part of a larger agenda, which Anna’s really, sort of, slightly touched on, which is that what were once deemed residual emissions, which net zero was going to balance out by using technology, such as bioenergy with carbon captures and storage, or direct air capture, and kind of, net out the difference, basically, countries now are just thinking about all of their fossil fuels, nearly, I mean, not quite, basically, being netted out by negative emission technologies, which actually is technically impossible and thermodynamically insane.

So, I think, yeah, I really do think I am actually probably half – glass half empty here, but I think as we move forward, I think the thin – the world changes, right? And I think what we’re likely to see, over the next decade, next – partic – maybe in the next five years, is extreme weather events and losses of food productivity, etc., etc., will really shift the dial and shift the political will to start to act faster. And I think one of the big lessons of COVID is that when we want to act quickly, we can act quickly, but it tends not to be on the supply side. It tends to be on the demand side. So, we can control demand, and I think one of the last political levers that we’ll have left to use, in five years’ time, is governments getting more serious on limiting/constraining demand, because that can be acted upon overnight and allow the supply side technologies to catch up.

But on the direct question around additional commitments, yes, maybe something from EVs, but probably not on fossil fuel phaseout.

Professor Tim Benton

Thank you, Dan. Kieran O’Meara asked me to ask the question for them. I think this is a really interesting question and it is can – “Could the magnitude of decarbonisation, whether great or small, lead to a potential rebalancing of the global political order?” For instance, if any state were to seek adapting their soft power basis through exemplary emissions reductions, green financial investment, to which we can add carbon capture and storage, using land as a resource. So, you know, there are a whole host of things, as well as the geopolitical power that might wane with the large oil producing countries at the moment. So, speculations on how the transition might impact global geopolitics. Bernice, can I ask you first?

Bernice Lee

Oh, I think that a lot of people – in fact, I think I started asking that question at Chatham House about a decade ago, looking at some of the geopolitical implication of renewable transition, but also, digitalisation as well, in the energy sector. And I did get someone shouting at me at the time, when I used to be the Director for the Energy, Environment Department at Chatham House. I remember someone shouting at me, saying that “Bernice, let us do the decarbonisation first before you start giving them new risks to worry about,” which I thought was quite funny.

So, the point is that we are, at the moment, really building a car while we’re driving. So, while there are some assets and some knowledge that we have accumulated in the past decade of the more tech – more, well, you know, revved up decarbonisation efforts, we are all in the process of learning new things about decarbonisation and, as well as adaptation. Now, what does that mean? What it means is that, ultimately, I don’t think there are new genuinely existing power that are good at everything that we need to do in a zero-carbon world. I think Dan and Anna both mentioned a few things already. And what does it mean? It means that it’s putting a premium on the politics of learning and co-creation. And now, if you look at COVID as a harbinger for things to come, in terms of how we share technology there and how we didn’t manage to share technology there, I would say that we’re in a pretty rough ride when it comes down to the way that knowledge sharing and technology sharing could become – you know, well, definitely could become a harbinger of future power. But certainly, whether or not we will manage it is another question, in a way that will enable peaceful, you know, peaceful decarbonisation at the same time, all of us, unless we really invest time and energy into that.

So, I think that is a really interesting question, in terms of how this will evolve, but also it’s important to remind ourselves that there is no – so, how shall I put this? We have to be humble. There is nobody who actually really knows it all at this point. If they tell you they do, it’s just because they might have a PhD in geekery, but actually, you know, engineering problem isn’t going to be all of it. Because my second point I was going to raise is that what we’re going to see here is that – oh, and that’s two other things is that – really, is the fact that this decarbonisation drive at the moment is supported by people. This means that we – and because we supported by, you know, population, almost – most of the polls in most part of the world suggested that it is important to do more and therefore, it is important that governments are investing in it. But because we somehow don’t know it all and most definitely don’t, this means that mistakes will be made, and this means that we need to cause correct as we decarbonise. Your ability to bring your people with you, as you course correct over time, becomes an extremely important factor.

I’ve been talking quite a lot about this the last couple of months, especially around cities, where it’s becoming quite obvious that a combination of lessons from COVID and from decarbonisation is teaching us how important it is to bring people with us. It’s not just carbon science that is in doubt all the time. Every single piece of scientific evidence could be questioned by anyone who can listen to a podcast and, therefore, it is very important that we remind ourselves that this reconfiguration of power isn’t just happening geopolitically between countries, but also within countries, at the same time. And this, together, will definitely mean that some of these boundaries will be redrawn, and it is only very early stage for us to really understand how that would be redrawn at this point. Thanks.

Professor Tim Benton

Thank you, Bernice. Dan, you wanted to come in on this question.

Dr Daniel Quiggin

Yeah, I’ll just be super quick. Obviously, energy has been a cornerstone to geopolitics for decades. You know, the IEA was a response to – by consumer countries, US, Europe, to the power of OPEC and, you know, energy will continue to be an integral part of how geopolitics plays out. And as countries start to phase themselves off fossil fuels, those producer consumer dynamics will change, and we’re already seeing that, right? So, like, you know, what’s Russia doing now? And there’s lots of speculation over whether what it’s doing is to, sort of, regain or reassert its geopolitical power in constraining supply of gas to Europe. So, I think it will be a fundamental underpinning and if we see a wholesale shift to EVs, then the power of the producer countries declines, and so on and so on.

I do, though, think one often overlooked thing – we often talk about, you know, those countries that produce loads of solar power or wind power will become the kind of, the main, sort of, geopolitical players in the energy domain, which I think is true, but I think the bigger shift is on the demand side. So, as we start to consume less fossil fuels, or indeed, if the West sees hyperinflation, meaning that consumers just simply financially cannot consume, as they previously once did, then those producer-consumer dynamics really start to shift in a very, very big way. So, I think the broad answer to the question is, yes, those dynamics are going to change, for a plethora of different reasons.

Professor Tim Benton

Thank you, Dan. Anna, do you want to add anything to that question?

Anna Åberg

And I think colleagues have carried it well.

Professor Tim Benton

Okay. The next question, and please, please, do add more questions to your list, the next question is from Richard Bridge. Richard, do you want to open your mic to answer this – to ask this question?

Richard Bridge

Yes, thank you very much. It’s really – can you hear me okay?

Professor Tim Benton

Yes, yeah, great.

Richard Bridge

Good. Yeah, thank you, this is a very interesting session. It’s really a question about the role of country leaders and leadership, because some leaders are not going to be there and some leaders, like Joe Biden and I guess many others, will be there. And I just wondered if, from your experience of previous COPs, it is – whether it is important that leaders be there and, also, whether there’s also a kind of, correct balance, as it were, so that leaders can push against each other and, you know, and compete in order to improve their commitments. Thank you.

Professor Tim Benton

Thank you very much, Richard. Bernice, let me turn to you first, as the COP veteran on the panel.

Bernice Lee

Thank you. I think that is a bit rude to mention a woman’s age, but never mind. I think that – look, obviously, it will be great if leaders are there, but we’ve also seen when leaders showed up that it didn’t always end up in the big group hug at the end, which I’m thinking about, obviously, Copenhagen, which was one of the reason why I think it is important not to overstate the importance of any things of this sort. Whether or not Xi Jinping is coming to COP, or for that matter, G20, or not, isn’t necessarily a bad thing. Typically, when it comes to China, it makes big climate announcements at domestic events, so at the UN General Assembly, and in some sense, as far as Xi Jinping is concerned, the idea that he would have gone large in Glasgow is perhaps a little bit fanciful.

Having said that, obviously, we would like to see more from China at this point, and we’ve seen some of it now. I mean, obviously, the NDC is to come. So, at the same time, you know, obviously, if these dynamics of personal interaction – and I think if all of us have learned one thing together this year is how much in person dynamics matter compared to the Zoom dynamics. And obviously, at this point, because the COP26 preparation – and we have had an extra year, by the way, I know the pandemic is not great, it’s awful, in fact, but nonetheless, has given countries an extra year. But also, that was – but that also meant that there isn’t this, kind of, in person push that perhaps – whether among leaders or among delegates, that we would have liked to have seen more of over time.

So, in some sense, well, this is me trying to be balanced, on one side. Obviously, it would’ve been great if they were there, but I wouldn’t want to overstate the importance at this point, because if they really wanted to give us, sort of, more ambitions, commitments and more ambitious announcements, they can now do it from anywhere in the world and that’s a good thing.

Professor Tim Benton

Thank you, Bernice. Dan.

Dr Daniel Quiggin

Yeah, I completely agree with everything that Bernice just said. I do think – additionally, I think it’s important to ask oneself the question, and I hate dichotomies, but sometimes they’re useful, as to whether we live in a world of competition or co-operation. And I think Paris saw Xi Jinping and Obama come together in – under the guise of co-operation, in order to, sort of, get the Paris Agreement pushed through. I think we’re – not wanting to dichotomise, I think we’re more in a world of competition than we were then. You know, it’s a balance between the two, but I think when you think about EVs or deployment of solar and so on, I do think there is a race between countries as to how quickly they can get that sort of global leadership and, kind of, first mover advantage in many of these different sectors.

So, I think it’s maybe less important that Xi Jinping and other leaders are there, and I think it’s also probably important to remember that the stance of the US Government, even under Biden, has significantly shifted in relation to China. And so, if Xi Jinping were to be there, would we see the same dynamics of co-operation between the US and China as we did at Paris? I’m not sure.

Professor Tim Benton

Thank you. Anna, do you have anything to add?

Anna Åberg

Yeah, sure, and I agree with colleagues. As Bernice said, I – you know, great if we’re – as many world leaders as possible show up to show the importance of the summit and, kind of, give climate change the priority that it deserves. But it is a bit of a – well, one, we have a pandemic on and two, it is a bit of a different COP. There is a strong focus on these pledges and pledges can be made, as colleagues mentioned, from anywhere, essentially. So, I think the key thing will be to, you know, keep up the pressure on these governments who are not quite there yet, in terms of ambition and, kind of, not let them off the hook just because they’re not at the COP.

And, of course, the motivations why different world leaders have chosen not to come will vary, but I think, in the case of China, for instance, our colleague, Dan [Gill – 53:16] put out a good article just the other day and his main argument was that “This should not be interpreted, really, as China does not care about COP26, it does not care about climate change.” Because Xi Jinping has not travelled anywhere since the start of the pandemic. He didn’t even come to Kunming in China. He just sent a video message. So, I think it’s important not to, kind of, overinterpret, either, the fact that leaders may not be coming to COP26.

Professor Tim Benton

Thank you. Kunming being the equivalent COP for the Biodiversity Convention.

One, perhaps, last question, and this is a question from me, to get back to the glass half full/glass half empty issue, I’m going to ask Dan and then, onto Bernice and Anna for responses to this. So, part of the issue about 1.5 is to try and avoid the situation where the unknowns of climate change means that we cross thresholds that we dimly see at the moment and lead climate to change its behaviour in a way that is very significant. So, to a certain extent, the end of year – end of century target is perhaps less important than the trajectory to get there, which is why there is the argument for the urgency of action over the next decade, in case we cross a threshold which makes things a whole lot worse than we can imagine. So, Dan, do you want to just say something about the science of that? And then we’ll turn to Bernice next to see whether or not this affects the glass half full/glass half empty, in terms of the urgency of being able to try and avoid the potentials of crossing some threshold that we can’t see yet.

Dr Daniel Quiggin

Yeah. I think it’s just really worth emphasising a positive, which is that for many, many, many hundreds – thousands of years we’ve been living in a relatively stable climate, relative to the kind of, the whole epoch of life on – or life and non-life on Earth. And that stability has been afforded in some – by some regards by the organisms that have been able to turn carbon dioxide – reduce carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. And the science, basically, says that as we pass, sort of, roughly 2°, a bunch of feedback mechanisms are likely to kick in, which we don’t fully understand, but that are likely to lead to what some term as “runaway climate change,” so, we don’t really know what happens after 2°.

So, saying 2.7° is somewhat misleading, because after 2°, it could well be 5°, and we are already at around about 1.2/1.3 and we could well be passing 2° within the next 20 years, if we continue emitting in the way that we are. So, the urgency is real, because after that 20-year period, we can’t control it anymore and we don’t really know where it’s going to go. It could be 3/4/5/6° and the impacts under that sort of hothouse world are extreme. I mean, they go – they don’t just go beyond what countries can adapt to. They go beyond what life can broadly exist in.

So, I – personally, I do think the glass is half empty. But I think as more and more people, particularly leaders, decisionmakers, see the severity of the impacts, extreme weather events, over the next five to ten years, at which point we’re round about 1.5°, I do think at that point, there will be an inflection point, a point at which the ambition to change in a real way, rather than hiding behind the greenwash of, for instance, net zero, would shift dramatically. And then, I view – then I probably will change my opinion and then I think we probably will be in a glass half full world, where the desire and ability to shift changes completely.

Professor Tim Benton

Thank you, Dan. So, a political tipping point might be prompted by increasing climate impacts. Bernice, do you have anything to say about that, kind of – the potential for things to run away from us in the decade whilst we’re trying to ramp up ambition?

Bernice Lee

I’m not a Scientist, so I’m not going to answer it from a scientific perspective. Listening to other Scientist, it was – it would exactly be the case that we would be seeing some of the impacts and the runaway effects already. And we already saw what Dan described just now happening this last biblic – what I’m calling a biblical summer that we’ve had, and therefore, indeed, I think human society evolved with these observations. And, again, I think sometimes, you know, it is a choice one can make and today I’m making the choice that we’re going to be glass half full today, on the basis that I was reading it in part of the preparation, too many glass half empty and relatively self-righteous indignation, I would say, over the efforts so far on COP26. So, I’m, kind of, determined not to do that today, as a result.

And I think that anything counts, everything counts, so, what we need, as I tried to describe earlier, is really, a way back so that we live to fight another day, through the process – through new processes and through new initiatives. And this is why Glasgow and COP26 is important for us to provide a pathway, so that we will have a way to regalvanise and keep doing. Now, is that the sign of madness? Probably, but we’ve done madder things. We get up every day, that’s repe – if repetition is a sign of madness, we certainly already live a rather mad life. So, thank you for that.

Professor Tim Benton

Thank you, Bernice. Anna, final comment from you?

Anna Åberg

Yeah. No, I just think the worst thing that can happen is that we give up and give into despair, because well, a standpoint differently, it can always get worse. So, yeah, I just think we need to keep on working to try and overcome this challenge.

Professor Tim Benton

Right, well, thank you very much, everybody. A fantastic panel, a stimulating discussion. I’ve certainly learnt stuff. I hope every other person has learnt stuff, as well. The glass is half full and the glass is half empty. There are things to hope for, there are things to pray for. There are things to be happy about with the progress that have made so far, even if there is still a distance to travel. So, thanks very much to our panellists, to Dan, to Anna, to Bernice. Thanks very much to the behind the scenes team for helping to facilitate that and thanks to the questioners and the audience. And with that, I wish you goodbye and we’ll see you on the other side of COP and hopefully, have something to celebrate.

Au revoir everybody, bye.